- Add module options for specifying what to do if the user has no key

or if the key was unreadable or invalid.

- Fix inverted success / failure logic.

The module is now in a (barely) usable state.


git-svn-id: svn+ssh://svn.openpam.org/svn/openpam/trunk@676 185d5e19-27fe-0310-9dcf-9bff6b9f3609
This commit is contained in:
Dag-Erling Smørgrav 2013-03-18 19:20:54 +00:00
parent 2be62b5732
commit 496bd4632b
1 changed files with 64 additions and 15 deletions

View File

@ -47,22 +47,51 @@
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#include <security/oath.h>
#define PAM_OATH_PROMPT "Verification code: "
enum pam_oath_nokey { nokey_error = -1, nokey_fail, nokey_fake, nokey_ignore };
static enum pam_oath_nokey
get_nokey_option(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *option)
{
const char *value;
if ((value = openpam_get_option(pamh, option)) == NULL)
return (nokey_fail);
else if (strcmp(value, "fail") == 0)
return (nokey_fail);
else if (strcmp(value, "fake") == 0)
return (nokey_fake);
else if (strcmp(value, "ignore") == 0)
return (nokey_ignore);
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "the value of the %s option "
"must be either 'fail', 'fake' or 'ignore'", option);
return (nokey_error);
}
PAM_EXTERN int
pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
int argc, const char *argv[])
{
enum pam_oath_nokey nokey, badkey;
struct passwd *pwd;
const char *user;
char *keyfile;
struct oath_key *key;
unsigned long code;
unsigned long response;
char *password, *end;
int pam_err, ret;
/* unused */
(void)flags;
(void)argc;
(void)argv;
/* check how to behave if the user does not have a valid key */
if ((nokey = get_nokey_option(pamh, "nokey")) == nokey_error ||
(badkey = get_nokey_option(pamh, "badkey")) == nokey_error)
return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
/* identify user */
if ((pam_err = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL)) != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (pam_err);
@ -70,38 +99,56 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
return (PAM_USER_UNKNOWN);
/* load key */
/* XXX implement additional schemes */
keyfile = calloc(1, strlen(pwd->pw_dir) + sizeof "/.otpauth");
if (keyfile == NULL)
return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
sprintf(keyfile, "%s/.otpauth", pwd->pw_dir);
key = oath_key_from_file(keyfile);
free(keyfile);
if ((key = oath_key_from_file(keyfile)) == NULL) {
/* no key, fake it? */
if (openpam_get_option(pamh, "fakeauth") == NULL)
/*
* The user doesn't have a key, should we fake it?
*
* XXX implement badkey - currently, oath_key_from_file() doesn't
* provide enough information for us to tell the difference
* between a bad key and no key at all.
*/
if (key == NULL) {
switch (nokey) {
case nokey_fail:
return (PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
key = oath_dummy_key(om_hotp, oh_sha1, 6);
case nokey_fake:
key = oath_dummy_key(om_hotp, oh_sha1, 6);
break;
case nokey_ignore:
return (PAM_IGNORE);
default:
/* can't happen */
return (PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
}
}
/* get code */
/* get user's response */
pam_err = pam_get_authtok(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK,
(const char **)&password, NULL);
if (pam_err == PAM_CONV_ERR)
(const char **)&password, PAM_OATH_PROMPT);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
oath_key_free(key);
return (pam_err);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (PAM_AUTH_ERR);
}
/* convert to number */
code = strtoul(password, &end, 10);
response = strtoul(password, &end, 10);
if (end == password || *end != '\0')
code = ULONG_MAX;
response = ULONG_MAX;
/* verify response */
if (key->mode == om_hotp)
ret = oath_hotp_match(key, code, 1);
ret = oath_hotp_match(key, response, 1);
else
ret = oath_totp_match(key, code, 1);
ret = oath_totp_match(key, response, 1);
oath_key_free(key);
if (ret != 0)
if (ret != 1)
return (PAM_AUTH_ERR);
/* XXX write back */
@ -113,6 +160,7 @@ pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
int argc, const char *argv[])
{
/* unused */
(void)pamh;
(void)flags;
(void)argc;
@ -125,6 +173,7 @@ pam_sm_acct_mgmt(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
int argc, const char *argv[])
{
/* unused */
(void)pamh;
(void)flags;
(void)argc;