Move OATH development to a branch. OATH will soon disappear entirely

from this repository as Cryb takes over.


git-svn-id: svn+ssh://svn.openpam.org/svn/openpam/trunk@907 185d5e19-27fe-0310-9dcf-9bff6b9f3609
This commit is contained in:
Dag-Erling Smørgrav 2017-01-18 09:39:01 +00:00
parent 3699596d18
commit c75883564d
49 changed files with 9 additions and 18776 deletions

View file

@ -1,8 +1,3 @@
OpenPAM ?????????? 2014-??-??
- FEATURE: Add a pam_oath module that implements RFC 4226 (HOTP) and
RFC 6238 (TOTP).
============================================================================
OpenPAM Ourouparia 2014-09-12
- ENHANCE: When executing a chain, require at least one service

View file

@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
Copyright (c) 2002-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
Copyright (c) 2004-2017 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
Copyright (c) 2012-2016 The University of Oslo
All rights reserved.
This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and

View file

@ -17,11 +17,6 @@ The distribution consists of the following components:
- A test application (pamtest) which can be used to test policies and
modules.
- A library which implements the OATH one-time password algorithms,
with complete API documentation.
- A PAM module which implements OATH-based authentication.
- Unit tests for limited portions of the libraries.
Please direct bug reports and inquiries to <des@des.no>.

15
TODO
View file

@ -1,18 +1,5 @@
Before the next release:
- Add oath_alloc_secure() which allocates memory using mmap() +
mlock() and oath_free_secure() which wipes and frees it.
- Move key management (locate keyfile, load various key formats,
write back after use) into liboath.
- Implement support for PSKC (RFC 6030) keyfiles.
- Implement OATH OCRA (RFC 6287) authentication.
- Determine and document level of compliance with the OATH HOTP /
TOTP / OCRA validation server profiles.
- Rewrite openpam_ttyconv(3).
- mostly done, needs review.
@ -20,8 +7,6 @@ Before the next release:
documentation are slightly incorrect, OpenPAM's pam_unix(8) is
incorrect, all FreeBSD modules are broken)
- Finish pam_oath(8) and oathkey(1).
- Add loop detection to openpam_load_chain().
- Look into the possibility of implementing a version of (or a

View file

@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ if [ -z "$CC" -a -z "$CPP" -a -z "$CXX" ] ; then
fi
./configure \
--with-oath \
--with-doc \
--with-pam-unix \
--with-pamtest \

View file

@ -2,10 +2,6 @@
SUBDIRS = openpam_dump_policy
if WITH_OATH
SUBDIRS += oathkey
endif
if WITH_PAMTEST
SUBDIRS += pamtest
endif

View file

@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
# $Id$
AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/libpam
bin_PROGRAMS = oathkey
oathkey_SOURCES = oathkey.c
oathkey_LDADD =
if WITH_SYSTEM_LIBOATH
oathkey_LDADD += $(SYSTEM_LIBOATH)
else
oathkey_LDADD += $(top_builddir)/lib/liboath/liboath.la
endif
if WITH_SYSTEM_LIBPAM
oathkey_LDADD += $(SYSTEM_LIBPAM)
else
oathkey_LDADD += $(top_builddir)/lib/libpam/libpam.la
endif
dist_man1_MANS = oathkey.1
install-exec-hook:
chmod u+s $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/oathkey

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@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
.\"-
.\" Copyright (c) 2013-2014 The University of Oslo
.\" Copyright (c) 2016 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
.\" All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\" 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
.\" products derived from this software without specific prior written
.\" permission.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\" $Id$
.\"
.Dd January 9, 2016
.Dt OATHKEY 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm oathkey
.Nd OATH key management tool
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm
.Op Fl hnrvw
.Op Fl u Ar user
.Op Fl k Ar keyfile
.Ar command
.Op Ar args
.Sh DESCRIPTION
The
.Nm
utility creates and manages OATH keys, and can be used to validate an
OATH response.
.Pp
The following options are available:
.Bl -tag -width Fl
.It Fl h
Print a usage message and exit.
.It Fl k Ar keyfile
Specify the location of the keyfile on which to operate.
The default is
.Pa /var/oath/ Ns Ar user Ns Pa .otpauth .
.It Fl n
When printing codes with the
.Cm calc
command, print the counter or timestamp along with each code.
.It Fl r
Disable writeback mode.
.It Fl u Ar user
Specify the user on which to operate.
The default is the current user.
Only root may operate on other users.
.It Fl v
Enable verbose mode.
.It Fl w
Enable writeback mode (see below).
This is the default.
.El
.Pp
The commands are:
.Bl -tag -width 6n
.It Cm calc Op Ar count
Compute and display the current code for the given key.
If a count is specified, compute and display
.Ar count
codes in total, starting with the current code, up to a maximum of
1,000 codes.
If writeback mode is enabled, the user's keyfile is updated to prevent
reuse.
.It Cm genkey Ar hotp | totp
Generate a new key for the specified OATH mode.
If writeback mode is enabled, the user's key is set; otherwise, it is
printed to standard output.
.It Cm getkey
Print the user's key.
.It Cm geturi
Print the user's key in otpauth URI form.
.It Cm resync Ar code1 Ar code2 Op Ar code3
Resynchronize an event-mode token that has moved too far ahead of the
validation server.
The codes provided must be consecutive codes within the
resynchronization window.
The resynchronization window is 100 if two codes are provided and 1000
if three codes are provided.
.It Cm setkey Ar uri
Set the user's key to the given otpauth URI.
.It Cm uri
Deprecated synonym for
.Cm geturi .
.It Cm verify Ar code
Verify that the given code is the correct current response for the
user's key.
If writeback mode is enabled and the response matched, the user's
keyfile is updated to prevent reuse.
.El
.Sh EXIT STATUS
The
.Cm verify
command exits 0 if the code is valid, 1 if it is invalid and >1 if an
error occurred.
.Pp
The
.Cm resync
command exits 0 if resynchronization was successful, 1 if it failed or
the specified key does not support resynchronization, and >1 if an
error occurred.
.Pp
All other commands exit 0 if successful and >1 if an error occurred.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr oath_hotp 3 ,
.Xr oath_key 3 ,
.Xr oath_totp 3 ,
.Xr pam_oath 8
.Sh AUTHORS
The
.Nm
utility and this manual page were written by
.An Dag-Erling Sm\(/orgrav Aq des@des.no
for the University of Oslo.
.Sh BUGS
For TOTP keys, the
.Cm calc Ar count
command will only work correctly for a
.Ar count
of 1.

View file

@ -1,543 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2013-2016 The University of Oslo
* Copyright (c) 2016 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "openpam_asprintf.h"
#include <security/oath.h>
/* XXX hardcoded windows */
#define HOTP_WINDOW 9
#define TOTP_WINDOW 2
enum { RET_SUCCESS, RET_FAILURE, RET_ERROR, RET_USAGE, RET_UNAUTH };
static char *user;
static char *keyfile;
static int verbose;
static int readonly;
static int numbered;
static int isroot; /* running as root */
static int issameuser; /* real user same as target user */
/*
* Print key in hexadecimal form
*/
static int
oathkey_print_hex(struct oath_key *key)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < key->keylen; ++i)
printf("%02x", key->key[i]);
printf("\n");
return (RET_SUCCESS);
}
/*
* Print key in otpauth URI form
*/
static int
oathkey_print_uri(struct oath_key *key)
{
char *keyuri;
if ((keyuri = oath_key_to_uri(key)) == NULL) {
warnx("failed to convert key to otpauth URI");
return (RET_ERROR);
}
printf("%s\n", keyuri);
free(keyuri);
return (RET_SUCCESS);
}
/*
* Load key from file
*/
static int
oathkey_load(struct oath_key **key)
{
if (verbose)
warnx("loading key from %s", keyfile);
if ((*key = oath_key_from_file(keyfile)) == NULL) {
warn("%s", keyfile);
if (errno == EACCES || errno == EPERM)
return (RET_UNAUTH);
return (RET_ERROR);
}
return (RET_SUCCESS);
}
/*
* Save key to file
* XXX liboath should take care of this for us
*/
static int
oathkey_save(struct oath_key *key)
{
char *keyuri;
int fd, len, ret;
if (verbose)
warnx("saving key to %s", keyfile);
keyuri = NULL;
len = 0;
fd = ret = -1;
if ((keyuri = oath_key_to_uri(key)) == NULL) {
warnx("failed to convert key to otpauth URI");
goto done;
}
len = strlen(keyuri);
if ((fd = open(keyfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0600)) < 0 ||
write(fd, keyuri, len) != len || write(fd, "\n", 1) != 1) {
warn("%s", keyfile);
goto done;
}
ret = 0;
done:
if (fd >= 0)
close(fd);
if (keyuri != NULL)
free(keyuri);
return (ret);
}
/*
* Generate a new key
*/
static int
oathkey_genkey(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct oath_key *key;
enum oath_mode mode;
int ret;
if (argc != 1)
return (RET_USAGE);
if ((mode = oath_mode(argv[0])) == om_undef)
return (RET_USAGE);
if (!isroot && !issameuser)
return (RET_UNAUTH);
if ((key = oath_key_create(user, mode, oh_undef, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
return (RET_ERROR);
ret = readonly ? oathkey_print_uri(key) : oathkey_save(key);
oath_key_free(key);
return (ret);
}
/*
* Set a user's key
*/
static int
oathkey_setkey(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct oath_key *key;
int ret;
/* XXX add parameters later */
if (argc != 1)
return (RET_USAGE);
(void)argv;
if (!isroot && !issameuser)
return (RET_UNAUTH);
if ((key = oath_key_from_uri(argv[0])) == NULL)
return (RET_ERROR);
ret = oathkey_save(key);
oath_key_free(key);
return (ret);
}
/*
* Print raw key in hexadecimal
*/
static int
oathkey_getkey(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct oath_key *key;
int ret;
if (argc != 0)
return (RET_USAGE);
(void)argv;
if (!isroot && !issameuser)
return (RET_UNAUTH);
if ((ret = oathkey_load(&key)) != RET_SUCCESS)
return (ret);
ret = oathkey_print_hex(key);
oath_key_free(key);
return (ret);
}
/*
* Print the otpauth URI for a key
*/
static int
oathkey_geturi(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct oath_key *key;
int ret;
if (argc != 0)
return (RET_USAGE);
(void)argv;
if (!isroot && !issameuser)
return (RET_UNAUTH);
if ((ret = oathkey_load(&key)) != RET_SUCCESS)
return (ret);
ret = oathkey_print_uri(key);
oath_key_free(key);
return (ret);
}
/*
* Check whether a given response is correct for the given keyfile.
*/
static int
oathkey_verify(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct oath_key *key;
unsigned long counter;
unsigned int response;
char *end;
int match, ret;
if (argc < 1)
return (RET_USAGE);
if ((ret = oathkey_load(&key)) != RET_SUCCESS)
return (ret);
response = strtoul(*argv, &end, 10);
if (end == *argv || *end != '\0')
response = UINT_MAX; /* never valid */
switch (key->mode) {
case om_hotp:
counter = key->counter;
match = oath_hotp_match(key, response, HOTP_WINDOW);
if (verbose && match > 0 && key->counter > counter + 1)
warnx("skipped %lu codes", key->counter - counter - 1);
break;
case om_totp:
match = oath_totp_match(key, response, TOTP_WINDOW);
break;
default:
match = -1;
}
/* oath_*_match() return -1 on error, 0 on failure, 1 on success */
if (match < 0) {
warnx("OATH error");
match = 0;
}
if (verbose)
warnx("response: %u %s", response,
match ? "matched" : "did not match");
ret = match ? readonly ? RET_SUCCESS : oathkey_save(key) : RET_FAILURE;
oath_key_free(key);
return (ret);
}
/*
* Compute the current code
*/
static int
oathkey_calc(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct oath_key *key;
unsigned int current;
unsigned long i, n;
uintmax_t count;
char *end;
int ret;
if (argc > 1)
return (RET_USAGE);
if (argc > 0) {
n = strtoul(argv[0], &end, 10);
if (end == argv[0] || *end != '\0' || n < 1 || n > 1000)
return (RET_USAGE);
} else {
n = 1;
}
if ((ret = oathkey_load(&key)) != RET_SUCCESS)
return (ret);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (key->mode) {
case om_hotp:
current = oath_hotp_current(key);
count = key->counter;
break;
case om_totp:
current = oath_totp_current(key);
count = key->lastused * key->timestep;
break;
default:
current = UINT_MAX;
count = 0;
}
if (current == UINT_MAX) {
warnx("OATH error");
ret = RET_ERROR;
break;
}
if (numbered)
printf("%6ju ", count);
printf("%.*d\n", (int)key->digits, current);
}
if (ret == RET_SUCCESS && !readonly)
ret = oathkey_save(key);
oath_key_free(key);
return (ret);
}
/*
* Resynchronize
*/
static int
oathkey_resync(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct oath_key *key;
unsigned long counter;
unsigned int response[3];
char *end;
int i, match, n, ret, w;
if (argc < 2 || argc > 3)
return (RET_USAGE);
n = argc;
for (i = 0, w = 1; i < n; ++i) {
response[i] = strtoul(argv[i], &end, 10);
if (end == argv[i] || *end != '\0')
response[i] = UINT_MAX; /* never valid */
w = w * (HOTP_WINDOW + 1);
}
w -= n;
if ((ret = oathkey_load(&key)) != RET_SUCCESS)
return (ret);
switch (key->mode) {
case om_hotp:
/* this should be a library function */
counter = key->counter;
match = 0;
while (key->counter < counter + w && match == 0) {
match = oath_hotp_match(key, response[0],
counter + w - key->counter - 1);
if (match <= 0)
break;
for (i = 1; i < n && match > 0; ++i)
match = oath_hotp_match(key, response[i], 0);
}
if (verbose && match > 0)
warnx("skipped %lu codes", key->counter - counter);
break;
default:
match = -1;
}
if (match < 0) {
warnx("OATH error");
match = 0;
}
if (verbose)
warnx("resynchronization %s", match ? "succeeded" : "failed");
ret = match ? readonly ? RET_SUCCESS : oathkey_save(key) : RET_FAILURE;
oath_key_free(key);
return (ret);
}
/*
* Print usage string and exit.
*/
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: oathkey [-hnrvw] [-u user] [-k keyfile] command\n"
"\n"
"Commands:\n"
" calc [count]\n"
" Print the next code(s)\n"
" genkey hotp | totp\n"
" Generate a new key\n"
" getkey Print the key in hexadecimal form\n"
" geturi Print the key in otpauth URI form\n"
" resync code1 code2 [code3]\n"
" Resynchronize an HOTP token\n"
" setkey Generate a new key\n"
" verify code\n"
" Verify an HOTP or TOTP code\n");
exit(1);
}
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct passwd *pw;
int opt, ret;
char *cmd;
/*
* Parse command-line options
*/
while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "hk:nru:vw")) != -1)
switch (opt) {
case 'k':
keyfile = optarg;
break;
case 'n':
numbered = 1;
break;
case 'r':
readonly = 1;
break;
case 'u':
user = optarg;
break;
case 'v':
++verbose;
break;
case 'w':
readonly = 0;
break;
case 'h':
default:
usage();
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (argc-- < 1)
usage();
cmd = *argv++;
/*
* Check whether we are (really!) root.
*/
if (getuid() == 0)
isroot = 1;
/*
* If a user was specified on the command line, check whether it
* matches our real UID.
*/
if (user != NULL) {
if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
errx(1, "no such user");
if (getuid() == pw->pw_uid)
issameuser = 1;
}
/*
* If no user was specified on the command line, look up the user
* that corresponds to our real UID.
*/
if (user == NULL) {
if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL)
errx(1, "who are you?");
if (asprintf(&user, "%s", pw->pw_name) < 0)
err(1, "asprintf()");
issameuser = 1;
}
/*
* If no keyfile was specified on the command line, derive it from
* the user name.
*/
if (keyfile == NULL)
/* XXX replace with a function that searches multiple locations? */
if (asprintf(&keyfile, "/var/oath/%s.otpauth", user) < 0)
err(1, "asprintf()");
/*
* Execute the requested command
*/
if (strcmp(cmd, "help") == 0)
ret = RET_USAGE;
else if (strcmp(cmd, "calc") == 0)
ret = oathkey_calc(argc, argv);
else if (strcmp(cmd, "genkey") == 0)
ret = oathkey_genkey(argc, argv);
else if (strcmp(cmd, "getkey") == 0)
ret = oathkey_getkey(argc, argv);
else if (strcmp(cmd, "geturi") == 0 || strcmp(cmd, "uri") == 0)
ret = oathkey_geturi(argc, argv);
else if (strcmp(cmd, "resync") == 0)
ret = oathkey_resync(argc, argv);
else if (strcmp(cmd, "setkey") == 0)
ret = oathkey_setkey(argc, argv);
else if (strcmp(cmd, "verify") == 0)
ret = oathkey_verify(argc, argv);
else
ret = RET_USAGE;
/*
* Check result and act accordingly
*/
switch (ret) {
case RET_UNAUTH:
errno = EPERM;
err(1, "%s", cmd);
break;
case RET_USAGE:
usage();
break;
case RET_SUCCESS:
exit(0);
break;
case RET_FAILURE:
exit(1);
break;
case RET_ERROR:
exit(2);
break;
default:
exit(3);
break;
}
/* not reached */
exit(255);
}

