Prepare to release Ximenia tomorrow.

My thanks to Robert Morris <rtm@lcs.mit.edu> for finding and reporting the bug.

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/aclocal.m4
+/autom4te.cache
+/compile
+/config.guess
+/config.h.in
+/config.h
+/config.log
+/config.status
+/config.sub
+/configure
+/cov
+/depcomp
+/install-sh
+/libtool
+/ltmain.sh
+/missing
+/stamp-h1
+/test-driver
+*~
+.deps
+.libs
+*.a
+*.la
+*.lo
+*.log
+*.o
+*.pc
+*.profraw
+Makefile
+Makefile.in

CREDITS

@@ -15,23 +15,28 @@ directly or indirectly, with patches, criticism, suggestions, or
 ideas:
 
 	Andrew Morgan <morgan@transmeta.com>
+	Ankita Pal <pal.ankita.ankita@gmail.com>
+	Baptiste Daroussin <bapt@freebsd.org>
 	Brian Fundakowski Feldman <green@freebsd.org>
+	Brooks Davis <brooks@freebsd.org>
 	Christos Zoulas <christos@netbsd.org>
 	Daniel Richard G. <skunk@iskunk.org>
 	Darren J. Moffat <darren.moffat@sun.com>
+	Dimitry Andric <dim@freebsd.org>
 	Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
 	Don Lewis <truckman@freebsd.org>
 	Emmanuel Dreyfus <manu@netbsd.org>
 	Eric Melville <eric@freebsd.org>
 	Espen Grøndahl <espegro@usit.uio.no>
 	Gary Winiger <gary.winiger@sun.com>
+	Gavin Atkinson <gavin@freebsd.org>
 	Gleb Smirnoff <glebius@freebsd.org>
 	Hubert Feyrer <hubert@feyrer.de>
 	Jason Evans <jasone@freebsd.org>
 	Joe Marcus Clarke <marcus@freebsd.org>
-	Juli Mallett <jmallett@freebsd.org>
-	Ankita Pal <pal.ankita.ankita@gmail.com>
 	Jörg Sonnenberger <joerg@britannica.bec.de>
+	Juli Mallett <jmallett@freebsd.org>
+	Larry Baird <lab@gta.com>
 	Maëlle Lesage <lesage.maelle@gmail.com>
 	Mark Murray <markm@freebsd.org>
 	Matthias Drochner <drochner@netbsd.org>
@@ -39,12 +44,13 @@ ideas:
 	Mikhail Teterin <mi@aldan.algebra.com>
 	Mikko Työläjärvi <mbsd@pacbell.net>
 	Nick Hibma <nick@van-laarhoven.org>
+	Patrick Bihan-Faou <patrick-fbsd@mindstep.com>
+	Robert Morris <rtm@lcs.mit.edu>
 	Robert Watson <rwatson@freebsd.org>
 	Ruslan Ermilov <ru@freebsd.org>
 	Sebastian Krahmer <sebastian.krahmer@gmail.com>
 	Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
 	Takanori Saneto <sanewo@ba2.so-net.ne.jp>
+	Tim Creech <tcreech@tcreech.com>
 	Wojciech A. Koszek <wkoszek@freebsd.org>
 	Yar Tikhiy <yar@freebsd.org>
-
-$Id$

HISTORY

@@ -1,7 +1,82 @@
-OpenPAM ??????????						2013-??-??
+OpenPAM Ximenia							2023-06-27
 
- - FEATURE: Add a pam_oath module that implements RFC 4226 (HOTP) and
-   RFC 6238 (TOTP).
+ - BUGFIX: Fix race condition in openpam_ttyconv(3) when used with
+   expect scripts.
+
+ - BUGFIX: In openpam_set_option(3), when removing an option, properly
+   decrement the option count.
+
+ - BUGFIX: In openpam_subst(3), avoid incrementing past the end of the
+   template.
+============================================================================
+OpenPAM Tabebuia						2019-02-24
+
+ - BUGFIX: Fix off-by-one bug in pam_getenv(3) which was introduced in
+   OpenPAM Radula.
+
+ - ENHANCE: Add unit tests for pam_{get,put,set}env(3).
+============================================================================
+OpenPAM Resedacea						2017-04-30
+
+ - BUGFIX: Reinstore the NULL check in pam_end(3) which was removed in
+   OpenPAM Radula, as it breaks common error-handling constructs.
+
+ - BUGFIX: Return PAM_SYMBOL_ERR instead of PAM_SYSTEM_ERR from the
+   dispatcher when the required service function could not be found.
+
+ - ENHANCE: Introduce the PAM_BAD_HANDLE error code for when pamh is
+   NULL in API functions that have a NULL check.
+
+ - ENHANCE: Introduce the PAM_BAD_ITEM, PAM_BAD_FEATURE and
+   PAM_BAD_CONSTANT error codes for situations where we previously
+   incorrectly used PAM_SYMBOL_ERR to denote that an invalid constant
+   had been passed to an API function.
+
+ - ENHANCE: Improve the RETURN VALUES section in API man pages,
+   especially for functions that cannot fail, which were incorrectly
+   documented as returning -1 on failure.
+============================================================================
+OpenPAM Radula							2017-02-19
+
+ - BUGFIX: Fix an inverted test which prevented pam_get_authtok(3) and
+   pam_get_user(3) from using application-provided custom prompts.
+
+ - BUGFIX: Plug a memory leak in pam_set_item(3).
+
+ - BUGFIX: Plug a potential memory leak in openpam_readlinev(3).
+
+ - BUGFIX: In openpam_readword(3), support line continuations within
+   whitespace.
+
+ - ENHANCE: Add a feature flag to control fallback to "other" policy.
+
+ - ENHANCE: Add a pam_return(8) module which returns an arbitrary
+   code specified in the module options.
+
+ - ENHANCE: More and better unit tests.
+============================================================================
+OpenPAM Ourouparia						2014-09-12
+
+ - ENHANCE: When executing a chain, require at least one service
+   function to succeed.  This mitigates fail-open scenarios caused by
+   misconfigurations or missing modules.
+
+ - ENHANCE: Make sure to overwrite buffers which may have contained an
+   authentication token when they're no longer needed.
+
+ - BUGFIX: Under certain circumstances, specifying a non-existent
+   module (or misspelling the name of a module) in a policy could
+   result in a fail-open scenario.  (CVE-2014-3879)
+
+ - FEATURE: Add a search path for modules.  This was implemented in
+   Nummularia but inadvertently left out of the release notes.
+
+ - BUGFIX: The is_upper() predicate only accepted the letter A as an
+   upper-case character instead of the entire A-Z range.  As a result,
+   service and module names containing upper-case letters other than A
+   would be rejected.
+============================================================================
+OpenPAM Nummularia						2013-09-07
 
  - ENHANCE: Rewrite the dynamic loader to improve readability and
    reliability.  Modules can now be listed without the ".so" suffix in
@@ -100,7 +175,7 @@ OpenPAM Lycopsida						2011-12-18
    module before loading it.
 
  - ENHANCE: added / improved input validation in many cases, including
-   the policy file and some function arguments.
+   the policy file and some function arguments.  (CVE-2011-4122)
 ============================================================================
 OpenPAM Hydrangea						2007-12-21
 
@@ -430,5 +505,3 @@ Fixed a number of bugs in the previous release, including:
 OpenPAM Calamite						2002-02-09
 
 First (beta) release.
-============================================================================
-$Id$

INSTALL

@@ -54,5 +54,3 @@
   directory:
 
   # make install
-
-$Id$

LICENSE

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 
 Copyright (c) 2002-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
-Copyright (c) 2004-2012 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+Copyright (c) 2004-2023 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
 All rights reserved.
 
 This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
@@ -31,5 +31,3 @@ HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 SUCH DAMAGE.
-
-$Id$

Makefile.am

@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
-# $Id$
-
 ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I m4
 
-SUBDIRS = lib bin modules include
+SUBDIRS = misc include lib bin modules
 
 if WITH_DOC
 SUBDIRS += doc
@@ -19,3 +17,32 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
 	RELNOTES \
 	autogen.sh \
 	misc/gendoc.pl
+
+if WITH_CODE_COVERAGE
+covdir = @abs_top_builddir@/cov
+coverage: coverage-clean all coverage-prepare coverage-run coverage-report
+coverage-clean:
+	-rm -rf "${covdir}"
+coverage-prepare:
+	mkdir "${covdir}"
+if CLANG_CODE_COVERAGE
+profdata = ${covdir}/@PACKAGE@.profdata
+# hardcoding libpam.so here is horrible, need to find a better solution
+coverage-run:
+	LLVM_PROFILE_FILE="${covdir}/@PACKAGE@.%p.raw" \
+	    ${MAKE} -C "@abs_top_builddir@" check
+coverage-report:
+	llvm-profdata@clang_ver@ merge \
+	    --sparse "${covdir}/@PACKAGE@".*.raw -o "${profdata}"
+	llvm-cov@clang_ver@ show \
+	    --format=html --tab-size=8 \
+	    --output-dir="${covdir}" \
+	    --instr-profile="${profdata}" \
+	    --object "@abs_top_builddir@/lib/libpam/.libs/libpam.so"
+	@echo "coverage report: file://${covdir}/index.html"
+endif
+else
+coverage:
+	echo "code coverage is not enabled." >&2
+	false
+endif

README

@@ -7,21 +7,4 @@ implementations disagree, OpenPAM tries to remain compatible with
 Solaris, at the expense of XSSO conformance and Linux-PAM
 compatibility.
 
-These are some of OpenPAM's features:
-
-   - Implements the complete PAM API as described in the original PAM
-     paper and in OSF-RFC 86.0; this corresponds to the full XSSO API
-     except for mappings and secondary authentication.  Also
-     implements some extensions found in Solaris 9.
-
-   - Extends the API with several useful and time-saving functions.
-
-   - Performs strict checking of return values from service modules.
-
-   - Reads configuration from /etc/pam.d/, /etc/pam.conf,
-     /usr/local/etc/pam.d/ and /usr/local/etc/pam.conf, in that order;
-     this will be made configurable in a future release.
-
 Please direct bug reports and inquiries to <des@des.no>.
-
-$Id$

RELNOTES

@@ -1,29 +1,21 @@
 
-		  Release notes for OpenPAM ????????
-		  ==================================
+		  Release notes for OpenPAM Ximenia
+		  =================================
 
-This release corresponds to the code used in FreeBSD HEAD as of the
-release date, and is also expected to work on almost any POSIX-like
-platform that has GNU autotools, GNU make and the GNU compiler suite
-installed.
+OpenPAM is developed primarily on FreeBSD, but is expected to work on
+almost any POSIX-like platform that has GNU autotools, GNU make and
+the GNU compiler suite installed.
 
-The distribution consists of the following components:
+The OpenPAM distribution consists of the following components:
 
  - The PAM library itself, with complete API documentation.
 