View file

@ -67,12 +67,6 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam-unix],
[with_pam_unix=no])
AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_PAM_UNIX], [test x"$with_pam_unix" = x"yes"])
AC_ARG_WITH([oath],
AC_HELP_STRING([--without-oath], [do not build OATH library, module and utility]),
[],
[with_oath=yes])
AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_OATH], [test x"$with_oath" = x"yes"])
AC_ARG_WITH(pamtest,
AC_HELP_STRING([--with-pamtest], [build test application]),
[],
@ -91,12 +85,6 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(system-libpam,
[with_system_libpam=no])
AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_SYSTEM_LIBPAM], [test x"$with_system_libpam" = x"yes"])
AC_ARG_WITH(system-liboath,
AC_HELP_STRING([--with-system-liboath], [use system liboath]),
[],
[with_system_liboath=no])
AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_SYSTEM_LIBOATH], [test x"$with_system_liboath" = x"yes"])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([crypt.h])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([asprintf vasprintf])
@ -133,13 +121,6 @@ SYSTEM_LIBPAM="${LIBS}"
LIBS="${saved_LIBS}"
AC_SUBST(SYSTEM_LIBPAM)
saved_LIBS="${LIBS}"
LIBS=""
AC_CHECK_LIB([oath], [oath_key_alloc])
SYSTEM_LIBOATH="${LIBS}"
LIBS="${saved_LIBS}"
AC_SUBST(SYSTEM_LIBOATH)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([developer-warnings],
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-developer-warnings], [enable strict warnings (default is NO)]),
[CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} -Wall -Wextra -Wcast-qual"])
@ -153,7 +134,6 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE([werror],
AC_CONFIG_FILES([
Makefile
bin/Makefile
bin/oathkey/Makefile
bin/openpam_dump_policy/Makefile
bin/pamtest/Makefile
bin/su/Makefile
@ -162,14 +142,12 @@ AC_CONFIG_FILES([
include/Makefile
include/security/Makefile
lib/Makefile
lib/liboath/Makefile
lib/libpam/Makefile
modules/Makefile
modules/pam_deny/Makefile
modules/pam_permit/Makefile
modules/pam_return/Makefile
modules/pam_unix/Makefile
modules/pam_oath/Makefile
t/Makefile
])
AC_CONFIG_FILES([mkpkgng],[chmod +x mkpkgng])

View file

@ -61,37 +61,15 @@ OPENPAM_MAN = \
pam_vprompt.3 \
$(NULL)
if WITH_OATH
if !WITH_SYSTEM_LIBOATH
OATH_MAN = \
oath_key_alloc.3 \
oath_key_create.3 \
oath_key_dummy.3 \
oath_key_free.3 \
oath_key_from_file.3 \
oath_key_from_uri.3 \
oath_mode.3 \
oath_uri_decode.3 \
$(NULL)
endif
endif
EXTRA_DIST = oath.man openpam.man pam.man
EXTRA_DIST = openpam.man pam.man
if !WITH_SYSTEM_LIBPAM
PAMCMAN = $(PAM_MAN) $(MOD_MAN) $(OPENPAM_MAN)
PAMXMAN = openpam.3 pam.3
endif
if WITH_OATH
if !WITH_SYSTEM_LIBOATH
OATHCMAN = $(OATH_MAN)
OATHXMAN = oath.3
endif
endif
ALLCMAN = $(PAMCMAN) $(OATHCMAN)
GENMAN = $(ALLCMAN) $(PAMXMAN) $(OATHXMAN)
ALLCMAN = $(PAMCMAN)
GENMAN = $(ALLCMAN) $(PAMXMAN)
dist_man3_MANS = $(GENMAN) pam_conv.3
@ -102,24 +80,14 @@ CLEANFILES = $(GENMAN)
GENDOC = $(top_srcdir)/misc/gendoc.pl
LIBPAMSRCDIR = $(top_srcdir)/lib/libpam
if WITH_OATH
LIBOATHSRCDIR = $(top_srcdir)/lib/liboath
endif
VPATH = $(LIBPAMSRCDIR) $(LIBOATHSRCDIR) $(srcdir)
VPATH = $(LIBPAMSRCDIR) $(srcdir)
SUFFIXES = .3
.c.3: $(GENDOC)
perl -w $(GENDOC) $< || rm $@
if WITH_OATH
if !WITH_SYSTEM_LIBOATH
oath.3: $(OATH_MAN) $(GENDOC) $(srcdir)/oath.man
perl -w $(GENDOC) -a $(OATH_MAN) <$(srcdir)/oath.man || rm $@
endif
endif
openpam.3: $(OPENPAM_MAN) $(GENDOC) $(srcdir)/openpam.man
perl -w $(GENDOC) -o $(OPENPAM_MAN) <$(srcdir)/openpam.man || rm $@

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@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
.\"
.\" $Id$
.\"
.Sh DESCRIPTION
The OATH authentication library implements the OATH HOTP and TOTP
authentication methods.