  - Sample modules (pam_permit, pam_deny and pam_unix) and a sample
-   application (su) which demonstrate how to use PAM.
+   application (su) which demonstrate how to use the PAM library.
 
  - A test application (pamtest) which can be used to test policies and
    modules.
 
- - A library which implements the OATH one-time password algorithms,
-   with complete API documentation.
-
- - A PAM module which implements OATH-based authentication.
-
- - Unit tests for limited portions of the libraries.
+ - Unit tests for limited portions of the library.
 
 Please direct bug reports and inquiries to <des@des.no>.
-
-$Id$

TODO

@@ -1,17 +1,9 @@
-Before the next release:
+- Fix try_first_pass / use_first_pass (pam_get_authtok() code &
+  documentation are slightly incorrect, OpenPAM's pam_unix(8) is
+  incorrect, all FreeBSD modules are broken)
 
- - Add oath_alloc_secure() which allocates memory using mmap() +
-   mlock() and oath_free_secure() which wipes and frees it.
+- Add loop detection to openpam_load_chain().
 
- - Rewrite openpam_ttyconv(3).
-   - mostly done, needs review.
+- Complete unit tests for openpam_dispatch().
 
- - Fix try_first_pass / use_first_pass (pam_get_authtok() code &
-   documentation are slightly incorrect, OpenPAM's pam_unix(8) is
-   incorrect, all FreeBSD modules are broken)
-
- - Finish pam_oath(8) and oathkey(1).
-
- - Add loop detection to openpam_load_chain().
-
-$Id$
+- Stop using PAM_SYMBOL_ERR incorrectly.

autogen.des

@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-#
-# $Id$
-#
 
 set -ex
 
@@ -11,7 +8,6 @@ set -ex
 export CONFIG_SHELL=/bin/sh
 
 ./configure \
-	--with-oath \
 	--with-doc \
 	--with-pam-unix \
 	--with-pamtest \
@@ -19,4 +15,5 @@ export CONFIG_SHELL=/bin/sh
 	--enable-debug \
 	--enable-developer-warnings \
 	--enable-werror \
+	--enable-code-coverage \
 	"$@"

autogen.sh

@@ -1,10 +1,7 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-#
-# $Id$
-#
 
-aclocal -I m4
 libtoolize --copy --force
+aclocal -I m4
 autoheader
-automake -a -c --foreign
+automake --add-missing --copy --foreign
 autoconf

bin/Makefile.am

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-# $Id$
-
 SUBDIRS = openpam_dump_policy
 
 if WITH_PAMTEST

bin/openpam_dump_policy/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/openpam_dump_policy

bin/openpam_dump_policy/Makefile.am

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
-# $Id$
-
 AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/libpam
 
 noinst_PROGRAMS = openpam_dump_policy
 openpam_dump_policy_SOURCES = openpam_dump_policy.c
+if WITH_SYSTEM_LIBPAM
+openpam_dump_policy_LDADD = $(SYSTEM_LIBPAM)
+else
 openpam_dump_policy_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/libpam/libpam.la
+endif

bin/openpam_dump_policy/openpam_dump_policy.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*-
- * Copyright (c) 2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2011-2014 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
@@ -64,7 +62,7 @@ openpam_facility_index_name(pam_facility_t fclt)
 	if (asprintf(&name, "PAM_%s", facility) == -1)
 		return (NULL);
 	for (p = name + 4; *p; ++p)
-		*p = toupper(*p);
+		*p = toupper((unsigned char)*p);
 	return (name);
 }
 

bin/pamtest/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/pamtest

bin/pamtest/Makefile.am

@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-# $Id$
-
 AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include
 
 bin_PROGRAMS = pamtest
 pamtest_SOURCES = pamtest.c
+if WITH_SYSTEM_LIBPAM
+pamtest_LDADD = $(SYSTEM_LIBPAM)
+else
 pamtest_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/libpam/libpam.la
+endif
 
 dist_man1_MANS = pamtest.1

bin/pamtest/pamtest.1

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 .\"-
-.\" Copyright (c) 2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+.\" Copyright (c) 2011-2017 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
 .\" All rights reserved.
 .\"
 .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -26,15 +26,13 @@
 .\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 .\" SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $Id$
-.\"
 .Dd July 11, 2013
 .Dt PAMTEST 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
 .Nm pamtest
 .Nd PAM policy tester
-.Sh SYNOPSYS
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
 .Nm
 .Op Fl dkMPsv
 .Op Fl H Ar rhost
@@ -168,7 +166,7 @@ pamtest -v system auth account change setcred open close unsetcred
 The
 .Nm
 utility and this manual page were written by
-.An Dag-Erling Sm\(/orgrav Aq des@des.no .
+.An Dag-Erling Sm\(/orgrav Aq Mt des@des.no .
 .Sh BUGS
 The
 .Nm

bin/pamtest/pamtest.c

@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

bin/su/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/su

bin/su/Makefile.am

@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-# $Id$
-
 AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include
 
 bin_PROGRAMS = su
 su_SOURCES = su.c
+if WITH_SYSTEM_LIBPAM
+su_LDADD = $(SYSTEM_LIBPAM)
+else
 su_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/libpam/libpam.la
+endif
 
 dist_man1_MANS = su.1

bin/su/su.1

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 .\"-
-.\" Copyright (c) 2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+.\" Copyright (c) 2011-2017 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
 .\" All rights reserved.
 .\"
 .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -26,15 +26,13 @@
 .\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 .\" SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $Id$
-.\"
 .Dd November 2, 2011
 .Dt SU 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
 .Nm su
 .Nd switch user identity
-.Sh SYNOPSYS
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
 .Nm
 .Op Ar login Op Ar ...
 .Sh DESCRIPTION
@@ -62,4 +60,4 @@ and should not be used in production systems.
 The
 .Nm
 utility and this manual page were written by
-.An Dag-Erling Sm\(/orgrav Aq des@des.no .
+.An Dag-Erling Sm\(/orgrav Aq Mt des@des.no .

bin/su/su.c

@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

configure.ac

@@ -1,8 +1,5 @@
-dnl $Id$
-
-AC_PREREQ([2.62])
-AC_REVISION([$Id$])
-AC_INIT([OpenPAM], [trunk], [des@des.no], [openpam], [http://www.openpam.org/])
+AC_PREREQ([2.69])
+AC_INIT([OpenPAM], [trunk], [des@des.no], [openpam], [https://openpam.org/])
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([lib/libpam/pam_start.c])
 AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
 AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([foreign])
@@ -10,18 +7,23 @@ AM_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h])
 
 # C compiler and features
 AC_LANG(C)
-AC_PROG_CC
+AC_PROG_CC([clang gcc cc])
 AC_PROG_CC_STDC
 AC_PROG_CPP
+AC_PROG_CXX([clang++ g++ c++])
 AC_GNU_SOURCE
 AC_C_CONST
 AC_C_RESTRICT
 AC_C_VOLATILE
+AX_COMPILER_VENDOR
 
 # libtool
 LT_PREREQ([2.2.6])
 LT_INIT([disable-static dlopen])
 
+# pkg-config
+AX_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
+
 # other programs
 AC_PROG_INSTALL
 
@@ -31,26 +33,26 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LIB_MAJ, $LIB_MAJ, [OpenPAM library major number])
 
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([debug],
     AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-debug],
-	[turn debugging macros on]),
+        [turn debugging macros on]),
     AC_DEFINE(OPENPAM_DEBUG, 1, [Turn debugging macros on]))
 
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([unversioned-modules],
     AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-unversioned-modules],
-	[support loading of unversioned modules]),
+        [support loading of unversioned modules]),
     [AS_IF([test x"$enableval" = x"no"], [
-	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UNVERSIONED_MODULES,
-	    1,
-	    [Whether loading unversioned modules support is disabled])
+        AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UNVERSIONED_MODULES,
+            1,
+            [Whether loading unversioned modules support is disabled])
     ])])
 
 AC_ARG_WITH([modules-dir],
     AC_HELP_STRING([--with-modules-dir=DIR],
-	[OpenPAM modules directory]),
+        [OpenPAM modules directory]),
     [AS_IF([test x"$withval" != x"no"], [
-	OPENPAM_MODULES_DIR="$withval"
-	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(OPENPAM_MODULES_DIR, 
-	    "${OPENPAM_MODULES_DIR%/}",
-	    [OpenPAM modules directory])
+        OPENPAM_MODULES_DIR="$withval"
+        AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(OPENPAM_MODULES_DIR,
+            "${OPENPAM_MODULES_DIR%/}",
+            [OpenPAM modules directory])
     ])])
 AC_SUBST(OPENPAM_MODULES_DIR)
 AM_CONDITIONAL([CUSTOM_MODULES_DIR], [test x"$OPENPAM_MODULES_DIR" != x""])
@@ -62,36 +64,36 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([doc],
 AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_DOC], [test x"$with_doc" = x"yes"])
 
 AC_ARG_WITH([pam-unix],
-    AC_HELP_STRING([--with-pam-unix], [compile sample pam_unix(8) module]),
+    AC_HELP_STRING([--with-pam-unix], [build sample pam_unix(8) module]),
     [],
     [with_pam_unix=no])
 AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_PAM_UNIX], [test x"$with_pam_unix" = x"yes"])
 
-AC_ARG_WITH([oath],
-    AC_HELP_STRING([--with-oath], [compile OATH library, module and utility]),
-    [],
-    [with_oath=no])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_OATH], [test x"$with_oath" = x"yes"])
-
 AC_ARG_WITH(pamtest,
-    AC_HELP_STRING([--with-pamtest], [compile test application]),
+    AC_HELP_STRING([--with-pamtest], [build test application]),
     [],
     [with_pamtest=no])
 AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_PAMTEST], [test x"$with_pamtest" = x"yes"])
 
 AC_ARG_WITH(su,
-    AC_HELP_STRING([--with-su], [compile sample su(1) implementation]),
+    AC_HELP_STRING([--with-su], [build sample su(1) implementation]),
     [],
     [with_su=no])
 AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_SU], [test x"$with_su" = x"yes"])
 
+AC_ARG_WITH(system-libpam,
+    AC_HELP_STRING([--with-system-libpam], [use system libpam]),
+    [],
+    [with_system_libpam=no])
+AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_SYSTEM_LIBPAM], [test x"$with_system_libpam" = x"yes"])
+
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS([crypt.h])
 
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS([asprintf vasprintf])
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dlfunc fdlopen])
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fpurge])
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setlogmask])
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strlcat strlcmp strlcpy])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strlcat strlcmp strlcpy strlset])
 
 saved_LIBS="${LIBS}"
 LIBS=""
@@ -102,21 +104,19 @@ AC_SUBST(DL_LIBS)
 
 saved_LIBS="${LIBS}"
 LIBS=""
-AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt])
-CRYPT_LIBS="${LIBS}"
+AC_CHECK_LIB([pam], [pam_start])
+SYSTEM_LIBPAM="${LIBS}"
 LIBS="${saved_LIBS}"
-AC_SUBST(CRYPT_LIBS)
+AC_SUBST(SYSTEM_LIBPAM)
 