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Network Working Group H. Krawczyk
Request for Comments: 2104 IBM
Category: Informational M. Bellare
UCSD
R. Canetti
IBM
February 1997
HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
Status of This Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo
does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of
this memo is unlimited.
Abstract
This document describes HMAC, a mechanism for message authentication
using cryptographic hash functions. HMAC can be used with any
iterative cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1, in
combination with a secret shared key. The cryptographic strength of
HMAC depends on the properties of the underlying hash function.
1. Introduction
Providing a way to check the integrity of information transmitted
over or stored in an unreliable medium is a prime necessity in the
world of open computing and communications. Mechanisms that provide
such integrity check based on a secret key are usually called
"message authentication codes" (MAC). Typically, message
authentication codes are used between two parties that share a secret
key in order to validate information transmitted between these
parties. In this document we present such a MAC mechanism based on
cryptographic hash functions. This mechanism, called HMAC, is based
on work by the authors [BCK1] where the construction is presented and
cryptographically analyzed. We refer to that work for the details on
the rationale and security analysis of HMAC, and its comparison to
other keyed-hash methods.
Krawczyk, et. al. Informational [Page 1]
RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
HMAC can be used in combination with any iterated cryptographic hash
function. MD5 and SHA-1 are examples of such hash functions. HMAC
also uses a secret key for calculation and verification of the
message authentication values. The main goals behind this
construction are
* To use, without modifications, available hash functions.
In particular, hash functions that perform well in software,
and for which code is freely and widely available.
* To preserve the original performance of the hash function without
incurring a significant degradation.
* To use and handle keys in a simple way.
* To have a well understood cryptographic analysis of the strength of
the authentication mechanism based on reasonable assumptions on the
underlying hash function.
* To allow for easy replaceability of the underlying hash function in
case that faster or more secure hash functions are found or
required.
This document specifies HMAC using a generic cryptographic hash
function (denoted by H). Specific instantiations of HMAC need to
define a particular hash function. Current candidates for such hash
functions include SHA-1 [SHA], MD5 [MD5], RIPEMD-128/160 [RIPEMD].
These different realizations of HMAC will be denoted by HMAC-SHA1,
HMAC-MD5, HMAC-RIPEMD, etc.
Note: To the date of writing of this document MD5 and SHA-1 are the
most widely used cryptographic hash functions. MD5 has been recently
shown to be vulnerable to collision search attacks [Dobb]. This
attack and other currently known weaknesses of MD5 do not compromise
the use of MD5 within HMAC as specified in this document (see
[Dobb]); however, SHA-1 appears to be a cryptographically stronger
function. To this date, MD5 can be considered for use in HMAC for
applications where the superior performance of MD5 is critical. In
any case, implementers and users need to be aware of possible
cryptanalytic developments regarding any of these cryptographic hash
functions, and the eventual need to replace the underlying hash
function. (See section 6 for more information on the security of
HMAC.)
Krawczyk, et. al. Informational [Page 2]
RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
2. Definition of HMAC
The definition of HMAC requires a cryptographic hash function, which
we denote by H, and a secret key K. We assume H to be a cryptographic
hash function where data is hashed by iterating a basic compression
function on blocks of data. We denote by B the byte-length of such
blocks (B=64 for all the above mentioned examples of hash functions),
and by L the byte-length of hash outputs (L=16 for MD5, L=20 for
SHA-1). The authentication key K can be of any length up to B, the
block length of the hash function. Applications that use keys longer
than B bytes will first hash the key using H and then use the
resultant L byte string as the actual key to HMAC. In any case the
minimal recommended length for K is L bytes (as the hash output
length). See section 3 for more information on keys.
We define two fixed and different strings ipad and opad as follows
(the 'i' and 'o' are mnemonics for inner and outer):
ipad = the byte 0x36 repeated B times
opad = the byte 0x5C repeated B times.
To compute HMAC over the data `text' we perform
H(K XOR opad, H(K XOR ipad, text))
Namely,
(1) append zeros to the end of K to create a B byte string
(e.g., if K is of length 20 bytes and B=64, then K will be
appended with 44 zero bytes 0x00)
(2) XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) the B byte string computed in step
(1) with ipad
(3) append the stream of data 'text' to the B byte string resulting
from step (2)
(4) apply H to the stream generated in step (3)
(5) XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) the B byte string computed in
step (1) with opad
(6) append the H result from step (4) to the B byte string
resulting from step (5)
(7) apply H to the stream generated in step (6) and output
the result
For illustration purposes, sample code based on MD5 is provided as an
appendix.
Krawczyk, et. al. Informational [Page 3]
RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
3. Keys
The key for HMAC can be of any length (keys longer than B bytes are
first hashed using H). However, less than L bytes is strongly
discouraged as it would decrease the security strength of the
function. Keys longer than L bytes are acceptable but the extra
length would not significantly increase the function strength. (A
longer key may be advisable if the randomness of the key is
considered weak.)
Keys need to be chosen at random (or using a cryptographically strong
pseudo-random generator seeded with a random seed), and periodically
refreshed. (Current attacks do not indicate a specific recommended
frequency for key changes as these attacks are practically
infeasible. However, periodic key refreshment is a fundamental
security practice that helps against potential weaknesses of the
function and keys, and limits the damage of an exposed key.)
4. Implementation Note
HMAC is defined in such a way that the underlying hash function H can
be used with no modification to its code. In particular, it uses the
function H with the pre-defined initial value IV (a fixed value
specified by each iterative hash function to initialize its
compression function). However, if desired, a performance
improvement can be achieved at the cost of (possibly) modifying the
code of H to support variable IVs.
The idea is that the intermediate results of the compression function
on the B-byte blocks (K XOR ipad) and (K XOR opad) can be precomputed
only once at the time of generation of the key K, or before its first
use. These intermediate results are stored and then used to
initialize the IV of H each time that a message needs to be
authenticated. This method saves, for each authenticated message,
the application of the compression function of H on two B-byte blocks
(i.e., on (K XOR ipad) and (K XOR opad)). Such a savings may be
significant when authenticating short streams of data. We stress
that the stored intermediate values need to be treated and protected
the same as secret keys.
Choosing to implement HMAC in the above way is a decision of the
local implementation and has no effect on inter-operability.
Krawczyk, et. al. Informational [Page 4]
RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
5. Truncated output
A well-known practice with message authentication codes is to
truncate the output of the MAC and output only part of the bits
(e.g., [MM, ANSI]). Preneel and van Oorschot [PV] show some
analytical advantages of truncating the output of hash-based MAC
functions. The results in this area are not absolute as for the
overall security advantages of truncation. It has advantages (less
information on the hash result available to an attacker) and
disadvantages (less bits to predict for the attacker). Applications
of HMAC can choose to truncate the output of HMAC by outputting the t
leftmost bits of the HMAC computation for some parameter t (namely,
the computation is carried in the normal way as defined in section 2
above but the end result is truncated to t bits). We recommend that
the output length t be not less than half the length of the hash
output (to match the birthday attack bound) and not less than 80 bits
(a suitable lower bound on the number of bits that need to be
predicted by an attacker). We propose denoting a realization of HMAC
that uses a hash function H with t bits of output as HMAC-H-t. For
example, HMAC-SHA1-80 denotes HMAC computed using the SHA-1 function
and with the output truncated to 80 bits. (If the parameter t is not
specified, e.g. HMAC-MD5, then it is assumed that all the bits of the
hash are output.)
6. Security
The security of the message authentication mechanism presented here
depends on cryptographic properties of the hash function H: the
resistance to collision finding (limited to the case where the
initial value is secret and random, and where the output of the
function is not explicitly available to the attacker), and the
message authentication property of the compression function of H when
applied to single blocks (in HMAC these blocks are partially unknown
to an attacker as they contain the result of the inner H computation
and, in particular, cannot be fully chosen by the attacker).
These properties, and actually stronger ones, are commonly assumed
for hash functions of the kind used with HMAC. In particular, a hash
function for which the above properties do not hold would become
unsuitable for most (probably, all) cryptographic applications,
including alternative message authentication schemes based on such
functions. (For a complete analysis and rationale of the HMAC
function the reader is referred to [BCK1].)
Krawczyk, et. al. Informational [Page 5]
RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
Given the limited confidence gained so far as for the cryptographic
strength of candidate hash functions, it is important to observe the
following two properties of the HMAC construction and its secure use
for message authentication:
1. The construction is independent of the details of the particular
hash function H in use and then the latter can be replaced by any
other secure (iterative) cryptographic hash function.
2. Message authentication, as opposed to encryption, has a
"transient" effect. A published breaking of a message authentication
scheme would lead to the replacement of that scheme, but would have
no adversarial effect on information authenticated in the past. This
is in sharp contrast with encryption, where information encrypted
today may suffer from exposure in the future if, and when, the
encryption algorithm is broken.
The strongest attack known against HMAC is based on the frequency of
collisions for the hash function H ("birthday attack") [PV,BCK2], and
is totally impractical for minimally reasonable hash functions.
As an example, if we consider a hash function like MD5 where the
output length equals L=16 bytes (128 bits) the attacker needs to
acquire the correct message authentication tags computed (with the
_same_ secret key K!) on about 2**64 known plaintexts. This would
require the processing of at least 2**64 blocks under H, an
impossible task in any realistic scenario (for a block length of 64
bytes this would take 250,000 years in a continuous 1Gbps link, and
without changing the secret key K during all this time). This attack
could become realistic only if serious flaws in the collision
behavior of the function H are discovered (e.g. collisions found
after 2**30 messages). Such a discovery would determine the immediate
replacement of the function H (the effects of such failure would be
far more severe for the traditional uses of H in the context of
digital signatures, public key certificates, etc.).
Note: this attack needs to be strongly contrasted with regular
collision attacks on cryptographic hash functions where no secret key
is involved and where 2**64 off-line parallelizable (!) operations
suffice to find collisions. The latter attack is approaching
feasibility [VW] while the birthday attack on HMAC is totally
impractical. (In the above examples, if one uses a hash function
with, say, 160 bit of output then 2**64 should be replaced by 2**80.)
Krawczyk, et. al. Informational [Page 6]
RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
A correct implementation of the above construction, the choice of
random (or cryptographically pseudorandom) keys, a secure key
exchange mechanism, frequent key refreshments, and good secrecy
protection of keys are all essential ingredients for the security of
the integrity verification mechanism provided by HMAC.
Krawczyk, et. al. Informational [Page 7]
RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
Appendix -- Sample Code
For the sake of illustration we provide the following sample code for
the implementation of HMAC-MD5 as well as some corresponding test
vectors (the code is based on MD5 code as described in [MD5]).
/*
** Function: hmac_md5
*/
void
hmac_md5(text, text_len, key, key_len, digest)
unsigned char* text; /* pointer to data stream */
int text_len; /* length of data stream */
unsigned char* key; /* pointer to authentication key */
int key_len; /* length of authentication key */
caddr_t digest; /* caller digest to be filled in */
{
MD5_CTX context;
unsigned char k_ipad[65]; /* inner padding -
* key XORd with ipad
*/
unsigned char k_opad[65]; /* outer padding -
* key XORd with opad
*/
unsigned char tk[16];
int i;
/* if key is longer than 64 bytes reset it to key=MD5(key) */
if (key_len > 64) {
MD5_CTX tctx;
MD5Init(&tctx);
MD5Update(&tctx, key, key_len);
MD5Final(tk, &tctx);
key = tk;
key_len = 16;
}
/*
* the HMAC_MD5 transform looks like:
*
* MD5(K XOR opad, MD5(K XOR ipad, text))
*
* where K is an n byte key
* ipad is the byte 0x36 repeated 64 times
Krawczyk, et. al. Informational [Page 8]
RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
* opad is the byte 0x5c repeated 64 times
* and text is the data being protected
*/
/* start out by storing key in pads */
bzero( k_ipad, sizeof k_ipad);
bzero( k_opad, sizeof k_opad);
bcopy( key, k_ipad, key_len);
bcopy( key, k_opad, key_len);
/* XOR key with ipad and opad values */
for (i=0; i<64; i++) {
k_ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
k_opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
}
/*
* perform inner MD5
*/
MD5Init(&context); /* init context for 1st
* pass */
MD5Update(&context, k_ipad, 64) /* start with inner pad */
MD5Update(&context, text, text_len); /* then text of datagram */
MD5Final(digest, &context); /* finish up 1st pass */
/*
* perform outer MD5
*/
MD5Init(&context); /* init context for 2nd
* pass */
MD5Update(&context, k_opad, 64); /* start with outer pad */
MD5Update(&context, digest, 16); /* then results of 1st
* hash */
MD5Final(digest, &context); /* finish up 2nd pass */
}
Test Vectors (Trailing '\0' of a character string not included in test):
key = 0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b
key_len = 16 bytes
data = "Hi There"
data_len = 8 bytes
digest = 0x9294727a3638bb1c13f48ef8158bfc9d
key = "Jefe"
data = "what do ya want for nothing?"
data_len = 28 bytes
digest = 0x750c783e6ab0b503eaa86e310a5db738
key = 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Krawczyk, et. al. Informational [Page 9]
RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
key_len 16 bytes
data = 0xDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD...
..DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD...
..DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD...
..DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD...
..DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
data_len = 50 bytes
digest = 0x56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6
Acknowledgments
Pau-Chen Cheng, Jeff Kraemer, and Michael Oehler, have provided
useful comments on early drafts, and ran the first interoperability
tests of this specification. Jeff and Pau-Chen kindly provided the
sample code and test vectors that appear in the appendix. Burt
Kaliski, Bart Preneel, Matt Robshaw, Adi Shamir, and Paul van
Oorschot have provided useful comments and suggestions during the
investigation of the HMAC construction.
References
[ANSI] ANSI X9.9, "American National Standard for Financial
Institution Message Authentication (Wholesale)," American
Bankers Association, 1981. Revised 1986.
[Atk] Atkinson, R., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 1826, August
1995.
[BCK1] M. Bellare, R. Canetti, and H. Krawczyk,
"Keyed Hash Functions and Message Authentication",
Proceedings of Crypto'96, LNCS 1109, pp. 1-15.
(http://www.research.ibm.com/security/keyed-md5.html)
[BCK2] M. Bellare, R. Canetti, and H. Krawczyk,
"Pseudorandom Functions Revisited: The Cascade Construction",
Proceedings of FOCS'96.
[Dobb] H. Dobbertin, "The Status of MD5 After a Recent Attack",
RSA Labs' CryptoBytes, Vol. 2 No. 2, Summer 1996.
http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/pubs/cryptobytes.html
[PV] B. Preneel and P. van Oorschot, "Building fast MACs from hash
functions", Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO'95 Proceedings,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag Vol.963,
1995, pp. 1-14.
[MD5] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm",
RFC 1321, April 1992.
Krawczyk, et. al. Informational [Page 10]
RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
[MM] Meyer, S. and Matyas, S.M., Cryptography, New York Wiley,
1982.
[RIPEMD] H. Dobbertin, A. Bosselaers, and B. Preneel, "RIPEMD-160: A
strengthened version of RIPEMD", Fast Software Encryption,
LNCS Vol 1039, pp. 71-82.
ftp://ftp.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/pub/COSIC/bosselae/ripemd/.
[SHA] NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1: Secure Hash Standard, April 1995.
[Tsu] G. Tsudik, "Message authentication with one-way hash
functions", In Proceedings of Infocom'92, May 1992.
(Also in "Access Control and Policy Enforcement in
Internetworks", Ph.D. Dissertation, Computer Science
Department, University of Southern California, April 1991.)
[VW] P. van Oorschot and M. Wiener, "Parallel Collision
Search with Applications to Hash Functions and Discrete
Logarithms", Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conf. Computer and
Communications Security, Fairfax, VA, November 1994.
Authors' Addresses
Hugo Krawczyk
IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
P.O.Box 704
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598
EMail: hugo@watson.ibm.com
Mihir Bellare
Dept of Computer Science and Engineering
Mail Code 0114
University of California at San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093
EMail: mihir@cs.ucsd.edu
Ran Canetti
IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
P.O.Box 704
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598
EMail: canetti@watson.ibm.com
Krawczyk, et. al. Informational [Page 11]

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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. M'Raihi
Request for Comments: 6238 Verisign, Inc.
Category: Informational S. Machani
ISSN: 2070-1721 Diversinet Corp.
M. Pei
Symantec
J. Rydell
Portwise, Inc.
May 2011
TOTP: Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm
Abstract
This document describes an extension of the One-Time Password (OTP)
algorithm, namely the HMAC-based One-Time Password (HOTP) algorithm,
as defined in RFC 4226, to support the time-based moving factor. The
HOTP algorithm specifies an event-based OTP algorithm, where the
moving factor is an event counter. The present work bases the moving
factor on a time value. A time-based variant of the OTP algorithm
provides short-lived OTP values, which are desirable for enhanced
security.
The proposed algorithm can be used across a wide range of network
applications, from remote Virtual Private Network (VPN) access and
Wi-Fi network logon to transaction-oriented Web applications. The
authors believe that a common and shared algorithm will facilitate
adoption of two-factor authentication on the Internet by enabling
interoperability across commercial and open-source implementations.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6238.
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 1]
RFC 6238 HOTPTimeBased May 2011
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. Scope ......................................................2
1.2. Background .................................................3
2. Notation and Terminology ........................................3
3. Algorithm Requirements ..........................................3
4. TOTP Algorithm ..................................................4
4.1. Notations ..................................................4
4.2. Description ................................................4
5. Security Considerations .........................................5
5.1. General ....................................................5
5.2. Validation and Time-Step Size ..............................6
6. Resynchronization ...............................................7
7. Acknowledgements ................................................7
8. References ......................................................8
8.1. Normative References .......................................8
8.2. Informative References .....................................8
Appendix A. TOTP Algorithm: Reference Implementation ...............9
Appendix B. Test Vectors ..........................................14
1. Introduction
1.1. Scope
This document describes an extension of the One-Time Password (OTP)
algorithm, namely the HMAC-based One-Time Password (HOTP) algorithm,
as defined in [RFC4226], to support the time-based moving factor.
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 2]
RFC 6238 HOTPTimeBased May 2011
1.2. Background
As defined in [RFC4226], the HOTP algorithm is based on the
HMAC-SHA-1 algorithm (as specified in [RFC2104]) and applied to an
increasing counter value representing the message in the HMAC
computation.
Basically, the output of the HMAC-SHA-1 calculation is truncated to
obtain user-friendly values:
HOTP(K,C) = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-1(K,C))
where Truncate represents the function that can convert an HMAC-SHA-1
value into an HOTP value. K and C represent the shared secret and
counter value; see [RFC4226] for detailed definitions.
TOTP is the time-based variant of this algorithm, where a value T,
derived from a time reference and a time step, replaces the counter C
in the HOTP computation.
TOTP implementations MAY use HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-512 functions,
based on SHA-256 or SHA-512 [SHA2] hash functions, instead of the
HMAC-SHA-1 function that has been specified for the HOTP computation
in [RFC4226].
2. Notation and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Algorithm Requirements
This section summarizes the requirements taken into account for
designing the TOTP algorithm.
R1: The prover (e.g., token, soft token) and verifier (authentication
or validation server) MUST know or be able to derive the current
Unix time (i.e., the number of seconds elapsed since midnight UTC
of January 1, 1970) for OTP generation. See [UT] for a more
detailed definition of the commonly known "Unix time". The
precision of the time used by the prover affects how often the
clock synchronization should be done; see Section 6.
R2: The prover and verifier MUST either share the same secret or the
knowledge of a secret transformation to generate a shared secret.
R3: The algorithm MUST use HOTP [RFC4226] as a key building block.
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 3]
RFC 6238 HOTPTimeBased May 2011
R4: The prover and verifier MUST use the same time-step value X.
R5: There MUST be a unique secret (key) for each prover.
R6: The keys SHOULD be randomly generated or derived using key
derivation algorithms.
R7: The keys MAY be stored in a tamper-resistant device and SHOULD be
protected against unauthorized access and usage.
4. TOTP Algorithm
This variant of the HOTP algorithm specifies the calculation of a
one-time password value, based on a representation of the counter as
a time factor.
4.1. Notations
o X represents the time step in seconds (default value X =
30 seconds) and is a system parameter.
o T0 is the Unix time to start counting time steps (default value is
0, i.e., the Unix epoch) and is also a system parameter.
4.2. Description
Basically, we define TOTP as TOTP = HOTP(K, T), where T is an integer
and represents the number of time steps between the initial counter
time T0 and the current Unix time.
More specifically, T = (Current Unix time - T0) / X, where the
default floor function is used in the computation.
For example, with T0 = 0 and Time Step X = 30, T = 1 if the current
Unix time is 59 seconds, and T = 2 if the current Unix time is
60 seconds.
The implementation of this algorithm MUST support a time value T
larger than a 32-bit integer when it is beyond the year 2038. The
value of the system parameters X and T0 are pre-established during
the provisioning process and communicated between a prover and
verifier as part of the provisioning step. The provisioning flow is
out of scope of this document; refer to [RFC6030] for such
provisioning container specifications.
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 4]
RFC 6238 HOTPTimeBased May 2011
5. Security Considerations
5.1. General
The security and strength of this algorithm depend on the properties
of the underlying building block HOTP, which is a construction based
on HMAC [RFC2104] using SHA-1 as the hash function.
The conclusion of the security analysis detailed in [RFC4226] is
that, for all practical purposes, the outputs of the dynamic
truncation on distinct inputs are uniformly and independently
distributed strings.
The analysis demonstrates that the best possible attack against the
HOTP function is the brute force attack.
As indicated in the algorithm requirement section, keys SHOULD be
chosen at random or using a cryptographically strong pseudorandom
generator properly seeded with a random value.
Keys SHOULD be of the length of the HMAC output to facilitate
interoperability.
We RECOMMEND following the recommendations in [RFC4086] for all
pseudorandom and random number generations. The pseudorandom numbers
used for generating the keys SHOULD successfully pass the randomness
test specified in [CN], or a similar well-recognized test.
All the communications SHOULD take place over a secure channel, e.g.,
Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) [RFC5246] or
IPsec connections [RFC4301].
We also RECOMMEND storing the keys securely in the validation system,
and, more specifically, encrypting them using tamper-resistant
hardware encryption and exposing them only when required: for
example, the key is decrypted when needed to verify an OTP value, and
re-encrypted immediately to limit exposure in the RAM to a short
period of time.
The key store MUST be in a secure area, to avoid, as much as
possible, direct attack on the validation system and secrets
database. Particularly, access to the key material should be limited
to programs and processes required by the validation system only.
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 5]
RFC 6238 HOTPTimeBased May 2011
5.2. Validation and Time-Step Size
An OTP generated within the same time step will be the same. When an
OTP is received at a validation system, it doesn't know a client's
exact timestamp when an OTP was generated. The validation system may
typically use the timestamp when an OTP is received for OTP
comparison. Due to network latency, the gap (as measured by T, that
is, the number of time steps since T0) between the time that the OTP
was generated and the time that the OTP arrives at the receiving
system may be large. The receiving time at the validation system and
the actual OTP generation may not fall within the same time-step
window that produced the same OTP. When an OTP is generated at the
end of a time-step window, the receiving time most likely falls into
the next time-step window. A validation system SHOULD typically set
a policy for an acceptable OTP transmission delay window for
validation. The validation system should compare OTPs not only with
the receiving timestamp but also the past timestamps that are within
the transmission delay. A larger acceptable delay window would
expose a larger window for attacks. We RECOMMEND that at most one
time step is allowed as the network delay.
The time-step size has an impact on both security and usability. A
larger time-step size means a larger validity window for an OTP to be
accepted by a validation system. There are implications for using a
larger time-step size, as follows:
First, a larger time-step size exposes a larger window to attack.
When an OTP is generated and exposed to a third party before it is
consumed, the third party can consume the OTP within the time-step
window.
We RECOMMEND a default time-step size of 30 seconds. This default
value of 30 seconds is selected as a balance between security and
usability.
Second, the next different OTP must be generated in the next time-
step window. A user must wait until the clock moves to the next
time-step window from the last submission. The waiting time may not
be exactly the length of the time step, depending on when the last
OTP was generated. For example, if the last OTP was generated at the
halfway point in a time-step window, the waiting time for the next
OTP is half the length of the time step. In general, a larger time-
step window means a longer waiting time for a user to get the next
valid OTP after the last successful OTP validation. A too-large
window (for example, 10 minutes) most probably won't be suitable for
typical Internet login use cases; a user may not be able to get the
next OTP within 10 minutes and therefore will have to re-login to the
same site in 10 minutes.
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 6]
RFC 6238 HOTPTimeBased May 2011
Note that a prover may send the same OTP inside a given time-step
window multiple times to a verifier. The verifier MUST NOT accept
the second attempt of the OTP after the successful validation has
been issued for the first OTP, which ensures one-time only use of an
OTP.
6. Resynchronization
Because of possible clock drifts between a client and a validation
server, we RECOMMEND that the validator be set with a specific limit
to the number of time steps a prover can be "out of synch" before
being rejected.
This limit can be set both forward and backward from the calculated
time step on receipt of the OTP value. If the time step is
30 seconds as recommended, and the validator is set to only accept
two time steps backward, then the maximum elapsed time drift would be
around 89 seconds, i.e., 29 seconds in the calculated time step and
60 seconds for two backward time steps.
This would mean the validator could perform a validation against the
current time and then two further validations for each backward step
(for a total of 3 validations). Upon successful validation, the
validation server can record the detected clock drift for the token
in terms of the number of time steps. When a new OTP is received
after this step, the validator can validate the OTP with the current
timestamp adjusted with the recorded number of time-step clock drifts
for the token.
Also, it is important to note that the longer a prover has not sent
an OTP to a validation system, the longer (potentially) the
accumulated clock drift between the prover and the verifier. In such
cases, the automatic resynchronization described above may not work
if the drift exceeds the allowed threshold. Additional
authentication measures should be used to safely authenticate the
prover and explicitly resynchronize the clock drift between the
prover and the validator.
7. Acknowledgements
The authors of this document would like to thank the following people
for their contributions and support to make this a better
specification: Hannes Tschofenig, Jonathan Tuliani, David Dix,
Siddharth Bajaj, Stu Veath, Shuh Chang, Oanh Hoang, John Huang, and
Siddhartha Mohapatra.
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 7]
RFC 6238 HOTPTimeBased May 2011
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Recommendations for Security", BCP 106,
RFC 4086, June 2005.
[RFC4226] M'Raihi, D., Bellare, M., Hoornaert, F., Naccache, D., and
O. Ranen, "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password
Algorithm", RFC 4226, December 2005.
[SHA2] NIST, "FIPS PUB 180-3: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)",
October 2008, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/
fips180-3/fips180-3_final.pdf>.
8.2. Informative References
[CN] Coron, J. and D. Naccache, "An Accurate Evaluation of
Maurer's Universal Test", LNCS 1556, February 1999,
<http://www.gemplus.com/smart/rd/publications/pdf/
CN99maur.pdf>.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC6030] Hoyer, P., Pei, M., and S. Machani, "Portable Symmetric
Key Container (PSKC)", RFC 6030, October 2010.
[UT] Wikipedia, "Unix time", February 2011,
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix_time>.
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 8]
RFC 6238 HOTPTimeBased May 2011
Appendix A. TOTP Algorithm: Reference Implementation
<CODE BEGINS>
/**
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license
terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section
4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
*/
import java.lang.reflect.UndeclaredThrowableException;
import java.security.GeneralSecurityException;
import java.text.DateFormat;
import java.text.SimpleDateFormat;
import java.util.Date;
import javax.crypto.Mac;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
import java.math.BigInteger;
import java.util.TimeZone;
/**
* This is an example implementation of the OATH
* TOTP algorithm.
* Visit www.openauthentication.org for more information.
*
* @author Johan Rydell, PortWise, Inc.
*/
public class TOTP {
private TOTP() {}
/**
* This method uses the JCE to provide the crypto algorithm.
* HMAC computes a Hashed Message Authentication Code with the
* crypto hash algorithm as a parameter.
*
* @param crypto: the crypto algorithm (HmacSHA1, HmacSHA256,
* HmacSHA512)
* @param keyBytes: the bytes to use for the HMAC key
* @param text: the message or text to be authenticated
*/
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 9]
RFC 6238 HOTPTimeBased May 2011
private static byte[] hmac_sha(String crypto, byte[] keyBytes,
byte[] text){
try {
Mac hmac;
hmac = Mac.getInstance(crypto);
SecretKeySpec macKey =
new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "RAW");
hmac.init(macKey);
return hmac.doFinal(text);
} catch (GeneralSecurityException gse) {
throw new UndeclaredThrowableException(gse);
}
}
/**
* This method converts a HEX string to Byte[]
*
* @param hex: the HEX string
*
* @return: a byte array
*/
private static byte[] hexStr2Bytes(String hex){
// Adding one byte to get the right conversion
// Values starting with "0" can be converted
byte[] bArray = new BigInteger("10" + hex,16).toByteArray();
// Copy all the REAL bytes, not the "first"
byte[] ret = new byte[bArray.length - 1];
for (int i = 0; i < ret.length; i++)
ret[i] = bArray[i+1];
return ret;
}
private static final int[] DIGITS_POWER
// 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
= {1,10,100,1000,10000,100000,1000000,10000000,100000000 };
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 10]
RFC 6238 HOTPTimeBased May 2011
/**
* This method generates a TOTP value for the given
* set of parameters.
*
* @param key: the shared secret, HEX encoded
* @param time: a value that reflects a time
* @param returnDigits: number of digits to return
*
* @return: a numeric String in base 10 that includes
* {@link truncationDigits} digits
*/
public static String generateTOTP(String key,
String time,
String returnDigits){
return generateTOTP(key, time, returnDigits, "HmacSHA1");
}
/**
* This method generates a TOTP value for the given
* set of parameters.
*
* @param key: the shared secret, HEX encoded
* @param time: a value that reflects a time
* @param returnDigits: number of digits to return
*
* @return: a numeric String in base 10 that includes
* {@link truncationDigits} digits
*/
public static String generateTOTP256(String key,
String time,
String returnDigits){
return generateTOTP(key, time, returnDigits, "HmacSHA256");
}
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 11]
RFC 6238 HOTPTimeBased May 2011
/**
* This method generates a TOTP value for the given
* set of parameters.
*
* @param key: the shared secret, HEX encoded
* @param time: a value that reflects a time
* @param returnDigits: number of digits to return
*
* @return: a numeric String in base 10 that includes
* {@link truncationDigits} digits
*/
public static String generateTOTP512(String key,
String time,
String returnDigits){
return generateTOTP(key, time, returnDigits, "HmacSHA512");
}
/**
* This method generates a TOTP value for the given
* set of parameters.
*
* @param key: the shared secret, HEX encoded
* @param time: a value that reflects a time
* @param returnDigits: number of digits to return
* @param crypto: the crypto function to use
*
* @return: a numeric String in base 10 that includes
* {@link truncationDigits} digits
*/
public static String generateTOTP(String key,
String time,
String returnDigits,
String crypto){
int codeDigits = Integer.decode(returnDigits).intValue();
String result = null;
// Using the counter
// First 8 bytes are for the movingFactor
// Compliant with base RFC 4226 (HOTP)
while (time.length() < 16 )
time = "0" + time;
// Get the HEX in a Byte[]
byte[] msg = hexStr2Bytes(time);
byte[] k = hexStr2Bytes(key);
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 12]
RFC 6238 HOTPTimeBased May 2011
byte[] hash = hmac_sha(crypto, k, msg);
// put selected bytes into result int
int offset = hash[hash.length - 1] & 0xf;
int binary =
((hash[offset] & 0x7f) << 24) |
((hash[offset + 1] & 0xff) << 16) |
((hash[offset + 2] & 0xff) << 8) |
(hash[offset + 3] & 0xff);
int otp = binary % DIGITS_POWER[codeDigits];
result = Integer.toString(otp);
while (result.length() < codeDigits) {
result = "0" + result;
}
return result;
}
public static void main(String[] args) {
// Seed for HMAC-SHA1 - 20 bytes
String seed = "3132333435363738393031323334353637383930";
// Seed for HMAC-SHA256 - 32 bytes
String seed32 = "3132333435363738393031323334353637383930" +
"313233343536373839303132";
// Seed for HMAC-SHA512 - 64 bytes
String seed64 = "3132333435363738393031323334353637383930" +
"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930" +
"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930" +
"31323334";
long T0 = 0;
long X = 30;
long testTime[] = {59L, 1111111109L, 1111111111L,
1234567890L, 2000000000L, 20000000000L};
String steps = "0";
DateFormat df = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss");
df.setTimeZone(TimeZone.getTimeZone("UTC"));
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 13]
RFC 6238 HOTPTimeBased May 2011
try {
System.out.println(
"+---------------+-----------------------+" +
"------------------+--------+--------+");
System.out.println(
"| Time(sec) | Time (UTC format) " +
"| Value of T(Hex) | TOTP | Mode |");
System.out.println(
"+---------------+-----------------------+" +
"------------------+--------+--------+");
for (int i=0; i<testTime.length; i++) {
long T = (testTime[i] - T0)/X;
steps = Long.toHexString(T).toUpperCase();
while (steps.length() < 16) steps = "0" + steps;
String fmtTime = String.format("%1$-11s", testTime[i]);
String utcTime = df.format(new Date(testTime[i]*1000));
System.out.print("| " + fmtTime + " | " + utcTime +
" | " + steps + " |");
System.out.println(generateTOTP(seed, steps, "8",
"HmacSHA1") + "| SHA1 |");
System.out.print("| " + fmtTime + " | " + utcTime +
" | " + steps + " |");
System.out.println(generateTOTP(seed32, steps, "8",
"HmacSHA256") + "| SHA256 |");
System.out.print("| " + fmtTime + " | " + utcTime +
" | " + steps + " |");
System.out.println(generateTOTP(seed64, steps, "8",
"HmacSHA512") + "| SHA512 |");
System.out.println(
"+---------------+-----------------------+" +
"------------------+--------+--------+");
}
}catch (final Exception e){
System.out.println("Error : " + e);
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
Appendix B. Test Vectors
This section provides test values that can be used for the HOTP time-
based variant algorithm interoperability test.
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 14]
RFC 6238 HOTPTimeBased May 2011
The test token shared secret uses the ASCII string value
"12345678901234567890". With Time Step X = 30, and the Unix epoch as
the initial value to count time steps, where T0 = 0, the TOTP
algorithm will display the following values for specified modes and
timestamps.
+-------------+--------------+------------------+----------+--------+
| Time (sec) | UTC Time | Value of T (hex) | TOTP | Mode |
+-------------+--------------+------------------+----------+--------+
| 59 | 1970-01-01 | 0000000000000001 | 94287082 | SHA1 |
| | 00:00:59 | | | |
| 59 | 1970-01-01 | 0000000000000001 | 46119246 | SHA256 |
| | 00:00:59 | | | |
| 59 | 1970-01-01 | 0000000000000001 | 90693936 | SHA512 |
| | 00:00:59 | | | |
| 1111111109 | 2005-03-18 | 00000000023523EC | 07081804 | SHA1 |
| | 01:58:29 | | | |
| 1111111109 | 2005-03-18 | 00000000023523EC | 68084774 | SHA256 |
| | 01:58:29 | | | |
| 1111111109 | 2005-03-18 | 00000000023523EC | 25091201 | SHA512 |
| | 01:58:29 | | | |
| 1111111111 | 2005-03-18 | 00000000023523ED | 14050471 | SHA1 |
| | 01:58:31 | | | |
| 1111111111 | 2005-03-18 | 00000000023523ED | 67062674 | SHA256 |
| | 01:58:31 | | | |
| 1111111111 | 2005-03-18 | 00000000023523ED | 99943326 | SHA512 |
| | 01:58:31 | | | |
| 1234567890 | 2009-02-13 | 000000000273EF07 | 89005924 | SHA1 |
| | 23:31:30 | | | |
| 1234567890 | 2009-02-13 | 000000000273EF07 | 91819424 | SHA256 |
| | 23:31:30 | | | |
| 1234567890 | 2009-02-13 | 000000000273EF07 | 93441116 | SHA512 |
| | 23:31:30 | | | |
| 2000000000 | 2033-05-18 | 0000000003F940AA | 69279037 | SHA1 |
| | 03:33:20 | | | |
| 2000000000 | 2033-05-18 | 0000000003F940AA | 90698825 | SHA256 |
| | 03:33:20 | | | |
| 2000000000 | 2033-05-18 | 0000000003F940AA | 38618901 | SHA512 |
| | 03:33:20 | | | |
| 20000000000 | 2603-10-11 | 0000000027BC86AA | 65353130 | SHA1 |
| | 11:33:20 | | | |
| 20000000000 | 2603-10-11 | 0000000027BC86AA | 77737706 | SHA256 |
| | 11:33:20 | | | |
| 20000000000 | 2603-10-11 | 0000000027BC86AA | 47863826 | SHA512 |
| | 11:33:20 | | | |
+-------------+--------------+------------------+----------+--------+
Table 1: TOTP Table
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 15]
RFC 6238 HOTPTimeBased May 2011
Authors' Addresses
David M'Raihi
Verisign, Inc.
685 E. Middlefield Road
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
EMail: davidietf@gmail.com
Salah Machani
Diversinet Corp.
2225 Sheppard Avenue East, Suite 1801
Toronto, Ontario M2J 5C2
Canada
EMail: smachani@diversinet.com
Mingliang Pei
Symantec
510 E. Middlefield Road
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
EMail: Mingliang_Pei@symantec.com
Johan Rydell
Portwise, Inc.
275 Hawthorne Ave., Suite 119
Palo Alto, CA 94301
USA
EMail: johanietf@gmail.com
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 16]