-saved_LIBS="${LIBS}"
-LIBS=""
-AC_CHECK_LIB([crypto], [HMAC_CTX_init])
-CRYPTO_LIBS="${LIBS}"
-LIBS="${saved_LIBS}"
-AC_SUBST(CRYPTO_LIBS)
+AX_PKG_CONFIG_CHECK([cryb-test],
+  [AC_MSG_NOTICE([Cryb test framework found, unit tests enabled.])],
+  [AC_MSG_WARN([Cryb test framework not found, unit tests disabled.])])
+AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_TEST], [test x"$CRYB_TEST_LIBS" != x""])
 
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([developer-warnings],
     AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-developer-warnings], [enable strict warnings (default is NO)]),
-    [CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} -Wall -Wextra"])
+    [CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} -Wall -Wextra -Wcast-qual"])
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([debugging-symbols],
     AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-debugging-symbols], [enable debugging symbols (default is NO)]),
     [CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} -O0 -g -fno-inline"])
@@ -124,6 +124,27 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE([werror],
     AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-werror], [use -Werror (default is NO)]),
     [CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} -Werror"])
 
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([code-coverage],
+    AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-code-coverage],
+        [enable code coverage]))
+AS_IF([test x"$enable_code_coverage" = x"yes"], [
+    AM_COND_IF([WITH_TEST], [
+        AS_IF([test x"$ax_cv_c_compiler_vendor" = x"clang"], [
+            CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} -fprofile-instr-generate -fcoverage-mapping"
+            clang_code_coverage="yes"
+	    AC_SUBST([clang_ver], [${CC#clang}])
+        ], [
+            AC_MSG_ERROR([code coverage is only supported with clang])
+        ])
+        AC_DEFINE([WITH_CODE_COVERAGE], [1], [Define to 1 if code coverage is enabled])
+        AC_MSG_NOTICE([code coverage enabled])
+    ], [
+        AC_MSG_ERROR([code coverage requires unit tests])
+    ])
+])
+AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_CODE_COVERAGE], [test x"$enable_code_coverage" = x"yes"])
+AM_CONDITIONAL([CLANG_CODE_COVERAGE], [test x"$clang_code_coverage" = x"yes"])
+
 AC_CONFIG_FILES([
     Makefile
     bin/Makefile
@@ -132,18 +153,18 @@ AC_CONFIG_FILES([
     bin/su/Makefile
     doc/Makefile
     doc/man/Makefile
+    freebsd/Makefile
     include/Makefile
     include/security/Makefile
     lib/Makefile
-    lib/liboath/Makefile
     lib/libpam/Makefile
+    misc/Makefile
     modules/Makefile
     modules/pam_deny/Makefile
     modules/pam_permit/Makefile
+    modules/pam_return/Makefile
     modules/pam_unix/Makefile
-    modules/pam_oath/Makefile
     t/Makefile
 ])
-AC_CONFIG_FILES([pamgdb],[chmod +x pamgdb])
-AC_CONFIG_FILES([mkpkgng],[chmod +x mkpkgng])
+AC_CONFIG_FILES([misc/coverity.sh],[chmod +x misc/coverity.sh])
 AC_OUTPUT

doc/Makefile.am

@@ -1,3 +1 @@
-# $Id$
-
 SUBDIRS = man

doc/man/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+/*.3
+!/pam_conv.3

doc/man/Makefile.am

@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
-# $Id$
-
 NULL =
 
 # Standard PAM API
-PMAN = \
+PAM_MAN = \
 	pam_acct_mgmt.3 \
 	pam_authenticate.3 \
 	pam_chauthtok.3 \
@@ -24,7 +22,7 @@ PMAN = \
 	$(NULL)
 
 # Standard module API
-MMAN = \
+MOD_MAN = \
 	pam_sm_acct_mgmt.3 \
 	pam_sm_authenticate.3 \
 	pam_sm_chauthtok.3 \
@@ -34,7 +32,7 @@ MMAN = \
 	$(NULL)
 
 # OpenPAM extensions
-OMAN = \
+OPENPAM_MAN = \
 	openpam_borrow_cred.3 \
 	openpam_free_data.3 \
 	openpam_free_envlist.3 \
@@ -63,27 +61,35 @@ OMAN = \
 
 EXTRA_DIST = openpam.man pam.man
 
-ALLCMAN = $(PMAN) $(MMAN) $(OMAN)
+if !WITH_SYSTEM_LIBPAM
+PAMCMAN = $(PAM_MAN) $(MOD_MAN) $(OPENPAM_MAN)
+PAMXMAN = openpam.3 pam.3
+endif
 
-dist_man3_MANS = $(ALLCMAN) openpam.3 pam.3 pam_conv.3
+ALLCMAN = $(PAMCMAN)
+GENMAN = $(ALLCMAN) $(PAMXMAN)
+
+dist_man3_MANS = $(GENMAN) pam_conv.3
 
 dist_man5_MANS = pam.conf.5
 
-CLEANFILES = $(ALLCMAN) openpam.3 pam.3
+CLEANFILES = $(GENMAN)
 
 GENDOC = $(top_srcdir)/misc/gendoc.pl
 
-LIBSRCDIR = $(top_srcdir)/lib/libpam
+LIBPAMSRCDIR = $(top_srcdir)/lib/libpam
 
-VPATH = $(LIBSRCDIR) $(srcdir)
+VPATH = $(LIBPAMSRCDIR) $(srcdir)
 
 SUFFIXES = .3
 
 .c.3: $(GENDOC)
-	perl -w $(GENDOC) $<
+	perl -w $(GENDOC) $< || rm $@
 
-openpam.3: $(OMAN) $(GENDOC) $(srcdir)/openpam.man
-	perl -w $(GENDOC) -o $(abs_srcdir)/$(OMAN) <$(srcdir)/openpam.man
+openpam.3: $(OPENPAM_MAN) $(GENDOC) $(srcdir)/openpam.man
+	perl -w $(GENDOC) -o $(OPENPAM_MAN) <$(srcdir)/openpam.man || rm $@
 
-pam.3: $(PMAN) $(GENDOC) $(srcdir)/pam.man
-	perl -w $(GENDOC) -p $(abs_srcdir)/$(PMAN) <$(srcdir)/pam.man
+pam.3: $(PAM_MAN) $(GENDOC) $(srcdir)/pam.man
+	perl -w $(GENDOC) -p $(PAM_MAN) <$(srcdir)/pam.man || rm $@
+
+$(GENMAN): $(GENDOC)

doc/man/openpam.man

@@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
-.\"
-.\" $Id$
-.\"
 .Sh DESCRIPTION
 These functions are OpenPAM extensions to the PAM API.
 Those named

doc/man/pam.conf.5

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 .\"-
-.\" Copyright (c) 2005-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+.\" Copyright (c) 2005-2017 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
 .\" All rights reserved.
 .\"
 .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -26,8 +26,6 @@
 .\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 .\" SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $Id$
-.\"
 .Dd March 17, 2013
 .Dt PAM.CONF 5
 .Os
@@ -212,4 +210,4 @@ DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
 as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
 .Pp
 The OpenPAM library is maintained by
-.An Dag-Erling Sm\(/orgrav Aq des@des.no .
+.An Dag-Erling Sm\(/orgrav Aq Mt des@des.no .

doc/man/pam.man

@@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
-.\"
-.\" $Id$
-.\"
 .Sh DESCRIPTION
 The Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) library abstracts a number
 of common authentication-related operations and provides a framework

doc/man/pam_conv.3

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 .\"-
 .\" Copyright (c) 2002-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
-.\" Copyright (c) 2004-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+.\" Copyright (c) 2004-2017 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
 .\" All rights reserved.
 .\"
 .\" This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
@@ -32,8 +32,6 @@
 .\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 .\" SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $Id$
-.\"
 .Dd June 16, 2005
 .Dt PAM_CONV 3
 .Os
@@ -76,7 +74,7 @@ item.
 .Pp
 The conversation function's first argument specifies the number of
 messages (up to
-.Dv PAM_NUM_MSG )
+.Dv PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG )
 to process.
 The second argument is a pointer to an array of pointers to
 .Vt pam_message
@@ -183,4 +181,4 @@ DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
 as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
 .Pp
 The OpenPAM library is maintained by
-.An Dag-Erling Sm\(/orgrav Aq des@des.no .
+.An Dag-Erling Sm\(/orgrav Aq Mt des@des.no .

doc/rfc/rfc2104.txt

@@ -1,619 +0,0 @@
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Network Working Group                                       H. Krawczyk
-Request for Comments: 2104                                          IBM
-Category: Informational                                      M. Bellare
-                                                                   UCSD
-                                                             R. Canetti
-                                                                    IBM
-                                                          February 1997
-
-
-             HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
-
-Status of This Memo
-
-   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  This memo
-   does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of
-   this memo is unlimited.
-
-Abstract
-
-   This document describes HMAC, a mechanism for message authentication
-   using cryptographic hash functions. HMAC can be used with any
-   iterative cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1, in
-   combination with a secret shared key.  The cryptographic strength of
-   HMAC depends on the properties of the underlying hash function.
-
-1. Introduction
-
-   Providing a way to check the integrity of information transmitted
-   over or stored in an unreliable medium is a prime necessity in the
-   world of open computing and communications. Mechanisms that provide
-   such integrity check based on a secret key are usually called
-   "message authentication codes" (MAC). Typically, message
-   authentication codes are used between two parties that share a secret
-   key in order to validate information transmitted between these
-   parties. In this document we present such a MAC mechanism based on
-   cryptographic hash functions. This mechanism, called HMAC, is based
-   on work by the authors [BCK1] where the construction is presented and
-   cryptographically analyzed. We refer to that work for the details on
-   the rationale and security analysis of HMAC, and its comparison to
-   other keyed-hash methods.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Krawczyk, et. al.            Informational                      [Page 1]
-
-RFC 2104                          HMAC                     February 1997
-
-
-   HMAC can be used in combination with any iterated cryptographic hash
-   function. MD5 and SHA-1 are examples of such hash functions. HMAC
-   also uses a secret key for calculation and verification of the
-   message authentication values. The main goals behind this
-   construction are
-
-   * To use, without modifications, available hash functions.
-     In particular, hash functions that perform well in software,
-     and for which code is freely and widely available.
-
-   * To preserve the original performance of the hash function without
-     incurring a significant degradation.
-
-   * To use and handle keys in a simple way.
-
-   * To have a well understood cryptographic analysis of the strength of
-     the authentication mechanism based on reasonable assumptions on the
-     underlying hash function.
-
-   * To allow for easy replaceability of the underlying hash function in
-     case that faster or more secure hash functions are found or
-     required.
-
-   This document specifies HMAC using a generic cryptographic hash
-   function (denoted by H). Specific instantiations of HMAC need to
-   define a particular hash function. Current candidates for such hash
-   functions include SHA-1 [SHA], MD5 [MD5], RIPEMD-128/160 [RIPEMD].
-   These different realizations of HMAC will be denoted by HMAC-SHA1,
-   HMAC-MD5, HMAC-RIPEMD, etc.
-
-   Note: To the date of writing of this document MD5 and SHA-1 are the
-   most widely used cryptographic hash functions. MD5 has been recently
-   shown to be vulnerable to collision search attacks [Dobb].  This
-   attack and other currently known weaknesses of MD5 do not compromise
-   the use of MD5 within HMAC as specified in this document (see
-   [Dobb]); however, SHA-1 appears to be a cryptographically stronger
-   function. To this date, MD5 can be considered for use in HMAC for
-   applications where the superior performance of MD5 is critical.   In
-   any case, implementers and users need to be aware of possible
-   cryptanalytic developments regarding any of these cryptographic hash
-   functions, and the eventual need to replace the underlying hash
-   function. (See section 6 for more information on the security of
-   HMAC.)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Krawczyk, et. al.            Informational                      [Page 2]
-
-RFC 2104                          HMAC                     February 1997
-
-
-2. Definition of HMAC
-
-   The definition of HMAC requires a cryptographic hash function, which
-   we denote by H, and a secret key K. We assume H to be a cryptographic
-   hash function where data is hashed by iterating a basic compression
-   function on blocks of data.   We denote by B the byte-length of such
-   blocks (B=64 for all the above mentioned examples of hash functions),
-   and by L the byte-length of hash outputs (L=16 for MD5, L=20 for
-   SHA-1).  The authentication key K can be of any length up to B, the
-   block length of the hash function.  Applications that use keys longer
-   than B bytes will first hash the key using H and then use the
-   resultant L byte string as the actual key to HMAC. In any case the
-   minimal recommended length for K is L bytes (as the hash output
-   length). See section 3 for more information on keys.
-
-   We define two fixed and different strings ipad and opad as follows
-   (the 'i' and 'o' are mnemonics for inner and outer):
-
-                   ipad = the byte 0x36 repeated B times
-                  opad = the byte 0x5C repeated B times.
-
-   To compute HMAC over the data `text' we perform
-
-                    H(K XOR opad, H(K XOR ipad, text))
-
-   Namely,
-
-    (1) append zeros to the end of K to create a B byte string
-        (e.g., if K is of length 20 bytes and B=64, then K will be
-         appended with 44 zero bytes 0x00)
-    (2) XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) the B byte string computed in step
-        (1) with ipad
-    (3) append the stream of data 'text' to the B byte string resulting
-        from step (2)
-    (4) apply H to the stream generated in step (3)
-    (5) XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) the B byte string computed in
-        step (1) with opad
-    (6) append the H result from step (4) to the B byte string
-        resulting from step (5)
-    (7) apply H to the stream generated in step (6) and output
-        the result
-
-   For illustration purposes, sample code based on MD5 is provided as an
-   appendix.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Krawczyk, et. al.            Informational                      [Page 3]
-
-RFC 2104                          HMAC                     February 1997
-
-
-3. Keys
-
-   The key for HMAC can be of any length (keys longer than B bytes are
-   first hashed using H).  However, less than L bytes is strongly
-   discouraged as it would decrease the security strength of the
-   function.  Keys longer than L bytes are acceptable but the extra
-   length would not significantly increase the function strength. (A
-   longer key may be advisable if the randomness of the key is
-   considered weak.)
-
-   Keys need to be chosen at random (or using a cryptographically strong
-   pseudo-random generator seeded with a random seed), and periodically
-   refreshed.  (Current attacks do not indicate a specific recommended
-   frequency for key changes as these attacks are practically
-   infeasible.  However, periodic key refreshment is a fundamental
-   security practice that helps against potential weaknesses of the
-   function and keys, and limits the damage of an exposed key.)
-
-4. Implementation Note
-
-   HMAC is defined in such a way that the underlying hash function H can
-   be used with no modification to its code. In particular, it uses the
-   function H with the pre-defined initial value IV (a fixed value
-   specified by each iterative hash function to initialize its
-   compression function).  However, if desired, a performance
-   improvement can be achieved at the cost of (possibly) modifying the
-   code of H to support variable IVs.
-
-   The idea is that the intermediate results of the compression function
-   on the B-byte blocks (K XOR ipad) and (K XOR opad) can be precomputed
-   only once at the time of generation of the key K, or before its first
-   use. These intermediate results are stored and then used to
-   initialize the IV of H each time that a message needs to be
-   authenticated.  This method saves, for each authenticated message,
-   the application of the compression function of H on two B-byte blocks
-   (i.e., on (K XOR ipad) and (K XOR opad)). Such a savings may be
-   significant when authenticating short streams of data.  We stress
-   that the stored intermediate values need to be treated and protected
-   the same as secret keys.
-
-   Choosing to implement HMAC in the above way is a decision of the
-   local implementation and has no effect on inter-operability.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Krawczyk, et. al.            Informational                      [Page 4]
-
-RFC 2104                          HMAC                     February 1997
-
-
-5. Truncated output
-
-   A well-known practice with message authentication codes is to
-   truncate the output of the MAC and output only part of the bits
-   (e.g., [MM, ANSI]).  Preneel and van Oorschot [PV] show some
-   analytical advantages of truncating the output of hash-based MAC
-   functions. The results in this area are not absolute as for the
-   overall security advantages of truncation. It has advantages (less
-   information on the hash result available to an attacker) and
-   disadvantages (less bits to predict for the attacker).  Applications
-   of HMAC can choose to truncate the output of HMAC by outputting the t
-   leftmost bits of the HMAC computation for some parameter t (namely,
-   the computation is carried in the normal way as defined in section 2
-   above but the end result is truncated to t bits). We recommend that
-   the output length t be not less than half the length of the hash
-   output (to match the birthday attack bound) and not less than 80 bits
-   (a suitable lower bound on the number of bits that need to be
-   predicted by an attacker).  We propose denoting a realization of HMAC
-   that uses a hash function H with t bits of output as HMAC-H-t. For
-   example, HMAC-SHA1-80 denotes HMAC computed using the SHA-1 function
-   and with the output truncated to 80 bits.  (If the parameter t is not
-   specified, e.g. HMAC-MD5, then it is assumed that all the bits of the
-   hash are output.)
-
-6. Security
-
-   The security of the message authentication mechanism presented here
-   depends on cryptographic properties of the hash function H: the
-   resistance to collision finding (limited to the case where the
-   initial value is secret and random, and where the output of the
-   function is not explicitly available to the attacker), and the
-   message authentication property of the compression function of H when
-   applied to single blocks (in HMAC these blocks are partially unknown
-   to an attacker as they contain the result of the inner H computation
-   and, in particular, cannot be fully chosen by the attacker).
-
-   These properties, and actually stronger ones, are commonly assumed
-   for hash functions of the kind used with HMAC. In particular, a hash
-   function for which the above properties do not hold would become
-   unsuitable for most (probably, all) cryptographic applications,