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@ -10,12 +10,3 @@ security_HEADERS = \
pam_constants.h \
pam_modules.h \
pam_types.h
if WITH_OATH
security_HEADERS += \
oath.h \
oath_constants.h \
oath_rfc3986.h \
oath_rfc4648.h \
oath_types.h
endif

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@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2012-2014 The University of Oslo
* Copyright (c) 2013-2014 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifndef OATH_H_INCLUDED
#define OATH_H_INCLUDED
#include <security/oath_constants.h>
#include <security/oath_types.h>
#include <security/oath_rfc3986.h>
#include <security/oath_rfc4648.h>
struct oath_key *oath_key_alloc(void);
struct oath_key *oath_key_create(const char *, enum oath_mode,
enum oath_hash, const char *, size_t);
void oath_key_free(struct oath_key *);
struct oath_key *oath_key_from_uri(const char *);
struct oath_key *oath_key_from_file(const char *);
char *oath_key_to_uri(const struct oath_key *);
struct oath_key *oath_key_dummy(enum oath_mode, enum oath_hash, unsigned int);
enum oath_mode oath_mode(const char *);
unsigned int oath_hotp(const uint8_t *, size_t, uint64_t, unsigned int);
unsigned int oath_hotp_current(struct oath_key *);
int oath_hotp_match(struct oath_key *, unsigned int, int);
unsigned int oath_totp(const uint8_t *, size_t, unsigned int);
unsigned int oath_totp_current(const struct oath_key *);
int oath_totp_match(struct oath_key *, unsigned int, int);
#endif

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@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2012-2013 The University of Oslo
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifndef OATH_CONSTANTS_H_INCLUDED
#define OATH_CONSTANTS_H_INCLUDED
/*
* OATH modes
*/
enum oath_mode {
om_undef, /* not set / default */
om_hotp, /* RFC 4226 HOTP */
om_totp, /* RFC 6238 TOTP */
om_max
};
/*
* Hash functions
*/
enum oath_hash {
oh_undef, /* not set / default */
oh_md5, /* RFC 1321 MD5 */
oh_sha1, /* FIPS 180 SHA-1 */
oh_sha256, /* FIPS 180 SHA-256 */
oh_sha512, /* FIPS 180 SHA-512 */
oh_max
};
/*
* Default time step for TOTP: 30 seconds.
*/
#define OATH_DEF_TIMESTEP 30
/*
* Maximum time step for TOTP: 10 minutes, which RFC 6238 cites as an
* example of an unreasonably large time step.
*/
#define OATH_MAX_TIMESTEP 600
/*
* Maximum key length in bytes. HMAC has a 64-byte block size; if the key
* K is longer than that, HMAC derives a new key K' = H(K).
*/
#define OATH_MAX_KEYLEN 64
/*
* Maximum label length in characters, including terminating NUL.
*/
#define OATH_MAX_LABELLEN 64
/*
* Label to use for dummy keys
*/
#define OATH_DUMMY_LABEL "oath-dummy@openpam.org"
#endif

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@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2014 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifndef OATH_RFC3986_H_INCLUDED
#define OATH_RFC3986_H_INCLUDED
size_t oath_uri_decode(const char *, size_t, char *, size_t);
#endif

View file

@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2012-2014 The University of Oslo
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifndef OATH_RFC4648_H_INCLUDED
#define OATH_RFC4648_H_INCLUDED
/* estimate of output length for base32 encoding / decoding */
#define base32_enclen(l) (size_t)(((l + 4) / 5) * 8)
#define base32_declen(l) (size_t)(((l + 7) / 8) * 5)
/* base32 encoding / decoding */
int base32_enc(const char *, size_t, char *, size_t *);
int base32_dec(const char *, size_t, char *, size_t *);
/* estimate of output length for base64 encoding / decoding */
#define base64_enclen(l) (size_t)(((l + 2) / 3) * 4)
#define base64_declen(l) (size_t)(((l + 3) / 4) * 3)
/* base64 encoding / decoding */
int base64_enc(const char *, size_t, char *, size_t *);
int base64_dec(const char *, size_t, char *, size_t *);
#endif

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@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2012-2013 The University of Oslo
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifndef OATH_TYPES_H_INCLUDED
#define OATH_TYPES_H_INCLUDED
/*
* OATH key and associated parameters
*/
struct oath_key {
/* mode and parameters */
enum oath_mode mode;
unsigned int digits;
uint64_t counter; /* HOTP only */
unsigned int timestep; /* TOTP only - in seconds */
uint64_t lastused; /* TOTP only */
/* housekeeping */
unsigned int dummy:1; /* dummy key, always fail */
unsigned int mapped:1; /* allocated with mmap() */
unsigned int locked:1; /* locked / wired with madvise() */
/* hash algorithm */
enum oath_hash hash;
/* label */
size_t labellen; /* bytes incl. NUL */
char label[OATH_MAX_LABELLEN];
/* key */
size_t keylen; /* bytes */
uint8_t key[OATH_MAX_KEYLEN];
};
#endif

View file

@ -5,9 +5,3 @@ SUBDIRS =
if !WITH_SYSTEM_LIBPAM
SUBDIRS += libpam
endif
if WITH_OATH
if !WITH_SYSTEM_LIBOATH
SUBDIRS += liboath
endif
endif

View file

@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
# $Id$
AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/libpam
lib_LTLIBRARIES = liboath.la
noinst_HEADERS = oath_impl.h
liboath_la_SOURCES = \
oath_base32.c \
oath_base64.c \
oath_hotp.c \
oath_totp.c \
oath_key_alloc.c \
oath_key_create.c \
oath_key_dummy.c \
oath_key_from_file.c \
oath_key_from_uri.c \
oath_key_free.c \
oath_key.c \
oath_mode.c \
oath_uri_decode.c
liboath_la_LDFLAGS = -no-undefined -version-info $(LIB_MAJ)
if WITH_SYSTEM_LIBPAM
liboath_la_LIBADD = $(SYSTEM_LIBPAM)
else
liboath_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/libpam/libpam.la
endif
liboath_la_LIBADD += $(CRYPTO_LIBS)

View file

@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2013-2014 The University of Oslo
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <security/oath.h>
#include "oath_impl.h"
static const char b32enc[] =
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567";
static const char b32dec[256] = {
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06,
0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e,
0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16,
0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
};
/*
* Encode data in RFC 4648 base 32 representation. The target buffer must
* have room for base32_enclen(len) characters and a terminating NUL.
*/
int
base32_enc(const char *cin, size_t ilen, char *out, size_t *olen)
{
const uint8_t *in = (const uint8_t *)cin;
uint64_t bits;
if (*olen <= base32_enclen(ilen)) {
*olen = base32_enclen(ilen) + 1;
errno = ENOSPC;
return (-1);
}
*olen = 0;
while (ilen >= 5) {
bits = 0;
bits |= (uint64_t)in[0] << 32;
bits |= (uint64_t)in[1] << 24;
bits |= (uint64_t)in[2] << 16;
bits |= (uint64_t)in[3] << 8;
bits |= (uint64_t)in[4];
ilen -= 5;
in += 5;
out[0] = b32enc[bits >> 35 & 0x1f];
out[1] = b32enc[bits >> 30 & 0x1f];
out[2] = b32enc[bits >> 25 & 0x1f];
out[3] = b32enc[bits >> 20 & 0x1f];
out[4] = b32enc[bits >> 15 & 0x1f];
out[5] = b32enc[bits >> 10 & 0x1f];
out[6] = b32enc[bits >> 5 & 0x1f];
out[7] = b32enc[bits & 0x1f];
*olen += 8;
out += 8;
}
if (ilen > 0) {
bits = 0;
switch (ilen) {
case 4:
bits |= (uint64_t)in[3] << 8;
case 3:
bits |= (uint64_t)in[2] << 16;
case 2:
bits |= (uint64_t)in[1] << 24;
case 1:
bits |= (uint64_t)in[0] << 32;
COVERAGE_NO_DEFAULT_CASE
}
out[0] = b32enc[bits >> 35 & 0x1f];
out[1] = b32enc[bits >> 30 & 0x1f];
out[2] = ilen > 1 ? b32enc[bits >> 25 & 0x1f] : '=';
out[3] = ilen > 1 ? b32enc[bits >> 20 & 0x1f] : '=';
out[4] = ilen > 2 ? b32enc[bits >> 15 & 0x1f] : '=';
out[5] = ilen > 3 ? b32enc[bits >> 10 & 0x1f] : '=';
out[6] = ilen > 3 ? b32enc[bits >> 5 & 0x1f] : '=';
out[7] = '=';
*olen += 8;
out += 8;
}
out[0] = '\0';
++*olen;
return (0);
}
/*
* Decode data in RFC 4648 base 32 representation, stopping at the
* terminating NUL, the first invalid (non-base32, non-whitespace)
* character or after len characters, whichever comes first.
*
* Padding is handled sloppily: any padding character following the data
* is silently consumed. This not only simplifies the code but ensures
* compatibility with implementations which do not emit or understand
* padding.
*
* The olen argument is used by the caller to pass the size of the buffer
* and by base32_dec() to return the amount of data successfully decoded.
* If the buffer is too small, base32_dec() discards the excess data, but
* returns the total amount.
*/
int
base32_dec(const char *cin, size_t ilen, char *out, size_t *olen)
{
const uint8_t *in = (const uint8_t *)cin;
size_t len;
int bits, shift, padding;
for (bits = shift = padding = len = 0; ilen && *in; --ilen, ++in) {
if (*in == ' ' || *in == '\t' || *in == '\r' || *in == '\n' ||
(padding && *in == '=')) {
/* consume */
continue;
} else if (!padding && b32dec[*in] >= 0) {
/* shift into accumulator */
shift += 5;
bits = bits << 5 | b32dec[*in];
} else if (!padding && shift > 0 && shift < 5 && *in == '=') {
/* final byte */
shift = 0;
padding = 1;
} else {
/* error */
*olen = 0;
errno = EINVAL;
return (-1);
}
if (shift >= 8) {
/* output accumulated byte */
shift -= 8;
if (len++ < *olen)
*out++ = (bits >> shift) & 0xff;
}
}
/* report decoded length */
if (len > *olen) {
/* overflow */
*olen = len;
errno = ENOSPC;
return (-1);
}
*olen = len;
return (0);
}

View file

@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2013-2014 The University of Oslo
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <security/oath.h>
#include "oath_impl.h"
static const char b64enc[] =
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
"0123456789+/";
static const char b64dec[256] = {
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3e, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f,
0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b,
0x3c, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06,
0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e,
0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16,
0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x20,
0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28,
0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x30,
0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
};
/*
* Encode data in RFC 4648 base 64 representation. The target buffer must
* have room for base64_enclen(len) characters and a terminating NUL.
*/
int
base64_enc(const char *cin, size_t ilen, char *out, size_t *olen)
{
const uint8_t *in = (const uint8_t *)cin;
uint32_t bits;
if (*olen <= base64_enclen(ilen)) {
*olen = base64_enclen(ilen) + 1;
errno = ENOSPC;
return (-1);
}
*olen = 0;
while (ilen >= 3) {
bits = 0;
bits |= (uint32_t)in[0] << 16;
bits |= (uint32_t)in[1] << 8;
bits |= (uint32_t)in[2];
ilen -= 3;
in += 3;
out[0] = b64enc[bits >> 18 & 0x3f];
out[1] = b64enc[bits >> 12 & 0x3f];
out[2] = b64enc[bits >> 6 & 0x3f];
out[3] = b64enc[bits & 0x3f];
*olen += 4;
out += 4;
}
if (ilen > 0) {
bits = 0;
switch (ilen) {
case 2:
bits |= (uint32_t)in[1] << 8;
case 1:
bits |= (uint32_t)in[0] << 16;
COVERAGE_NO_DEFAULT_CASE
}
out[0] = b64enc[bits >> 18 & 0x3f];
out[1] = b64enc[bits >> 12 & 0x3f];
out[2] = ilen > 1 ? b64enc[bits >> 6 & 0x3f] : '=';
out[3] = '=';
*olen += 4;
out += 4;
}
out[0] = '\0';
++*olen;
return (0);
}
/*
* Decode data in RFC 4648 base 64 representation, stopping at the
* terminating NUL, the first invalid (non-base64, non-whitespace)
* character or after len characters, whichever comes first.
*
* Padding is handled sloppily: any padding character following the data
* is silently consumed. This not only simplifies the code but ensures
* compatibility with implementations which do not emit or understand
* padding.
*
* The olen argument is used by the caller to pass the size of the buffer
* and by base64_dec() to return the amount of data successfully decoded.
* If the buffer is too small, base64_dec() discards the excess data, but
* returns the total amount.
*/
int
base64_dec(const char *cin, size_t ilen, char *out, size_t *olen)
{
const uint8_t *in = (const uint8_t *)cin;
size_t len;
int bits, shift, padding;
for (bits = shift = padding = len = 0; ilen && *in; --ilen, ++in) {
if (*in == ' ' || *in == '\t' || *in == '\r' || *in == '\n' ||
(padding && *in == '=')) {
/* consume */
continue;
} else if (!padding && b64dec[*in] >= 0) {
/* shift into accumulator */
shift += 6;
bits = bits << 6 | b64dec[*in];
} else if (!padding && shift > 0 && shift != 6 && *in == '=') {
/* final byte */
shift = 0;
padding = 1;
} else {
/* error */
*olen = 0;
errno = EINVAL;
return (-1);
}
if (shift >= 8) {
/* output accumulated byte */
shift -= 8;
if (len++ < *olen)
*out++ = (bits >> shift) & 0xff;
}
}
/* report decoded length */
if (len > *olen) {
/* overflow */
*olen = len;
errno = ENOSPC;
return (-1);
}
*olen = len;
return (0);
}

View file

@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2012-2014 The University of Oslo
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <security/oath.h>
#define StToNum(St) (St)
static uint32_t
DT(const uint8_t *String)
{
uint8_t OffsetBits;
int Offset;
uint32_t P;
OffsetBits = String[19] & 0x0f;
Offset = StToNum(OffsetBits);
P = (uint32_t)String[Offset + 0] << 24 |
(uint32_t)String[Offset + 1] << 16 |
(uint32_t)String[Offset + 2] << 8 |
(uint32_t)String[Offset + 3];
return (P & 0x7fffffffUL);
}
unsigned int
oath_hotp(const uint8_t *K, size_t Klen, uint64_t seq, unsigned int Digit)
{
HMAC_CTX ctx;
uint8_t C[8];
uint8_t HS[20];
unsigned int HSlen;
uint32_t Sbits, Snum;
unsigned int mod, D;
for (int i = 7; i >= 0; --i) {
C[i] = seq & 0xff;
seq >>= 8;
}
/* HS = HMAC-SHA-1(K,C) */
HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, K, Klen, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
HMAC_Update(&ctx, (const uint8_t *)&C, sizeof C);
HMAC_Final(&ctx, HS, &HSlen);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
Sbits = DT(HS);
Snum = StToNum(Sbits);
for (mod = 1; Digit > 0; --Digit)
mod *= 10;
D = Snum % mod;
return (D);
}
/*
* Computes the current code for the given key and advances the counter.
*/
unsigned int
oath_hotp_current(struct oath_key *k)
{
unsigned int code;
if (k == NULL)
return (UINT_MAX);
if (k->mode != om_hotp)
return (UINT_MAX);
if (k->counter == UINT64_MAX)
return (UINT_MAX);
code = oath_hotp(k->key, k->keylen, k->counter, k->digits);
k->counter += 1;
return (code);
}
/*
* Compares the code provided by the user with expected values within a
* given window. Returns 1 if there was a match, 0 if not, and -1 if an
* error occurred. Also advances the counter if there was a match.
*/
int
oath_hotp_match(struct oath_key *k, unsigned int response, int window)
{
unsigned int code;
if (k == NULL)
return (-1);
if (window < 0)
return (-1);
if (k->mode != om_hotp)
return (-1);
if (k->counter >= UINT64_MAX - window - 1)
return (-1);
for (int i = 0; i <= window; ++i) {
code = oath_hotp(k->key, k->keylen, k->counter + i, k->digits);
if (code == response && !k->dummy) {
k->counter = k->counter + i + 1;
return (1);
}
}
return (0);
}