-   including alternative message authentication schemes based on such
-   functions.  (For a complete analysis and rationale of the HMAC
-   function the reader is referred to [BCK1].)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Krawczyk, et. al.            Informational                      [Page 5]
-
-RFC 2104                          HMAC                     February 1997
-
-
-   Given the limited confidence gained so far as for the cryptographic
-   strength of candidate hash functions, it is important to observe the
-   following two properties of the HMAC construction and its secure use
-   for message authentication:
-
-   1. The construction is independent of the details of the particular
-   hash function H in use and then the latter can be replaced by any
-   other secure (iterative) cryptographic hash function.
-
-   2. Message authentication, as opposed to encryption, has a
-   "transient" effect. A published breaking of a message authentication
-   scheme would lead to the replacement of that scheme, but would have
-   no adversarial effect on information authenticated in the past.  This
-   is in sharp contrast with encryption, where information encrypted
-   today may suffer from exposure in the future if, and when, the
-   encryption algorithm is broken.
-
-   The strongest attack known against HMAC is based on the frequency of
-   collisions for the hash function H ("birthday attack") [PV,BCK2], and
-   is totally impractical for minimally reasonable hash functions.
-
-   As an example, if we consider a hash function like MD5 where the
-   output length equals L=16 bytes (128 bits) the attacker needs to
-   acquire the correct message authentication tags computed (with the
-   _same_ secret key K!) on about 2**64 known plaintexts.  This would
-   require the processing of at least 2**64 blocks under H, an
-   impossible task in any realistic scenario (for a block length of 64
-   bytes this would take 250,000 years in a continuous 1Gbps link, and
-   without changing the secret key K during all this time).  This attack
-   could become realistic only if serious flaws in the collision
-   behavior of the function H are discovered (e.g.  collisions found
-   after 2**30 messages). Such a discovery would determine the immediate
-   replacement of the function H (the effects of such failure would be
-   far more severe for the traditional uses of H in the context of
-   digital signatures, public key certificates, etc.).
-
-   Note: this attack needs to be strongly contrasted with regular
-   collision attacks on cryptographic hash functions where no secret key
-   is involved and where 2**64 off-line parallelizable (!) operations
-   suffice to find collisions.  The latter attack is approaching
-   feasibility [VW] while the birthday attack on HMAC is totally
-   impractical.  (In the above examples, if one uses a hash function
-   with, say, 160 bit of output then 2**64 should be replaced by 2**80.)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Krawczyk, et. al.            Informational                      [Page 6]
-
-RFC 2104                          HMAC                     February 1997
-
-
-   A correct implementation of the above construction, the choice of
-   random (or cryptographically pseudorandom) keys, a secure key
-   exchange mechanism, frequent key refreshments, and good secrecy
-   protection of keys are all essential ingredients for the security of
-   the integrity verification mechanism provided by HMAC.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Krawczyk, et. al.            Informational                      [Page 7]
-
-RFC 2104                          HMAC                     February 1997
-
-
-Appendix -- Sample Code
-
-   For the sake of illustration we provide the following sample code for
-   the implementation of HMAC-MD5 as well as some corresponding test
-   vectors (the code is based on MD5 code as described in [MD5]).
-
-/*
-** Function: hmac_md5
-*/
-
-void
-hmac_md5(text, text_len, key, key_len, digest)
-unsigned char*  text;                /* pointer to data stream */
-int             text_len;            /* length of data stream */
-unsigned char*  key;                 /* pointer to authentication key */
-int             key_len;             /* length of authentication key */
-caddr_t         digest;              /* caller digest to be filled in */
-
-{
-        MD5_CTX context;
-        unsigned char k_ipad[65];    /* inner padding -
-                                      * key XORd with ipad
-                                      */
-        unsigned char k_opad[65];    /* outer padding -
-                                      * key XORd with opad
-                                      */
-        unsigned char tk[16];
-        int i;
-        /* if key is longer than 64 bytes reset it to key=MD5(key) */
-        if (key_len > 64) {
-
-                MD5_CTX      tctx;
-
-                MD5Init(&tctx);
-                MD5Update(&tctx, key, key_len);
-                MD5Final(tk, &tctx);
-
-                key = tk;
-                key_len = 16;
-        }
-
-        /*
-         * the HMAC_MD5 transform looks like:
-         *
-         * MD5(K XOR opad, MD5(K XOR ipad, text))
-         *
-         * where K is an n byte key
-         * ipad is the byte 0x36 repeated 64 times
-
-
-
-Krawczyk, et. al.            Informational                      [Page 8]
-
-RFC 2104                          HMAC                     February 1997
-
-
-         * opad is the byte 0x5c repeated 64 times
-         * and text is the data being protected
-         */
-
-        /* start out by storing key in pads */
-        bzero( k_ipad, sizeof k_ipad);
-        bzero( k_opad, sizeof k_opad);
-        bcopy( key, k_ipad, key_len);
-        bcopy( key, k_opad, key_len);
-
-        /* XOR key with ipad and opad values */
-        for (i=0; i<64; i++) {
-                k_ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
-                k_opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
-        }
-        /*
-         * perform inner MD5
-         */
-        MD5Init(&context);                   /* init context for 1st
-                                              * pass */
-        MD5Update(&context, k_ipad, 64)      /* start with inner pad */
-        MD5Update(&context, text, text_len); /* then text of datagram */
-        MD5Final(digest, &context);          /* finish up 1st pass */
-        /*
-         * perform outer MD5
-         */
-        MD5Init(&context);                   /* init context for 2nd
-                                              * pass */
-        MD5Update(&context, k_opad, 64);     /* start with outer pad */
-        MD5Update(&context, digest, 16);     /* then results of 1st
-                                              * hash */
-        MD5Final(digest, &context);          /* finish up 2nd pass */
-}
-
-Test Vectors (Trailing '\0' of a character string not included in test):
-
-  key =         0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b
-  key_len =     16 bytes
-  data =        "Hi There"
-  data_len =    8  bytes
-  digest =      0x9294727a3638bb1c13f48ef8158bfc9d
-
-  key =         "Jefe"
-  data =        "what do ya want for nothing?"
-  data_len =    28 bytes
-  digest =      0x750c783e6ab0b503eaa86e310a5db738
-
-  key =         0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
-
-
-
-Krawczyk, et. al.            Informational                      [Page 9]
-
-RFC 2104                          HMAC                     February 1997
-
-
-  key_len       16 bytes
-  data =        0xDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD...
-                ..DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD...
-                ..DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD...
-                ..DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD...
-                ..DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
-  data_len =    50 bytes
-  digest =      0x56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6
-
-Acknowledgments
-
-   Pau-Chen Cheng, Jeff Kraemer, and Michael Oehler, have provided
-   useful comments on early drafts, and ran the first interoperability
-   tests of this specification. Jeff and Pau-Chen kindly provided the
-   sample code and test vectors that appear in the appendix.  Burt
-   Kaliski, Bart Preneel, Matt Robshaw, Adi Shamir, and Paul van
-   Oorschot have provided useful comments and suggestions during the
-   investigation of the HMAC construction.
-
-References
-
-   [ANSI]  ANSI X9.9, "American National Standard for Financial
-           Institution Message Authentication (Wholesale)," American
-           Bankers Association, 1981.   Revised 1986.
-
-   [Atk]   Atkinson, R., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 1826, August
-           1995.
-
-   [BCK1]  M. Bellare, R. Canetti, and H. Krawczyk,
-           "Keyed Hash Functions and Message Authentication",
-           Proceedings of Crypto'96, LNCS 1109, pp. 1-15.
-           (http://www.research.ibm.com/security/keyed-md5.html)
-
-   [BCK2]  M. Bellare, R. Canetti, and H. Krawczyk,
-           "Pseudorandom Functions Revisited: The Cascade Construction",
-           Proceedings of FOCS'96.
-
-   [Dobb]  H. Dobbertin, "The Status of MD5  After a Recent Attack",
-           RSA Labs' CryptoBytes, Vol. 2 No. 2, Summer 1996.
-           http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/pubs/cryptobytes.html
-
-   [PV]    B. Preneel and P. van Oorschot, "Building fast MACs from hash
-           functions", Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO'95 Proceedings,
-           Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag Vol.963,
-           1995, pp. 1-14.
-
-   [MD5]   Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm",
-           RFC 1321, April 1992.
-
-
-
-Krawczyk, et. al.            Informational                     [Page 10]
-
-RFC 2104                          HMAC                     February 1997
-
-
-   [MM]    Meyer, S. and Matyas, S.M., Cryptography, New York Wiley,
-           1982.
-
-   [RIPEMD] H. Dobbertin, A. Bosselaers, and B. Preneel, "RIPEMD-160: A
-            strengthened version of RIPEMD", Fast Software Encryption,
-            LNCS Vol 1039, pp. 71-82.
-            ftp://ftp.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/pub/COSIC/bosselae/ripemd/.
-
-   [SHA]   NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1: Secure Hash Standard, April 1995.
-
-   [Tsu]   G. Tsudik, "Message authentication with one-way hash
-           functions", In Proceedings of Infocom'92, May 1992.
-           (Also in "Access Control and Policy Enforcement in
-            Internetworks", Ph.D. Dissertation, Computer Science
-            Department, University of Southern California, April 1991.)
-
-   [VW]    P. van Oorschot and M. Wiener, "Parallel Collision
-           Search with Applications to Hash Functions and Discrete
-           Logarithms", Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conf. Computer and
-           Communications Security, Fairfax, VA, November 1994.
-
-Authors' Addresses
-
-   Hugo Krawczyk
-   IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
-   P.O.Box 704
-   Yorktown Heights, NY 10598
-
-   EMail: hugo@watson.ibm.com
-
-   Mihir Bellare
-   Dept of Computer Science and Engineering
-   Mail Code 0114
-   University of California at San Diego
-   9500 Gilman Drive
-   La Jolla, CA 92093
-
-   EMail: mihir@cs.ucsd.edu
-
-   Ran Canetti
-   IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
-   P.O.Box 704
-   Yorktown Heights, NY 10598
-
-   EMail: canetti@watson.ibm.com
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Krawczyk, et. al.            Informational                     [Page 11]
-

doc/rfc/rfc6238.txt

@@ -1,899 +0,0 @@
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                        D. M'Raihi
-Request for Comments: 6238                                Verisign, Inc.
-Category: Informational                                       S. Machani
-ISSN: 2070-1721                                         Diversinet Corp.
-                                                                  M. Pei
-                                                                Symantec
-                                                               J. Rydell
-                                                          Portwise, Inc.
-                                                                May 2011
-
-
-              TOTP: Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm
-
-Abstract
-
-   This document describes an extension of the One-Time Password (OTP)
-   algorithm, namely the HMAC-based One-Time Password (HOTP) algorithm,
-   as defined in RFC 4226, to support the time-based moving factor.  The
-   HOTP algorithm specifies an event-based OTP algorithm, where the
-   moving factor is an event counter.  The present work bases the moving
-   factor on a time value.  A time-based variant of the OTP algorithm
-   provides short-lived OTP values, which are desirable for enhanced
-   security.
-
-   The proposed algorithm can be used across a wide range of network
-   applications, from remote Virtual Private Network (VPN) access and
-   Wi-Fi network logon to transaction-oriented Web applications.  The
-   authors believe that a common and shared algorithm will facilitate
-   adoption of two-factor authentication on the Internet by enabling
-   interoperability across commercial and open-source implementations.
-
-Status of This Memo
-
-   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
-   published for informational purposes.
-
-   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
-   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
-   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
-   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
-   approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
-   Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
-
-   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
-   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
-   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6238.
-
-
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                     [Page 1]
-
-RFC 6238                      HOTPTimeBased                     May 2011
-
-
-Copyright Notice
-
-   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
-   document authors.  All rights reserved.
-
-   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
-   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
-   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
-   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
-   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
-   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
-   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
-   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
-   described in the Simplified BSD License.
-
-Table of Contents
-
-   1. Introduction ....................................................2
-      1.1. Scope ......................................................2
-      1.2. Background .................................................3
-   2. Notation and Terminology ........................................3
-   3. Algorithm Requirements ..........................................3
-   4. TOTP Algorithm ..................................................4
-      4.1. Notations ..................................................4
-      4.2. Description ................................................4
-   5. Security Considerations .........................................5
-      5.1. General ....................................................5
-      5.2. Validation and Time-Step Size ..............................6
-   6. Resynchronization ...............................................7
-   7. Acknowledgements ................................................7
-   8. References ......................................................8
-      8.1. Normative References .......................................8
-      8.2. Informative References .....................................8
-   Appendix A. TOTP Algorithm: Reference Implementation ...............9
-   Appendix B. Test Vectors ..........................................14
-
-1.  Introduction
-
-1.1.  Scope
-
-   This document describes an extension of the One-Time Password (OTP)
-   algorithm, namely the HMAC-based One-Time Password (HOTP) algorithm,
-   as defined in [RFC4226], to support the time-based moving factor.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                     [Page 2]
-
-RFC 6238                      HOTPTimeBased                     May 2011
-
-
-1.2.  Background
-
-   As defined in [RFC4226], the HOTP algorithm is based on the
-   HMAC-SHA-1 algorithm (as specified in [RFC2104]) and applied to an
-   increasing counter value representing the message in the HMAC
-   computation.
-
-   Basically, the output of the HMAC-SHA-1 calculation is truncated to
-   obtain user-friendly values:
-
-      HOTP(K,C) = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-1(K,C))
-
-   where Truncate represents the function that can convert an HMAC-SHA-1
-   value into an HOTP value.  K and C represent the shared secret and
-   counter value; see [RFC4226] for detailed definitions.
-
-   TOTP is the time-based variant of this algorithm, where a value T,
-   derived from a time reference and a time step, replaces the counter C
-   in the HOTP computation.
-
-   TOTP implementations MAY use HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-512 functions,
-   based on SHA-256 or SHA-512 [SHA2] hash functions, instead of the
-   HMAC-SHA-1 function that has been specified for the HOTP computation
-   in [RFC4226].
-
-2.  Notation and Terminology
-
-   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
-   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
-   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
-
-3.  Algorithm Requirements
-
-   This section summarizes the requirements taken into account for
-   designing the TOTP algorithm.
-
-   R1: The prover (e.g., token, soft token) and verifier (authentication
-       or validation server) MUST know or be able to derive the current
-       Unix time (i.e., the number of seconds elapsed since midnight UTC
-       of January 1, 1970) for OTP generation.  See [UT] for a more
-       detailed definition of the commonly known "Unix time".  The
-       precision of the time used by the prover affects how often the
-       clock synchronization should be done; see Section 6.
-
-   R2: The prover and verifier MUST either share the same secret or the
-       knowledge of a secret transformation to generate a shared secret.
-
-   R3: The algorithm MUST use HOTP [RFC4226] as a key building block.
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                     [Page 3]
-
-RFC 6238                      HOTPTimeBased                     May 2011
-
-
-   R4: The prover and verifier MUST use the same time-step value X.
-
-   R5: There MUST be a unique secret (key) for each prover.
-
-   R6: The keys SHOULD be randomly generated or derived using key
-       derivation algorithms.
-
-   R7: The keys MAY be stored in a tamper-resistant device and SHOULD be
-       protected against unauthorized access and usage.
-
-4.  TOTP Algorithm
-
-   This variant of the HOTP algorithm specifies the calculation of a
-   one-time password value, based on a representation of the counter as
-   a time factor.
-
-4.1.  Notations
-
-   o  X represents the time step in seconds (default value X =
-      30 seconds) and is a system parameter.
-
-   o  T0 is the Unix time to start counting time steps (default value is
-      0, i.e., the Unix epoch) and is also a system parameter.
-
-4.2.  Description
-
-   Basically, we define TOTP as TOTP = HOTP(K, T), where T is an integer
-   and represents the number of time steps between the initial counter
-   time T0 and the current Unix time.
-
-   More specifically, T = (Current Unix time - T0) / X, where the
-   default floor function is used in the computation.
-
-   For example, with T0 = 0 and Time Step X = 30, T = 1 if the current
-   Unix time is 59 seconds, and T = 2 if the current Unix time is
-   60 seconds.
-
-   The implementation of this algorithm MUST support a time value T
-   larger than a 32-bit integer when it is beyond the year 2038.  The
-   value of the system parameters X and T0 are pre-established during
-   the provisioning process and communicated between a prover and
-   verifier as part of the provisioning step.  The provisioning flow is
-   out of scope of this document; refer to [RFC6030] for such
-   provisioning container specifications.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                     [Page 4]
-
-RFC 6238                      HOTPTimeBased                     May 2011
-
-
-5.  Security Considerations
-
-5.1.  General
-
-   The security and strength of this algorithm depend on the properties
-   of the underlying building block HOTP, which is a construction based
-   on HMAC [RFC2104] using SHA-1 as the hash function.
-
-   The conclusion of the security analysis detailed in [RFC4226] is
-   that, for all practical purposes, the outputs of the dynamic
-   truncation on distinct inputs are uniformly and independently
-   distributed strings.
-
-   The analysis demonstrates that the best possible attack against the
-   HOTP function is the brute force attack.
-
-   As indicated in the algorithm requirement section, keys SHOULD be
-   chosen at random or using a cryptographically strong pseudorandom
-   generator properly seeded with a random value.
-
-   Keys SHOULD be of the length of the HMAC output to facilitate
-   interoperability.
-
-   We RECOMMEND following the recommendations in [RFC4086] for all
-   pseudorandom and random number generations.  The pseudorandom numbers
-   used for generating the keys SHOULD successfully pass the randomness
-   test specified in [CN], or a similar well-recognized test.
-
-   All the communications SHOULD take place over a secure channel, e.g.,
-   Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) [RFC5246] or
-   IPsec connections [RFC4301].
-
-   We also RECOMMEND storing the keys securely in the validation system,
-   and, more specifically, encrypting them using tamper-resistant
-   hardware encryption and exposing them only when required: for
-   example, the key is decrypted when needed to verify an OTP value, and
-   re-encrypted immediately to limit exposure in the RAM to a short
-   period of time.
-
-   The key store MUST be in a secure area, to avoid, as much as
-   possible, direct attack on the validation system and secrets
-   database.  Particularly, access to the key material should be limited
-   to programs and processes required by the validation system only.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                     [Page 5]
-
-RFC 6238                      HOTPTimeBased                     May 2011
-
-
-5.2.  Validation and Time-Step Size
-
-   An OTP generated within the same time step will be the same.  When an
-   OTP is received at a validation system, it doesn't know a client's
-   exact timestamp when an OTP was generated.  The validation system may
-   typically use the timestamp when an OTP is received for OTP
-   comparison.  Due to network latency, the gap (as measured by T, that
-   is, the number of time steps since T0) between the time that the OTP
-   was generated and the time that the OTP arrives at the receiving
-   system may be large.  The receiving time at the validation system and
-   the actual OTP generation may not fall within the same time-step
-   window that produced the same OTP.  When an OTP is generated at the
-   end of a time-step window, the receiving time most likely falls into
-   the next time-step window.  A validation system SHOULD typically set
-   a policy for an acceptable OTP transmission delay window for
-   validation.  The validation system should compare OTPs not only with
-   the receiving timestamp but also the past timestamps that are within
-   the transmission delay.  A larger acceptable delay window would
-   expose a larger window for attacks.  We RECOMMEND that at most one
-   time step is allowed as the network delay.
-
-   The time-step size has an impact on both security and usability.  A
-   larger time-step size means a larger validity window for an OTP to be
-   accepted by a validation system.  There are implications for using a
-   larger time-step size, as follows:
-
-   First, a larger time-step size exposes a larger window to attack.
-   When an OTP is generated and exposed to a third party before it is
-   consumed, the third party can consume the OTP within the time-step
-   window.
-
-   We RECOMMEND a default time-step size of 30 seconds.  This default
-   value of 30 seconds is selected as a balance between security and
-   usability.
-
-   Second, the next different OTP must be generated in the next time-
-   step window.  A user must wait until the clock moves to the next
-   time-step window from the last submission.  The waiting time may not
-   be exactly the length of the time step, depending on when the last
-   OTP was generated.  For example, if the last OTP was generated at the
-   halfway point in a time-step window, the waiting time for the next
-   OTP is half the length of the time step.  In general, a larger time-
-   step window means a longer waiting time for a user to get the next
-   valid OTP after the last successful OTP validation.  A too-large
-   window (for example, 10 minutes) most probably won't be suitable for
-   typical Internet login use cases; a user may not be able to get the
-   next OTP within 10 minutes and therefore will have to re-login to the
-   same site in 10 minutes.
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                     [Page 6]
-
-RFC 6238                      HOTPTimeBased                     May 2011
-
-
-   Note that a prover may send the same OTP inside a given time-step
-   window multiple times to a verifier.  The verifier MUST NOT accept
-   the second attempt of the OTP after the successful validation has
-   been issued for the first OTP, which ensures one-time only use of an
-   OTP.
-
-6.  Resynchronization
-
-   Because of possible clock drifts between a client and a validation
-   server, we RECOMMEND that the validator be set with a specific limit
-   to the number of time steps a prover can be "out of synch" before
-   being rejected.
-
-   This limit can be set both forward and backward from the calculated
-   time step on receipt of the OTP value.  If the time step is
-   30 seconds as recommended, and the validator is set to only accept
-   two time steps backward, then the maximum elapsed time drift would be
-   around 89 seconds, i.e., 29 seconds in the calculated time step and
-   60 seconds for two backward time steps.
-
-   This would mean the validator could perform a validation against the
-   current time and then two further validations for each backward step
-   (for a total of 3 validations).  Upon successful validation, the
-   validation server can record the detected clock drift for the token
-   in terms of the number of time steps.  When a new OTP is received
-   after this step, the validator can validate the OTP with the current
-   timestamp adjusted with the recorded number of time-step clock drifts
-   for the token.
-
-   Also, it is important to note that the longer a prover has not sent
-   an OTP to a validation system, the longer (potentially) the
-   accumulated clock drift between the prover and the verifier.  In such
-   cases, the automatic resynchronization described above may not work
-   if the drift exceeds the allowed threshold.  Additional
-   authentication measures should be used to safely authenticate the
-   prover and explicitly resynchronize the clock drift between the
-   prover and the validator.
-
-7.  Acknowledgements
-
-   The authors of this document would like to thank the following people
-   for their contributions and support to make this a better