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@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2012-2013 The University of Oslo
* Copyright (c) 2016 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifndef OATH_IMPL_H_INCLUDED
#define OATH_IMPL_H_INCLUDED
#if _BullseyeCoverage
#define COVERAGE_DISABLE _Pragma("BullseyeCoverage save off")
#define COVERAGE_RESTORE _Pragma("BullseyeCoverage restore")
#else
#define COVERAGE_DISABLE
#define COVERAGE_RESTORE
#endif
/*
* Use at end of switch which has no default case
*/
#if _BullseyeCoverage
#define COVERAGE_NO_DEFAULT_CASE \
COVERAGE_DISABLE \
default: \
(void)0; \
COVERAGE_RESTORE
#else
#define COVERAGE_NO_DEFAULT_CASE
#endif
#endif

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@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2013-2016 The University of Oslo
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#include <security/openpam.h>
#include "openpam_asprintf.h"
#include <security/oath.h>
char *
oath_key_to_uri(const struct oath_key *key)
{
const char *hash;
char *tmp, *uri;
size_t kslen, urilen;
switch (key->hash) {
case oh_sha1:
hash = "SHA1";
break;
case oh_sha256:
hash = "SHA256";
break;
case oh_sha512:
hash = "SHA512";
break;
case oh_md5:
hash = "MD5";
break;
default:
return (NULL);
}
/* XXX the label and secret should be URI-encoded */
if (key->mode == om_hotp) {
urilen = asprintf(&uri, "otpauth://%s/%s?"
"algorithm=%s&digits=%d&counter=%ju&secret=",
"hotp", key->label, hash, key->digits,
(uintmax_t)key->counter);
} else if (key->mode == om_totp) {
urilen = asprintf(&uri, "otpauth://%s/%s?"
"algorithm=%s&digits=%d&period=%u&lastused=%ju&secret=",
"totp", key->label, hash, key->digits, key->timestep,
(uintmax_t)key->lastused);
} else {
/* unreachable */
return (NULL);
}
/* compute length of base32-encoded key and append it */
kslen = base32_enclen(key->keylen) + 1;
if ((tmp = realloc(uri, urilen + kslen)) == NULL) {
free(uri);
return (NULL);
}
uri = tmp;
if (base32_enc((const char *)key->key, key->keylen, uri + urilen, &kslen) != 0) {
free(uri);
return (NULL);
}
return (uri);
}

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@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2013-2014 The University of Oslo
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#include <security/openpam.h>
#include <security/oath.h>
/*
* OATH
*
* Allocates an OATH key structure
*/
struct oath_key *
oath_key_alloc(void)
{
struct oath_key *key;
int prot, flags;
prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
flags = MAP_ANON;
#ifdef MAP_NOCORE
flags |= MAP_NOCORE;
#endif
if ((key = mmap(NULL, sizeof *key, prot, flags, -1, 0)) != MAP_FAILED) {
memset(key, 0, sizeof *key);
key->mapped = 1;
if (mlock(key, sizeof *key) == 0)
key->locked = 1;
} else {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "mmap(): %m");
if ((key = calloc(sizeof *key, 1)) == NULL)
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "malloc(): %m");
}
return (key);
}
/**
* The =oath_key_alloc function allocates and initializes an OATH key
* structure.
*
* Keys allocated with =oath_key_alloc must be freed using =oath_key_free.
*
* >oath_key_free
*
* AUTHOR UIO
*/

View file

@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2013-2014 The University of Oslo
* Copyright (c) 2016 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <security/oath.h>
/*
* OATH
*
* Creates an OATH key with the specified parameters
*/
struct oath_key *
oath_key_create(const char *label,
enum oath_mode mode, enum oath_hash hash,
const char *keydata, size_t keylen)
{
char keybuf[OATH_MAX_KEYLEN];
struct oath_key *key;
int labellen;
/* check label length */
if (label == NULL ||
(labellen = strlen(label)) >= OATH_MAX_LABELLEN)
return (NULL);
/* check key length */
if (keylen > OATH_MAX_KEYLEN ||
(keydata != NULL && keylen == 0))
return (NULL);
if (keylen == 0)
keylen = 20;
/* check mode */
switch (mode) {
case om_hotp:
case om_totp:
break;
default:
return (NULL);
}
/* check hash */
switch (hash) {
case oh_undef:
hash = oh_sha1;
break;
case oh_md5:
case oh_sha1:
case oh_sha256:
case oh_sha512:
break;
default:
return (NULL);
}
/* generate key data if necessary */
if (keydata == NULL) {
if (RAND_bytes((void *)keybuf, keylen) != 1)
return (NULL);
keydata = keybuf;
}
/* allocate */
if ((key = oath_key_alloc()) == NULL)
return (NULL);
/* label */
memcpy(key->label, label, labellen);
key->label[labellen] = 0;
key->labellen = labellen;
/* mode and hash */
key->mode = mode;
key->hash = hash;
/* default parameters */
key->digits = 6;
if (key->mode == om_totp)
key->timestep = 30;
/* key */
memcpy(key->key, keydata, keylen);
key->keylen = keylen;
return (key);
}
/**
* The =oath_key_create function allocates and initializes an OATH key
* structure with the specified parameters.
*
* The =label parameter must point to a string describing the key.
*
* The =mode parameter indicates the OTP algorithm to use:
*
* ;om_hotp:
* RFC 4226 HOTP
* ;om_totp:
* RFC 6238 TOTP
*
* The =hash parameter indicates which hash algorithm to use:
*
* ;oh_md5:
* RFC 1321 MD5
* ;oh_sha1:
* RFC 3174 SHA-1
* ;oh_sha256:
* RFC 6234 SHA-256
* ;oh_sha512:
* RFC 6234 SHA-512
*
* If =hash is ;oh_undef, the default algorithm (SHA-1) is used.
*
* The =keydata parameter should point to a buffer containing the raw key
* to use.
* If =keydata is NULL, a key will be randomly generated.
* Note that the strength of the generated key is dependent on the
* strength of the operating system's pseudo-random number generator.
*
* The =keylen parameter specifies the length of the provided (or
* generated) key in bytes.
* Note that some OATH HOTP / TOTP implementations do not support key
* lengths that are not a multiple of 20 bits (5 bytes).
* If =keydata is NULL and =keylen is 0, a hardcoded default of 160 bits
* (20 bytes) is used.
*
* The following key parameters are set to hardcoded default values and
* can be changed after key creation:
*
* - For HOTP keys, the initial counter value is set to 0.
* - For TOTP keys, the timestep is set to 30 seconds.
* - For both HOTP and TOTP keys, the number of digits is set to 6.
*
* Keys created with =oath_key_create must be freed using =oath_key_free.
*
* >oath_key_alloc
* >oath_key_free
*
* AUTHOR UIO
*/

View file

@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2013 The University of Oslo
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <security/oath.h>
/*
* OATH
*
* Creates a dummy OATH key structure
*/
struct oath_key *
oath_key_dummy(enum oath_mode mode, enum oath_hash hash, unsigned int digits)
{
struct oath_key *key;
if ((key = oath_key_alloc()) == NULL)
return (NULL);
key->dummy = 1;
key->mode = mode;
key->digits = digits;
key->counter = 0;
key->timestep = 30;
key->hash = hash;
memcpy(key->label, OATH_DUMMY_LABEL, sizeof OATH_DUMMY_LABEL);
key->labellen = sizeof OATH_DUMMY_LABEL - 1;
key->keylen = sizeof key->key;
return (key);
}
/**
* The =oath_key_dummy function allocates and initializes a dummy OATH key
* structure.
* Authentication attempts using a dummy key will always fail.
*
* Keys allocated with =oath_key_dummy must be freed using =oath_key_free.
*
* >oath_key_alloc
* >oath_key_free
*
* AUTHOR UIO
*/

View file

@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2013 The University of Oslo
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#include <security/openpam.h>
#include <security/oath.h>
/*
* OATH
*
* Wipes and frees an OATH key structure
*/
void
oath_key_free(struct oath_key *key)
{
int mapped, locked;
if (key != NULL) {
mapped = key->mapped;
locked = key->locked;
memset(key, 0, sizeof *key);
if (mapped) {
if (locked)
munlock(key, sizeof *key);
munmap(key, sizeof *key);
} else {
free(key);
}
}
}
/**
* The =oath_key_free function wipes and frees an OATH key structure which
* was previously allocated using the =oath_key_alloc function.
*
* >oath_key_alloc
*
* AUTHOR UIO
*/

View file

@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2013 The University of Oslo
* Copyright (c) 2016 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#include <security/openpam.h>
#include "openpam_strlcmp.h"
#include <security/oath.h>
/*
* OATH
*
* Loads an OATH key from a file
*/
struct oath_key *
oath_key_from_file(const char *filename)
{
struct oath_key *key;
FILE *f;
char *line;
size_t len;
if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
return (NULL);
/* get first non-empty non-comment line */
line = openpam_readline(f, NULL, &len);
fclose(f);
if (strlcmp("otpauth://", line, len) == 0) {
key = oath_key_from_uri(line);
} else {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR,
"unrecognized key file format: %s", filename);
key = NULL;
}
free(line);
return (key);
}
/**
* The =oath_key_from_file function loads a key from the specified file.
* The file format is automatically detected.
*
* The following key file formats are supported:
*
* - otpauth URI
*
* Keys created with =oath_key_from_file must be freed using
* =oath_key_free.
*
* >oath_key_alloc
* >oath_key_free
* >oath_key_from_uri
*
* AUTHOR UIO
*/

View file

@ -1,234 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2013-2016 The University of Oslo
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#include <security/openpam.h>
#include "openpam_strlcmp.h"
#include "openpam_strlcpy.h"
#include <security/oath.h>
/*
* OATH
*
* Creates an OATH key from a Google otpauth URI
*/
struct oath_key *
oath_key_from_uri(const char *uri)
{
char name[64], value[256];
size_t namelen, valuelen;
struct oath_key *key;
const char *p, *q, *r;
uintmax_t n;
char *e;
if ((key = oath_key_alloc()) == NULL)
return (NULL);
/* check method */
p = uri;
if (strlcmp("otpauth://", p, 10) != 0)
goto invalid;
p += 10;
/* check mode (hotp = event, totp = time-sync) */
if ((q = strchr(p, '/')) == NULL)
goto invalid;
if (strlcmp("hotp", p, q - p) == 0) {
key->mode = om_hotp;
} else if (strlcmp("totp", p, q - p) == 0) {
key->mode = om_totp;
} else {
goto invalid;
}
p = q + 1;
/* extract label */
if ((q = strchr(p, '?')) == NULL)
goto invalid;
valuelen = oath_uri_decode(p, q - p, value, sizeof value) - 1;
key->labellen = strlcpy(key->label, value, sizeof key->label);
if (key->labellen >= sizeof key->label)
goto invalid;
p = q + 1;
/* extract parameters */
key->counter = UINT64_MAX;
key->lastused = UINT64_MAX;
while (*p != '\0') {
/* locate name-value separator */
if ((q = strchr(p, '=')) == NULL)
goto invalid;
q = q + 1;
/* locate end of value */
if ((r = strchr(p, '&')) == NULL)
r = strchr(p, '\0');
if (r < q)
/* & before = */
goto invalid;
/* decode name and value*/
namelen = oath_uri_decode(p, q - p - 1, name, sizeof name) - 1;
if (namelen >= sizeof name)
goto invalid;
valuelen = oath_uri_decode(q, r - q, value, sizeof value) - 1;
if (valuelen >= sizeof value)
goto invalid;
if (strcmp("secret", name) == 0) {
if (key->keylen != 0)
/* dupe */
goto invalid;
key->keylen = sizeof key->key;
if (base32_dec(value, valuelen, (char *)key->key, &key->keylen) != 0)
goto invalid;
} else if (strcmp("algorithm", name) == 0) {
if (key->hash != oh_undef)
/* dupe */
goto invalid;
if (strcmp("SHA1", value) == 0)
key->hash = oh_sha1;
else if (strcmp("SHA256", value) == 0)
key->hash = oh_sha256;
else if (strcmp("SHA512", value) == 0)
key->hash = oh_sha512;
else if (strcmp("MD5", value) == 0)
key->hash = oh_md5;
else
goto invalid;
} else if (strcmp("digits", name) == 0) {
if (key->digits != 0)
/* dupe */
goto invalid;
/* only 6 or 8 */
if (valuelen != 1 || (*value != '6' && *value != '8'))
goto invalid;
key->digits = *q - '0';
} else if (strcmp("counter", name) == 0) {
if (key->counter != UINT64_MAX)
/* dupe */
goto invalid;
n = strtoumax(value, &e, 10);
if (e == value || *e != '\0' || n >= UINT64_MAX)
goto invalid;
key->counter = (uint64_t)n;
} else if (strcmp("lastused", name) == 0) {
if (key->lastused != UINT64_MAX)
/* dupe */
goto invalid;
n = strtoumax(value, &e, 10);
if (e == value || *e != '\0' || n >= UINT64_MAX)
goto invalid;
key->lastused = (uint64_t)n;
} else if (strcmp("period", name) == 0) {
if (key->timestep != 0)
/* dupe */
goto invalid;
n = strtoumax(value, &e, 10);
if (e == value || *e != '\0' || n > OATH_MAX_TIMESTEP)
goto invalid;
key->timestep = n;
} else if (strcmp("issuer", name) == 0) {
// noop for now
} else {
goto invalid;
}
/* final parameter? */
if (*r == '\0')
break;
/* skip & and continue */
p = r + 1;
}
/* sanity checks and default values */
if (key->mode == om_hotp) {
if (key->counter == UINT64_MAX)
key->counter = 0;
if (key->timestep != 0)
goto invalid;
if (key->lastused != UINT64_MAX)
goto invalid;
} else if (key->mode == om_totp) {
if (key->counter != UINT64_MAX)
goto invalid;
if (key->timestep == 0)
key->timestep = OATH_DEF_TIMESTEP;
if (key->lastused == UINT64_MAX)
key->lastused = 0;
} else {
/* unreachable */
oath_key_free(key);
return (NULL);
}
if (key->hash == oh_undef)
key->hash = oh_sha1;
if (key->digits == 0)
key->digits = 6;
if (key->keylen == 0)
goto invalid;
return (key);
invalid:
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_NOTICE, "invalid OATH URI: %s", uri);
oath_key_free(key);
return (NULL);
}
/**
* The =oath_key_from_uri function parses a Google otpauth URI into a key
* structure.
*
* The =uri parameter points to a NUL-terminated string containing the
* URI.
*
* Keys created with =oath_key_from_uri must be freed using
* =oath_key_free.
*
* >oath_key_alloc
* >oath_key_free
* >oath_key_to_uri
*
* REFERENCES
*
* https://code.google.com/p/google-authenticator/wiki/KeyUriFormat
*
* AUTHOR UIO
*/

View file

@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2014 The University of Oslo
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <security/oath.h>
static const char *oath_mode_names[om_max] = {
[om_hotp] = "hotp",
[om_totp] = "totp",
};
/*
* OATH
*
* Converts a mode name to the corresponding enum value
*/
enum oath_mode
oath_mode(const char *str)
{
enum oath_mode om;
for (om = 0; om < om_max; ++om) {
if (oath_mode_names[om] != NULL &&
strcasecmp(oath_mode_names[om], str) == 0) {
return (om);
}
}
return (om_undef);
}
/**
* The =oath_mode function returns the =enum oath_mode value that
* corresponds to the specified string.
*
* AUTHOR UIO
*/

View file

@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2012-2014 The University of Oslo
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <security/oath.h>
#define TOTP_TIME_STEP 30
unsigned int
oath_totp(const uint8_t *K, size_t Klen, unsigned int Digit)
{
time_t now;
time(&now);
return (oath_hotp(K, Klen, now / TOTP_TIME_STEP, Digit));
}
unsigned int
oath_totp_current(const struct oath_key *k)
{
unsigned int code;
uint64_t seq;
if (k == NULL)
return (UINT_MAX);
if (k->mode != om_totp)
return (UINT_MAX);
if (k->timestep == 0)
return (UINT_MAX);
seq = time(NULL) / k->timestep;
code = oath_hotp(k->key, k->keylen, seq, k->digits);
return (code);
}
/*
* Compares the code provided by the user with expected values within a
* given window. Returns 1 if there was a match, 0 if not, and -1 if an
* error occurred.
*/
int
oath_totp_match(struct oath_key *k, unsigned int response, int window)
{
unsigned int code;
uint64_t seq;
if (k == NULL)
return (-1);
if (window < 0)
return (-1);
if (k->mode != om_totp)
return (-1);
if (k->timestep == 0)
return (-1);
seq = time(NULL) / k->timestep;
for (int i = -window; i <= window; ++i) {
if (seq + i <= k->lastused)
continue;
code = oath_hotp(k->key, k->keylen, seq + i, k->digits);
if (code == response && !k->dummy) {
k->lastused = seq;
return (1);
}
}
return (0);
}

View file

@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "openpam_ctype.h"
#define unhex(ch) \
((ch >= '0' && ch <= '9') ? ch - '0' : \
(ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'F') ? 0xa + ch - 'A' : \
(ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'f') ? 0xa + ch - 'a' : 0)
/*
* OATH
*
* Decodes a URI-encoded string.
*/
size_t
oath_uri_decode(const char *in, size_t ilen, char *out, size_t olen)
{
size_t ipos, opos;
if (ilen == 0)
ilen = strlen(in);
for (ipos = opos = 0; ipos < ilen && in[ipos] != '\0'; ++ipos, ++opos) {
if (in[ipos] == '%' && ipos + 2 < ilen &&
is_xdigit(in[ipos + 1]) && is_xdigit(in[ipos + 2])) {
if (out != NULL && opos < olen - 1)
out[opos] = unhex(in[ipos + 1]) * 16 +
unhex(in[ipos + 2]);
ipos += 2;
} else {
if (out != NULL && opos < olen - 1)
out[opos] = in[ipos];
}
}
if (out != NULL && olen > 0)
out[opos < olen ? opos : olen - 1] = '\0';
return (opos + 1);
}
/**
* The =oath_uri_decode function decodes a URI-encoded ("percent-encoded")
* string.
*
* The =in parameter points to the string to be decoded, and the =ilen
* parameter is its length. If =ilen is 0, =oath_uri_decode will decode
* the entire string.
*
* The =out parameter points to a buffer in which the decoded data is to
* be stored; the =olen parameter is the size of that buffer. If =out is
* =NULL, the decoded data is discarded, but =oath_uri_decode still counts
* the amount of space needed to store it.
*
* The output buffer is always NUL-terminated, regardless of how much or
* how little data was decoded.
*
* RETURN VALUES
*
* The =oath_uri_decode funtion always returns the amount of space
* required to store the entire decoded string, including the terminating
* NUL. This may exceed the actual size of the output buffer.
*
* AUTHOR UIO
*/

View file

@ -347,9 +347,6 @@ sub parse_source($) {
if ($source !~ m/^ \* XSSO \d/m) {
$FUNCTIONS{$func}->{openpam} = 1;
}
if ($func =~ m/^oath/) {
$FUNCTIONS{$func}->{oath} = 1;
}
expand_errors($FUNCTIONS{$func});
return $FUNCTIONS{$func};
}
@ -453,25 +450,14 @@ sub gendoc($) {
if ($func =~ m/^(?:open)?pam_/) {
$mdoc .= ".Sh LIBRARY
.Lb libpam
";
} elsif ($func =~ m/^oath_/) {
$mdoc .= ".Sh LIBRARY
.Lb liboath
";
}
$mdoc .= ".Sh SYNOPSIS
.In sys/types.h
";
if ($$func{name} =~ m/^oath/) {
$mdoc .= ".In stdint.h\n";
}
if ($$func{args} =~ m/\bFILE \*\b/) {
$mdoc .= ".In stdio.h\n";
}
if ($$func{name} =~ m/^oath/) {
$mdoc .= ".In security/oath.h
";
}
if ($$func{name} =~ m/^(?:open)?pam/) {
$mdoc .= ".In security/pam_appl.h
";
@ -541,8 +527,6 @@ on failure.
.Fn $$func{name}
function is an OpenPAM extension.
";
} elsif ($$func{oath}) {
# nothing yet
} else {
$mdoc .= ".Rs
.%T \"X/Open Single Sign-On Service (XSSO) - Pluggable Authentication Modules\"
@ -573,7 +557,7 @@ sub readproto($) {
open(FILE, "<", "$fn")
or die("$fn: open(): $!\n");
while (<FILE>) {
if (m/^\.Nm ((?:(?:open)?pam|oath)_.*?)\s*$/) {
if (m/^\.Nm ((?:(?:open)?pam)_.*?)\s*$/) {
$func{Nm} = $func{Nm} || $1;
} elsif (m/^\.Ft (\S.*?)\s*$/) {
$func{Ft} = $func{Ft} || $1;
@ -621,8 +605,6 @@ sub gensummary($) {
.Sh SYNOPSIS\n";
if ($page eq 'pam') {
print FILE ".In security/pam_appl.h\n";
} elsif ($page eq 'oath') {
print FILE ".In security/oath.h\n";
} else {
print FILE ".In security/openpam.h\n";
}
@ -657,21 +639,15 @@ The following return codes are defined by
++$xref{3}->{$func};
}
print FILE genxref(\%xref);
if ($page eq 'oath') {
print FILE ".Sh AUTHORS
The OATH library and this manual page were $AUTHORS{UIO}
";
} else {
print FILE ".Sh STANDARDS
print FILE ".Sh STANDARDS
.Rs
.%T \"X/Open Single Sign-On Service (XSSO) - Pluggable Authentication Modules\"
.%D \"June 1997\"
.Re
";
print FILE ".Sh AUTHORS
print FILE ".Sh AUTHORS
The OpenPAM library and this manual page were $AUTHORS{THINKSEC}
";
}
close(FILE);
}
@ -685,15 +661,13 @@ MAIN:{
my %opts;
usage()
unless (@ARGV && getopts("aop", \%opts));
unless (@ARGV && getopts("op", \%opts));
$TODAY = strftime("%B %e, %Y", localtime(time()));
$TODAY =~ s,\s+, ,g;
if ($opts{a} || $opts{o} || $opts{p}) {
if ($opts{o} || $opts{p}) {
foreach my $fn (@ARGV) {
readproto($fn);
}
gensummary('oath')
if ($opts{a});
gensummary('openpam')
if ($opts{o});
gensummary('pam')

View file

@ -5,7 +5,3 @@ SUBDIRS = pam_deny pam_permit pam_return
if WITH_PAM_UNIX
SUBDIRS += pam_unix
endif
if WITH_OATH
SUBDIRS += pam_oath
endif

View file

@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
# $Id$
if CUSTOM_MODULES_DIR
moduledir = $(OPENPAM_MODULES_DIR)
else
moduledir = $(libdir)
endif
AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include
module_LTLIBRARIES = pam_oath.la
pam_oath_la_SOURCES = pam_oath.c
pam_oath_la_LDFLAGS = -no-undefined -module -version-info $(LIB_MAJ) \
-export-symbols-regex '^pam_sm_'
pam_oath_la_LIBADD =
if WITH_SYSTEM_LIBOATH
pam_oath_la_LIBADD += $(SYSTEM_LIBOATH)
else
pam_oath_la_LIBADD += $(top_builddir)/lib/liboath/liboath.la
endif
if WITH_SYSTEM_LIBPAM
pam_oath_la_LIBADD += $(SYSTEM_LIBPAM)
else
pam_oath_la_LIBADD += $(top_builddir)/lib/libpam/libpam.la
endif
dist_man8_MANS = pam_oath.8

View file

@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
.\"-
.\" Copyright (c) 2012-2016 The University of Oslo
.\" All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\" 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
.\" products derived from this software without specific prior written
.\" permission.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\"
.\" $Id$
.\"
.Dd January 11, 2016
.Dt PAM_OATH 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm pam_oath
.Nd OATH service module
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Op Ar service
.Ar module-type
.Ar control-flag
.Cm Nm
.Op Ar arguments
.Sh DESCRIPTION
The
.Nm
service module implements counter-based and time-based one-time
passwords.
.Pp
The
.Nm
service module recognizes the following options:
.Bl -tag -width ".Cm echo_pass"
.It Cm nokey = Ar fail | fake | ignore
Specifies how the module should behave when no key is available for
the user: either fail immediately, prompt for a code but fail anyway,
or let authentication proceed by other means.
\" .It Cm nouser = Ar fail | fake | ignore
\" Specifies how the module should behave when the user does not exist.
\" See
\" .Bm nokey
\" above.
\" .It Cm badkey = Ar fail | fake | ignore
\" Specifies how the module should behave when the user exists and has a
\" key, but the key could not be loaded (e.g. due to a syntax error in
\" the keyfile).
\" See
\" .Bm nokey
\" above.
.El
.Pp
The
.Nm
service module uses
.Xr pam_get_authtok 3
to prompt the user, and will therefore also be affected by the
standard options
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr oathkey 1 ,
.Xr pam.conf 5 ,
.Xr pam 8
.Sh AUTHORS
The
.Nm
module and this manual page were developed by
.An Dag-Erling Sm\(/orgrav Aq des@des.no
for the University of Oslo.

View file

@ -1,320 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2012-2013 The University of Oslo
* Copyright (c) 2016 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define PAM_SM_AUTH
#define PAM_SM_ACCOUNT
#include <security/pam_modules.h>
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#include <security/oath.h>
#define PAM_OATH_PROMPT "Verification code: "
#define PAM_OATH_HOTP_WINDOW 3
#define PAM_OATH_TOTP_WINDOW 3
enum pam_oath_nokey { nokey_error = -1, nokey_fail, nokey_fake, nokey_ignore };
static const char *pam_oath_default_keyfile = "/var/oath/%u.otpauth";
/*
* Parse the nokey or badkey option, which indicates how we should act if
* the user has no keyfile or the keyfile is invalid.
*/
static enum pam_oath_nokey
pam_oath_nokey_option(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *option)
{
const char *value;
if ((value = openpam_get_option(pamh, option)) == NULL)
return (nokey_fail);
else if (strcmp(value, "fail") == 0)
return (nokey_fail);
else if (strcmp(value, "fake") == 0)
return (nokey_fake);
else if (strcmp(value, "ignore") == 0)
return (nokey_ignore);
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "the value of the %s option "
"must be either 'fail', 'fake' or 'ignore'", option);
return (nokey_error);
}
/*
* Parse a numeric option. Returns -1 if the option is not set or its
* value is not an integer in the range [0, INT_MAX].
*/
static int
pam_oath_int_option(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *option)
{
const char *value;
char *end;
long num;
if ((value = openpam_get_option(pamh, option)) == NULL)
return (-1);
num = strtol(value, &end, 10);
if (*value == '\0' || *end != '\0' || num < 0 || num > INT_MAX) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "the value of the %s option "
"is invalid.", option);
return (-1);
}
return (num);
}
/*
* Determine the location of the user's keyfile.
*/
static char *
pam_oath_keyfile(pam_handle_t *pamh)
{
const char *keyfile;
char *path;
size_t size;
if ((keyfile = openpam_get_option(pamh, "keyfile")) == NULL)
keyfile = pam_oath_default_keyfile;
size = 0;
if (openpam_subst(pamh, NULL, &size, keyfile) != PAM_TRY_AGAIN)
return (NULL);
if ((path = malloc(size)) == NULL)
return (NULL);
if (openpam_subst(pamh, path, &size, keyfile) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
free(path);
return (NULL);
}
return (path);
}
/*
* Load the user's key.
*/
static struct oath_key *
pam_oath_load_key(const char *keyfile)
{
/* XXX should check ownership and permissions */
return (oath_key_from_file(keyfile));
}
/*
* Save the user's key.
* XXX should be a liboath API function.
*/
static int
pam_oath_save_key(const struct oath_key *key, const char *keyfile)
{
char *keyuri;
int fd, len, pam_err;
keyuri = NULL;
len = 0;
fd = -1;
pam_err = PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
if ((keyuri = oath_key_to_uri(key)) == NULL)
goto done;
len = strlen(keyuri);
if ((fd = open(keyfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0600)) < 0 ||
write(fd, keyuri, len) != len || write(fd, "\n", 1) != 1) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", keyfile);
goto done;
}
pam_err = PAM_SUCCESS;
done:
if (fd >= 0)
close(fd);
if (keyuri != NULL) {
memset(keyuri, 0, len);
free(keyuri);
}
return (pam_err);
}
PAM_EXTERN int
pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
int argc, const char *argv[])
{
enum pam_oath_nokey nokey, badkey;
struct passwd *pwd;
const char *user, *password;
char *end, *keyfile;
struct oath_key *key;
unsigned long response;
int pam_err, ret, window;
/* unused */
(void)flags;
(void)argc;
(void)argv;
keyfile = NULL;
key = NULL;
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_VERBOSE, "attempting OATH authentication");
/* check how to behave if the user does not have a valid key */
if ((nokey = pam_oath_nokey_option(pamh, "nokey")) == nokey_error ||
(badkey = pam_oath_nokey_option(pamh, "badkey")) == nokey_error) {
pam_err = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
goto done;
}
/* identify user */
if ((pam_err = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL)) != PAM_SUCCESS)
goto done;
if ((pwd = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
pam_err = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
goto done;
}
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_VERBOSE, "authenticating user %s", user);
/* load key */
if ((keyfile = pam_oath_keyfile(pamh)) == NULL) {
pam_err = PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
goto done;
}
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_VERBOSE, "attempting to load %s for %s", keyfile, user);
key = pam_oath_load_key(keyfile);
/*
* The user doesn't have a key, should we fake it?
*
* XXX implement badkey - currently, oath_key_from_file() doesn't
* provide enough information for us to tell the difference
* between a bad key and no key at all.
*
* XXX move this into pam_oath_load_key()
*/
if (key == NULL) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_VERBOSE, "no key found for %s", user);
switch (nokey) {
case nokey_fail:
pam_err = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
goto done;
case nokey_fake:
key = oath_key_dummy(om_hotp, oh_sha1, 6);
break;
case nokey_ignore:
pam_err = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
default:
/* can't happen */
pam_err = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
goto done;
}
}
/* get user's response */
pam_err = pam_get_authtok(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK,
&password, PAM_OATH_PROMPT);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_VERBOSE, "conversation failure");
goto done;
}
/* convert to number */
response = strtoul(password, &end, 10);
if (end == password || *end != '\0')
response = ULONG_MAX;
/* verify response */
if (key->mode == om_hotp) {
if ((window = pam_oath_int_option(pamh, "hotp_window")) < 0 &&
(window = pam_oath_int_option(pamh, "window")) < 0)
window = PAM_OATH_HOTP_WINDOW;
ret = oath_hotp_match(key, response, window);
} else {
if ((window = pam_oath_int_option(pamh, "totp_window")) < 0 &&
(window = pam_oath_int_option(pamh, "window")) < 0)
window = PAM_OATH_TOTP_WINDOW;
ret = oath_totp_match(key, response, window);
}
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_VERBOSE, "verification code %s",
ret > 0 ? "matched" : "did not match");
if (ret <= 0) {
pam_err = ret < 0 ? PAM_SERVICE_ERR : PAM_AUTH_ERR;
goto done;
}
/* write back the key (update counter for HOTP, lastused for TOTP) */
if (pam_oath_save_key(key, keyfile) != 0) {
pam_err = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
goto done;
}
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_VERBOSE, "OATH authentication succeeded");
pam_err = PAM_SUCCESS;
done:
oath_key_free(key);
free(keyfile);
return (pam_err);
}
PAM_EXTERN int
pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
int argc, const char *argv[])
{
/* unused */
(void)pamh;
(void)flags;
(void)argc;
(void)argv;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
}
PAM_EXTERN int
pam_sm_acct_mgmt(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
int argc, const char *argv[])
{
/* unused */
(void)pamh;
(void)flags;
(void)argc;
(void)argv;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
}
PAM_MODULE_ENTRY("pam_unix");