-   specification: Hannes Tschofenig, Jonathan Tuliani, David Dix,
-   Siddharth Bajaj, Stu Veath, Shuh Chang, Oanh Hoang, John Huang, and
-   Siddhartha Mohapatra.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                     [Page 7]
-
-RFC 6238                      HOTPTimeBased                     May 2011
-
-
-8.  References
-
-8.1.  Normative References
-
-   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
-              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
-              February 1997.
-
-   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
-              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
-
-   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
-              "Randomness Recommendations for Security", BCP 106,
-              RFC 4086, June 2005.
-
-   [RFC4226]  M'Raihi, D., Bellare, M., Hoornaert, F., Naccache, D., and
-              O. Ranen, "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password
-              Algorithm", RFC 4226, December 2005.
-
-   [SHA2]     NIST, "FIPS PUB 180-3: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)",
-              October 2008, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/
-              fips180-3/fips180-3_final.pdf>.
-
-8.2.  Informative References
-
-   [CN]       Coron, J. and D. Naccache, "An Accurate Evaluation of
-              Maurer's Universal Test", LNCS 1556, February 1999,
-              <http://www.gemplus.com/smart/rd/publications/pdf/
-              CN99maur.pdf>.
-
-   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
-              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
-
-   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
-              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
-
-   [RFC6030]  Hoyer, P., Pei, M., and S. Machani, "Portable Symmetric
-              Key Container (PSKC)", RFC 6030, October 2010.
-
-   [UT]       Wikipedia, "Unix time", February 2011,
-              <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix_time>.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                     [Page 8]
-
-RFC 6238                      HOTPTimeBased                     May 2011
-
-
-Appendix A.  TOTP Algorithm: Reference Implementation
-
- <CODE BEGINS>
-
- /**
- Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
- authors of the code. All rights reserved.
-
- Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license
- terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section
- 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
- (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
- */
-
- import java.lang.reflect.UndeclaredThrowableException;
- import java.security.GeneralSecurityException;
- import java.text.DateFormat;
- import java.text.SimpleDateFormat;
- import java.util.Date;
- import javax.crypto.Mac;
- import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
- import java.math.BigInteger;
- import java.util.TimeZone;
-
-
- /**
-  * This is an example implementation of the OATH
-  * TOTP algorithm.
-  * Visit www.openauthentication.org for more information.
-  *
-  * @author Johan Rydell, PortWise, Inc.
-  */
-
- public class TOTP {
-
-     private TOTP() {}
-
-     /**
-      * This method uses the JCE to provide the crypto algorithm.
-      * HMAC computes a Hashed Message Authentication Code with the
-      * crypto hash algorithm as a parameter.
-      *
-      * @param crypto: the crypto algorithm (HmacSHA1, HmacSHA256,
-      *                             HmacSHA512)
-      * @param keyBytes: the bytes to use for the HMAC key
-      * @param text: the message or text to be authenticated
-      */
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                     [Page 9]
-
-RFC 6238                      HOTPTimeBased                     May 2011
-
-
-     private static byte[] hmac_sha(String crypto, byte[] keyBytes,
-             byte[] text){
-         try {
-             Mac hmac;
-             hmac = Mac.getInstance(crypto);
-             SecretKeySpec macKey =
-                 new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "RAW");
-             hmac.init(macKey);
-             return hmac.doFinal(text);
-         } catch (GeneralSecurityException gse) {
-             throw new UndeclaredThrowableException(gse);
-         }
-     }
-
-
-     /**
-      * This method converts a HEX string to Byte[]
-      *
-      * @param hex: the HEX string
-      *
-      * @return: a byte array
-      */
-
-     private static byte[] hexStr2Bytes(String hex){
-         // Adding one byte to get the right conversion
-         // Values starting with "0" can be converted
-         byte[] bArray = new BigInteger("10" + hex,16).toByteArray();
-
-         // Copy all the REAL bytes, not the "first"
-         byte[] ret = new byte[bArray.length - 1];
-         for (int i = 0; i < ret.length; i++)
-             ret[i] = bArray[i+1];
-         return ret;
-     }
-
-     private static final int[] DIGITS_POWER
-     // 0 1  2   3    4     5      6       7        8
-     = {1,10,100,1000,10000,100000,1000000,10000000,100000000 };
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                    [Page 10]
-
-RFC 6238                      HOTPTimeBased                     May 2011
-
-
-     /**
-      * This method generates a TOTP value for the given
-      * set of parameters.
-      *
-      * @param key: the shared secret, HEX encoded
-      * @param time: a value that reflects a time
-      * @param returnDigits: number of digits to return
-      *
-      * @return: a numeric String in base 10 that includes
-      *              {@link truncationDigits} digits
-      */
-
-     public static String generateTOTP(String key,
-             String time,
-             String returnDigits){
-         return generateTOTP(key, time, returnDigits, "HmacSHA1");
-     }
-
-
-     /**
-      * This method generates a TOTP value for the given
-      * set of parameters.
-      *
-      * @param key: the shared secret, HEX encoded
-      * @param time: a value that reflects a time
-      * @param returnDigits: number of digits to return
-      *
-      * @return: a numeric String in base 10 that includes
-      *              {@link truncationDigits} digits
-      */
-
-     public static String generateTOTP256(String key,
-             String time,
-             String returnDigits){
-         return generateTOTP(key, time, returnDigits, "HmacSHA256");
-     }
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                    [Page 11]
-
-RFC 6238                      HOTPTimeBased                     May 2011
-
-
-     /**
-      * This method generates a TOTP value for the given
-      * set of parameters.
-      *
-      * @param key: the shared secret, HEX encoded
-      * @param time: a value that reflects a time
-      * @param returnDigits: number of digits to return
-      *
-      * @return: a numeric String in base 10 that includes
-      *              {@link truncationDigits} digits
-      */
-
-     public static String generateTOTP512(String key,
-             String time,
-             String returnDigits){
-         return generateTOTP(key, time, returnDigits, "HmacSHA512");
-     }
-
-
-     /**
-      * This method generates a TOTP value for the given
-      * set of parameters.
-      *
-      * @param key: the shared secret, HEX encoded
-      * @param time: a value that reflects a time
-      * @param returnDigits: number of digits to return
-      * @param crypto: the crypto function to use
-      *
-      * @return: a numeric String in base 10 that includes
-      *              {@link truncationDigits} digits
-      */
-
-     public static String generateTOTP(String key,
-             String time,
-             String returnDigits,
-             String crypto){
-         int codeDigits = Integer.decode(returnDigits).intValue();
-         String result = null;
-
-         // Using the counter
-         // First 8 bytes are for the movingFactor
-         // Compliant with base RFC 4226 (HOTP)
-         while (time.length() < 16 )
-             time = "0" + time;
-
-         // Get the HEX in a Byte[]
-         byte[] msg = hexStr2Bytes(time);
-         byte[] k = hexStr2Bytes(key);
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                    [Page 12]
-
-RFC 6238                      HOTPTimeBased                     May 2011
-
-
-         byte[] hash = hmac_sha(crypto, k, msg);
-
-         // put selected bytes into result int
-         int offset = hash[hash.length - 1] & 0xf;
-
-         int binary =
-             ((hash[offset] & 0x7f) << 24) |
-             ((hash[offset + 1] & 0xff) << 16) |
-             ((hash[offset + 2] & 0xff) << 8) |
-             (hash[offset + 3] & 0xff);
-
-         int otp = binary % DIGITS_POWER[codeDigits];
-
-         result = Integer.toString(otp);
-         while (result.length() < codeDigits) {
-             result = "0" + result;
-         }
-         return result;
-     }
-
-     public static void main(String[] args) {
-         // Seed for HMAC-SHA1 - 20 bytes
-         String seed = "3132333435363738393031323334353637383930";
-         // Seed for HMAC-SHA256 - 32 bytes
-         String seed32 = "3132333435363738393031323334353637383930" +
-         "313233343536373839303132";
-         // Seed for HMAC-SHA512 - 64 bytes
-         String seed64 = "3132333435363738393031323334353637383930" +
-         "3132333435363738393031323334353637383930" +
-         "3132333435363738393031323334353637383930" +
-         "31323334";
-         long T0 = 0;
-         long X = 30;
-         long testTime[] = {59L, 1111111109L, 1111111111L,
-                 1234567890L, 2000000000L, 20000000000L};
-
-         String steps = "0";
-         DateFormat df = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss");
-         df.setTimeZone(TimeZone.getTimeZone("UTC"));
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                    [Page 13]
-
-RFC 6238                      HOTPTimeBased                     May 2011
-
-
-         try {
-             System.out.println(
-                     "+---------------+-----------------------+" +
-             "------------------+--------+--------+");
-             System.out.println(
-                     "|  Time(sec)    |   Time (UTC format)   " +
-             "| Value of T(Hex)  |  TOTP  | Mode   |");
-             System.out.println(
-                     "+---------------+-----------------------+" +
-             "------------------+--------+--------+");
-
-             for (int i=0; i<testTime.length; i++) {
-                 long T = (testTime[i] - T0)/X;
-                 steps = Long.toHexString(T).toUpperCase();
-                 while (steps.length() < 16) steps = "0" + steps;
-                 String fmtTime = String.format("%1$-11s", testTime[i]);
-                 String utcTime = df.format(new Date(testTime[i]*1000));
-                 System.out.print("|  " + fmtTime + "  |  " + utcTime +
-                         "  | " + steps + " |");
-                 System.out.println(generateTOTP(seed, steps, "8",
-                 "HmacSHA1") + "| SHA1   |");
-                 System.out.print("|  " + fmtTime + "  |  " + utcTime +
-                         "  | " + steps + " |");
-                 System.out.println(generateTOTP(seed32, steps, "8",
-                 "HmacSHA256") + "| SHA256 |");
-                 System.out.print("|  " + fmtTime + "  |  " + utcTime +
-                         "  | " + steps + " |");
-                 System.out.println(generateTOTP(seed64, steps, "8",
-                 "HmacSHA512") + "| SHA512 |");
-
-                 System.out.println(
-                         "+---------------+-----------------------+" +
-                 "------------------+--------+--------+");
-             }
-         }catch (final Exception e){
-             System.out.println("Error : " + e);
-         }
-     }
- }
-
- <CODE ENDS>
-
-Appendix B.  Test Vectors
-
-   This section provides test values that can be used for the HOTP time-
-   based variant algorithm interoperability test.
-
-
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                    [Page 14]
-
-RFC 6238                      HOTPTimeBased                     May 2011
-
-
-   The test token shared secret uses the ASCII string value
-   "12345678901234567890".  With Time Step X = 30, and the Unix epoch as
-   the initial value to count time steps, where T0 = 0, the TOTP
-   algorithm will display the following values for specified modes and
-   timestamps.
-
-  +-------------+--------------+------------------+----------+--------+
-  |  Time (sec) |   UTC Time   | Value of T (hex) |   TOTP   |  Mode  |
-  +-------------+--------------+------------------+----------+--------+
-  |      59     |  1970-01-01  | 0000000000000001 | 94287082 |  SHA1  |
-  |             |   00:00:59   |                  |          |        |
-  |      59     |  1970-01-01  | 0000000000000001 | 46119246 | SHA256 |
-  |             |   00:00:59   |                  |          |        |
-  |      59     |  1970-01-01  | 0000000000000001 | 90693936 | SHA512 |
-  |             |   00:00:59   |                  |          |        |
-  |  1111111109 |  2005-03-18  | 00000000023523EC | 07081804 |  SHA1  |
-  |             |   01:58:29   |                  |          |        |
-  |  1111111109 |  2005-03-18  | 00000000023523EC | 68084774 | SHA256 |
-  |             |   01:58:29   |                  |          |        |
-  |  1111111109 |  2005-03-18  | 00000000023523EC | 25091201 | SHA512 |
-  |             |   01:58:29   |                  |          |        |
-  |  1111111111 |  2005-03-18  | 00000000023523ED | 14050471 |  SHA1  |
-  |             |   01:58:31   |                  |          |        |
-  |  1111111111 |  2005-03-18  | 00000000023523ED | 67062674 | SHA256 |
-  |             |   01:58:31   |                  |          |        |
-  |  1111111111 |  2005-03-18  | 00000000023523ED | 99943326 | SHA512 |
-  |             |   01:58:31   |                  |          |        |
-  |  1234567890 |  2009-02-13  | 000000000273EF07 | 89005924 |  SHA1  |
-  |             |   23:31:30   |                  |          |        |
-  |  1234567890 |  2009-02-13  | 000000000273EF07 | 91819424 | SHA256 |
-  |             |   23:31:30   |                  |          |        |
-  |  1234567890 |  2009-02-13  | 000000000273EF07 | 93441116 | SHA512 |
-  |             |   23:31:30   |                  |          |        |
-  |  2000000000 |  2033-05-18  | 0000000003F940AA | 69279037 |  SHA1  |
-  |             |   03:33:20   |                  |          |        |
-  |  2000000000 |  2033-05-18  | 0000000003F940AA | 90698825 | SHA256 |
-  |             |   03:33:20   |                  |          |        |
-  |  2000000000 |  2033-05-18  | 0000000003F940AA | 38618901 | SHA512 |
-  |             |   03:33:20   |                  |          |        |
-  | 20000000000 |  2603-10-11  | 0000000027BC86AA | 65353130 |  SHA1  |
-  |             |   11:33:20   |                  |          |        |
-  | 20000000000 |  2603-10-11  | 0000000027BC86AA | 77737706 | SHA256 |
-  |             |   11:33:20   |                  |          |        |
-  | 20000000000 |  2603-10-11  | 0000000027BC86AA | 47863826 | SHA512 |
-  |             |   11:33:20   |                  |          |        |
-  +-------------+--------------+------------------+----------+--------+
-
-                            Table 1: TOTP Table
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                    [Page 15]
-
-RFC 6238                      HOTPTimeBased                     May 2011
-
-
-Authors' Addresses
-
-   David M'Raihi
-   Verisign, Inc.
-   685 E. Middlefield Road
-   Mountain View, CA  94043
-   USA
-
-   EMail: davidietf@gmail.com
-
-
-   Salah Machani
-   Diversinet Corp.
-   2225 Sheppard Avenue East, Suite 1801
-   Toronto, Ontario  M2J 5C2
-   Canada
-
-   EMail: smachani@diversinet.com
-
-
-   Mingliang Pei
-   Symantec
-   510 E. Middlefield Road
-   Mountain View, CA  94043
-   USA
-
-   EMail: Mingliang_Pei@symantec.com
-
-
-   Johan Rydell
-   Portwise, Inc.
-   275 Hawthorne Ave., Suite 119
-   Palo Alto, CA  94301
-   USA
-
-   EMail: johanietf@gmail.com
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-M'Raihi, et al.               Informational                    [Page 16]
-