View file

@ -13,9 +13,6 @@ TESTS += t_openpam_ctype
TESTS += t_openpam_dispatch
TESTS += t_openpam_readword
TESTS += t_openpam_readlinev
if WITH_OATH
TESTS += t_rfc3986 t_rfc4648
endif
check_PROGRAMS = $(TESTS)
# libt - common support code
@ -29,10 +26,3 @@ LDADD += $(SYSTEM_LIBPAM)
else
LDADD += $(top_builddir)/lib/libpam/libpam.la
endif
if WITH_OATH
if WITH_SYSTEM_LIBOATH
LDADD += $(SYSTEM_LIBOATH)
else
LDADD += $(top_builddir)/lib/liboath/liboath.la
endif
endif

View file

@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2013-2015 The University of Oslo
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <security/oath.h>
#include "t.h"
struct t_case {
const char *desc;
size_t (*func)(const char *, size_t, char *, size_t);
const char *in; /* input string */
size_t ilen; /* input length */
const char *out; /* expected output string */
size_t olen; /* expected output length */
};
/* basic encoding / decoding */
#define T_ENCODE6(d, i, il, o, ol) \
{ .func = oath_uri_encode, .desc = d, \
.in = i, .ilen = il, .out = o, .olen = ol }
#define T_ENCODE5(d, i, il, o, ol) \
T_ENCODE6(d, i, il, o, ol)
#define T_ENCODE4(d, i, il, o) \
T_ENCODE5(d, i, il, o, sizeof o)
#define T_ENCODE(d, i, o) \
T_ENCODE4(d, i, sizeof i - 1, o)
#define T_DECODE6(d, i, il, o, ol) \
{ .func = oath_uri_decode, .desc = d, \
.in = i, .ilen = il, .out = o, .olen = ol }
#define T_DECODE5(d, i, il, o, ol) \
T_DECODE6(d, i, il, o, ol)
#define T_DECODE4(d, i, il, o) \
T_DECODE5(d, i, il, o, sizeof o)
#define T_DECODE(d, i, o) \
T_DECODE4(d, i, sizeof i - 1, o)
#define T_ENCDEC(d, i, o) \
T_ENCODE(d " enc", i, o), T_DECODE(d " dec", o, i)
static struct t_case t_cases[] = {
/* empty */
T_DECODE("empty", "", ""),
/* simple */
T_DECODE("simple", "%20", " "),
T_DECODE("prefix", "x%20", "x "),
T_DECODE("suffix", "%20x", " x"),
T_DECODE("surrounded", "x%20x", "x x"),
/* input overflow */
T_DECODE4("short", "%20xy", 4, " x"),
/* partials */
T_DECODE("partial, one", "%", "%"),
T_DECODE("partial, two", "%2", "%2"),
/* non-hex character */
T_DECODE("non-hex, first", "%2x", "%2x"),
T_DECODE("non-hex, second", "%x0", "%x0"),
T_DECODE("non-hex, both", "%xx", "%xx"),
};
/*
* Encoding test function
*/
static int
t_rfc3986(void *arg)
{
struct t_case *t = arg;
char buf[256];
size_t len;
int ret;
len = t->func(t->in, t->ilen, buf, sizeof buf);
ret = 1;
if (t->out && len != t->olen) {
t_verbose("expected output length %zu, got %zu\n",
t->olen, len);
ret = 0;
}
if (t->out && strncmp(buf, t->out, len) != 0) {
t_verbose("expected '%.*s' got '%.*s'\n",
(int)t->olen, t->out, (int)len, buf);
ret = 0;
}
return (ret);
}
/*
* Generate the test plan
*/
struct t_test **
t_prepare(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct t_test **plan, *tests;
int i, n;
(void)argc;
(void)argv;
n = sizeof t_cases / sizeof t_cases[0];
if ((plan = calloc(n + 1, sizeof *plan)) == NULL ||
(tests = calloc(n, sizeof *tests)) == NULL)
return (NULL);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
plan[i] = &tests[i];
tests[i].func = t_rfc3986;
tests[i].desc = t_cases[i].desc;
tests[i].arg = &t_cases[i];
}
plan[n] = NULL;
return (plan);
}
/*
* Cleanup
*/
void
t_cleanup(void)
{
}

View file

@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2013-2015 The University of Oslo
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $Id$
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <security/oath.h>
#include "t.h"
struct t_case {
const char *desc;
int (*func)(const char *, size_t, char *, size_t *);
const char *in; /* input string */
size_t ilen; /* input length */
const char *out; /* expected output string or NULL */
size_t blen; /* initial value for olen or 0*/
size_t olen; /* expected value for olen */
int ret; /* expected return value */
int err; /* expected errno if ret != 0 */
};
/* basic encoding / decoding */
#define T_ENCODE_N(N, i, o) \
{ "base"#N"_enc("#i")", base##N##_enc, i, sizeof i - 1, \
o, sizeof o, sizeof o, 0, 0 }
#define T_DECODE_N(N, i, o) \
{ "base"#N"_dec("#i")", base##N##_dec, i, sizeof i - 1, \
o, sizeof o - 1, sizeof o - 1, 0, 0 }
#define T_ENCODE(p, b32, b64) \
T_ENCODE_N(32, p, b32), T_ENCODE_N(64, p, b64)
#define T_DECODE(p, b32, b64) \
T_DECODE_N(32, b32, p), T_DECODE_N(64, b64, p)
/* roundtrip encoding tests */
#define T_ENCDEC_N(N, p, e) \
T_ENCODE_N(N, p, e), T_DECODE_N(N, e, p)
#define T_ENCDEC(p, b32, b64) \
T_ENCDEC_N(32, p, b32), T_ENCDEC_N(64, p, b64)
/* decoding failure */
#define T_DECODE_FAIL_N(N, e, i) \
{ "base"#N"_dec("#i")", base##N##_dec, i, sizeof i - 1, \
NULL, 0, 0, -1, e }
#define T_DECODE_FAIL(e, b32, b64) \
T_DECODE_FAIL_N(32, e, b32), T_DECODE_FAIL_N(64, e, b64)
/* input string shorter than input length */
#define T_SHORT_INPUT_DEC(N, i) \
{ "base"#N"_dec (short input)", base##N##_dec, i, sizeof i + 2, \
NULL, 0, base##N##_declen(sizeof i - 1), 0, 0 }
#define T_SHORT_INPUT() \
T_SHORT_INPUT_DEC(32, "AAAAAAAA"), \
T_SHORT_INPUT_DEC(64, "AAAA")
/* output string longer than output length */
#define T_LONG_OUTPUT_ENC(N, i) \
{ "base"#N"_enc (long output)", base##N##_enc, i, sizeof i - 1, \
NULL, 1, base##N##_enclen(sizeof i - 1) + 1, -1, ENOSPC }
#define T_LONG_OUTPUT_DEC(N, i) \
{ "base"#N"_dec (long output)", base##N##_dec, "AAAAAAAA", 8, \
NULL, 1, base##N##_declen(sizeof i - 1), -1, ENOSPC }
#define T_LONG_OUTPUT() \
T_LONG_OUTPUT_ENC(32, "foo"), \
T_LONG_OUTPUT_DEC(32, "AAAAAAAA"), \
T_LONG_OUTPUT_ENC(64, "foo"), \
T_LONG_OUTPUT_DEC(64, "AAAA")
static const char b64alphabet[] =
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
"0123456789+/";
static const char b64complete[] = {
0x00, 0x10, 0x83, 0x10, 0x51, 0x87,
0x20, 0x92, 0x8b, 0x30, 0xd3, 0x8f,
0x41, 0x14, 0x93, 0x51, 0x55, 0x97,
0x61, 0x96, 0x9b, 0x71, 0xd7, 0x9f,
0x82, 0x18, 0xa3, 0x92, 0x59, 0xa7,
0xa2, 0x9a, 0xab, 0xb2, 0xdb, 0xaf,
0xc3, 0x1c, 0xb3, 0xd3, 0x5d, 0xb7,
0xe3, 0x9e, 0xbb, 0xf3, 0xdf, 0xbf,
0x00
};
static const char b32alphabet[] =
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567";
static const char b32complete[] = {
0x00, 0x44, 0x32, 0x14, 0xc7,
0x42, 0x54, 0xb6, 0x35, 0xcf,
0x84, 0x65, 0x3a, 0x56, 0xd7,
0xc6, 0x75, 0xbe, 0x77, 0xdf,
0x00
};
static struct t_case t_cases[] = {
/* complete alphabet */
T_ENCDEC_N(32, b32complete, b32alphabet),
T_ENCDEC_N(64, b64complete, b64alphabet),
/* test vectors from RFC 4648 */
/* plain base32 base64 */
T_ENCDEC("", "", ""),
T_ENCDEC("f", "MY======", "Zg=="),
T_ENCDEC("fo", "MZXQ====", "Zm8="),
T_ENCDEC("foo", "MZXW6===", "Zm9v"),
T_ENCDEC("foob", "MZXW6YQ=", "Zm9vYg=="),
T_ENCDEC("fooba", "MZXW6YTB", "Zm9vYmE="),
T_ENCDEC("foobar", "MZXW6YTBOI======", "Zm9vYmFy"),
/* zeroes */
T_ENCDEC("\0\0\0", "AAAAA===", "AAAA"),
/* sloppy padding */
T_DECODE("f", "MY=", "Zg="),
T_DECODE("f", "MY", "Zg"),
/* whitespace */
/* plain base32 base64 */
T_DECODE("tst", "ORZX I===", "dH N0"),
T_DECODE("tst", "ORZX\tI===", "dH\tN0"),
T_DECODE("tst", "ORZX\rI===", "dH\rN0"),
T_DECODE("tst", "ORZX\nI===", "dH\nN0"),
/* invalid character in data */
T_DECODE_FAIL(EINVAL, "AA!AAAAAA", "AA!A"),
/* invalid character in padding */
T_DECODE_FAIL(EINVAL, "AAAAA==!", "AA=!"),
/* padding with no data */
T_DECODE_FAIL(EINVAL, "AAAAAAAA=", "AAAA="),
/* data after padding */
T_DECODE_FAIL(EINVAL, "AA=A", "AA=A"),
/* padding in incorrect location */
T_DECODE_FAIL_N(32, EINVAL, "A======="),
T_DECODE_FAIL_N(32, EINVAL, "AAA====="),
T_DECODE_FAIL_N(32, EINVAL, "AAAAAA=="),
T_DECODE_FAIL_N(64, EINVAL, "A==="),
/* various error conditions */
T_SHORT_INPUT(),
T_LONG_OUTPUT(),
};
/*
* Encoding test function
*/
static int
t_rfc4648(void *arg)
{
struct t_case *t = arg;
char buf[256];
size_t len;
int ret;
len = t->blen ? t->blen : sizeof buf;
ret = t->func(t->in, t->ilen, buf, &len);
if (ret != t->ret) {
t_verbose("expected return code %d, got %d\n",
t->ret, ret);
return (0);
}
if (t->out && len != t->olen) {
t_verbose("expected output length %zu, got %zu\n",
t->olen, len);
return (0);
}
if (t->ret != 0 && errno != t->err) {
t_verbose("expected errno %d, got %d\n",
t->err, errno);
return (0);
}
if (t->ret == 0 && t->out && strncmp(buf, t->out, len) != 0) {
t_verbose("expected '%.*s' got '%.*s'\n",
(int)t->olen, t->out, (int)len, buf);
return (0);
}
return (1);
}
/*
* Generate the test plan
*/
struct t_test **
t_prepare(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct t_test **plan, *tests;
int i, n;
(void)argc;
(void)argv;
n = sizeof t_cases / sizeof t_cases[0];
if ((plan = calloc(n + 1, sizeof *plan)) == NULL ||
(tests = calloc(n, sizeof *tests)) == NULL)
return (NULL);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
plan[i] = &tests[i];
tests[i].func = t_rfc4648;
tests[i].desc = t_cases[i].desc;
tests[i].arg = &t_cases[i];
}
plan[n] = NULL;
return (plan);
}
/*
* Cleanup
*/
void
t_cleanup(void)
{
}