doc/xsso_errata.txt

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-$Id$
-
 Errata in XSSO, chapter 5:
 
 p. 25:	the first member of struct pam_response is named "resp", not

freebsd/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+!/Makefile.in
+/work

freebsd/Makefile.in

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# $FreeBSD: portlint$
+
+PORTNAME=	@PACKAGE_TARNAME@
+PORTVERSION=	@PACKAGE_VERSION@
+CATEGORIES=	security devel
+MASTER_SITES=	#
+DISTFILES=	#
+
+MAINTAINER=	@PACKAGE_BUGREPORT@
+COMMENT=	BSD-licensed implementation of Pluggable Authentication Modules
+
+LICENSE=	BSD3CLAUSE
+
+USES=		gmake libtool pkgconfig
+USE_LDCONFIG=	yes
+GNU_CONFIGURE=	yes
+INSTALL_TARGET=	install-strip
+TEST_TARGET=	check
+
+DESCR=		${WRKDIR}/pkg-descr
+
+do-extract:
+	(cd @abs_top_srcdir@ && \
+	    ${GMAKE} distdir && ${MV} ${PKGNAME} ${WRKDIR})
+	(${CAT} ${WRKSRC}/README && ${ECHO} && \
+	    ${ECHO} "WWW: @PACKAGE_URL@") >${DESCR}
+
+post-stage:
+	(cd ${STAGEDIR} && \
+	    ${FIND} -s . -type f -or -type l | cut -c 2- | \
+	    ${SED} -E '/\/man\//s/([0-9])$$/\1.gz/') >>${TMPPLIST}
+
+.include <bsd.port.mk>

include/Makefile.am

@@ -1,3 +1 @@
-# $Id$
-
 SUBDIRS = security

include/security/Makefile.am

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-# $Id$
-
 securitydir = $(includedir)/security
 
 security_HEADERS = \
@@ -10,11 +8,3 @@ security_HEADERS = \
 	pam_constants.h \
 	pam_modules.h \
 	pam_types.h
-
-if WITH_OATH
-security_HEADERS += \
-	oath.h \
-	oath_constants.h \
-	oath_rfc4648.h \
-	oath_types.h
-endif

include/security/oath.h

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-/*-
- * Copyright (c) 2012-2013 Universitetet i Oslo
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
- *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
- *    permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
- */
-
-#ifndef OATH_H_INCLUDED
-#define OATH_H_INCLUDED
-
-#include <security/oath_constants.h>
-#include <security/oath_types.h>
-#include <security/oath_rfc4648.h>
-
-struct oath_key *oath_key_alloc(void);
-void oath_key_free(struct oath_key *);
-struct oath_key *oath_key_from_uri(const char *);
-struct oath_key *oath_key_from_file(const char *);
-char *oath_key_to_uri(const struct oath_key *);
-
-struct oath_key *oath_key_dummy(enum oath_mode, enum oath_hash, unsigned int);
-
-unsigned int oath_hotp(const uint8_t *, size_t, uint64_t, unsigned int);
-unsigned int oath_hotp_current(struct oath_key *);
-int oath_hotp_match(struct oath_key *, unsigned int, int);
-
-unsigned int oath_totp(const uint8_t *, size_t, unsigned int);
-unsigned int oath_totp_current(const struct oath_key *);
-int oath_totp_match(struct oath_key *, unsigned int, int);
-
-#endif

include/security/oath_constants.h

@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-/*-
- * Copyright (c) 2012-2013 Universitetet i Oslo
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
- *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
- *    permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
- */
-
-#ifndef OATH_CONSTANTS_H_INCLUDED
-#define OATH_CONSTANTS_H_INCLUDED
-
-/*
- * OATH modes
- */
-enum oath_mode {
-	om_undef,		/* not set / default */
-	om_hotp,		/* RFC 4226 HOTP */
-	om_totp,		/* RFC 6238 TOTP */
-	om_max
-};
-
-/*
- * Hash functions
- */
-enum oath_hash {
-	oh_undef,		/* not set / default */
-	oh_md5,			/* RFC 1321 MD5 */
-	oh_sha1,		/* FIPS 180 SHA-1 */
-	oh_sha256,		/* FIPS 180 SHA-256 */
-	oh_sha512,		/* FIPS 180 SHA-512 */
-	oh_max
-};
-
-/*
- * Default time step for TOTP: 30 seconds.
- */
-#define OATH_DEF_TIMESTEP	30
-
-/*
- * Maximum time step for TOTP: 10 minutes, which RFC 6238 cites as an
- * example of an unreasonably large time step.
- */
-#define OATH_MAX_TIMESTEP	600
-
-/*
- * Maximum key length in bytes.  HMAC has a 64-byte block size; if the key
- * K is longer than that, HMAC derives a new key K' = H(K).
- */
-#define OATH_MAX_KEYLEN		64
-
-/*
- * Maximum label length in characters, including terminating NUL.
- */
-#define OATH_MAX_LABELLEN	64
-
-/*
- * Label to use for dummy keys
- */
-#define OATH_DUMMY_LABEL	"oath-dummy-key"
-
-#endif

include/security/openpam.h

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*-
  * Copyright (c) 2002-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2015 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef SECURITY_OPENPAM_H_INCLUDED
@@ -186,6 +184,7 @@ enum {
 	OPENPAM_VERIFY_POLICY_FILE,
 	OPENPAM_RESTRICT_MODULE_NAME,
 	OPENPAM_VERIFY_MODULE_FILE,
+	OPENPAM_FALLBACK_TO_OTHER,
 	OPENPAM_NUM_FEATURES
 };
 

include/security/openpam_attr.h

@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
-/*
- * $Id$
- */
-
 #ifndef SECURITY_OPENPAM_ATTR_H_INCLUDED
 #define SECURITY_OPENPAM_ATTR_H_INCLUDED
 

include/security/openpam_version.h

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*-
  * Copyright (c) 2002-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2023 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
@@ -31,15 +31,13 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef SECURITY_OPENPAM_VERSION_H_INCLUDED
 #define SECURITY_OPENPAM_VERSION_H_INCLUDED
 
 #define OPENPAM
-#define OPENPAM_VERSION	20120526
-#define OPENPAM_RELEASE	"Micrampelis"
+#define OPENPAM_VERSION	20230627
+#define OPENPAM_RELEASE	"Ximenia"
 
 #endif /* !SECURITY_OPENPAM_VERSION_H_INCLUDED */

include/security/pam_appl.h

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*-
  * Copyright (c) 2002-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2017 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H_INCLUDED

include/security/pam_constants.h

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*-
  * Copyright (c) 2002-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2017 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef SECURITY_PAM_CONSTANTS_H_INCLUDED
@@ -78,6 +76,10 @@ enum {
 	PAM_TRY_AGAIN			=  27,
 	PAM_MODULE_UNKNOWN		=  28,
 	PAM_DOMAIN_UNKNOWN		=  29,
+	PAM_BAD_HANDLE			=  30,		/* OpenPAM extension */
+	PAM_BAD_ITEM			=  31,		/* OpenPAM extension */
+	PAM_BAD_FEATURE			=  32,		/* OpenPAM extension */
+	PAM_BAD_CONSTANT		=  33,		/* OpenPAM extension */
 	PAM_NUM_ERRORS					/* OpenPAM extension */
 };
 

include/security/pam_modules.h

@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef SECURITY_PAM_MODULES_H_INCLUDED

include/security/pam_types.h

@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef SECURITY_PAM_TYPES_H_INCLUDED

lib/Makefile.am

@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
-# $Id$
+SUBDIRS =
 
-SUBDIRS = libpam
-
-if WITH_OATH
-SUBDIRS += liboath
+if !WITH_SYSTEM_LIBPAM
+SUBDIRS += libpam
 endif

lib/liboath/Makefile.am

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-# $Id$
-
-AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/libpam
-
-lib_LTLIBRARIES = liboath.la
-
-liboath_la_SOURCES = \
-	oath_base32.c \
-	oath_base64.c \
-	oath_hotp.c \
-	oath_totp.c \
-	oath_key_alloc.c \
-	oath_key_dummy.c \
-	oath_key_free.c \
-	oath_key.c
-
-liboath_la_LDFLAGS = -no-undefined -version-info @LIB_MAJ@
-liboath_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/libpam/libpam.la @CRYPTO_LIBS@

lib/liboath/oath_base32.c

@@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
-/*-
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Universitetet i Oslo
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
- *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
- *    permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
- */
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
-# include "config.h"
-#endif
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-#include <security/oath.h>
-
-static const char b32[] =
-    "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567";
-
-/*
- * Encode data in RFC 3548 base 32 representation.  The target buffer must
- * have room for base32_enclen(len) characters and a terminating NUL.
- */
-int
-base32_enc(const uint8_t *in, size_t ilen, char *out, size_t *olen)
-{
-	uint64_t bits;
-
-	if (*olen <= base32_enclen(ilen))
-		return (-1);
-	*olen = 0;
-	while (ilen >= 5) {
-		bits = 0;
-		bits |= (uint64_t)in[0] << 32;
-		bits |= (uint64_t)in[1] << 24;
-		bits |= (uint64_t)in[2] << 16;
-		bits |= (uint64_t)in[3] << 8;
-		bits |= (uint64_t)in[4];
-		ilen -= 5;
-		in += 5;
-		out[0] = b32[bits >> 35 & 0x1f];
-		out[1] = b32[bits >> 30 & 0x1f];
-		out[2] = b32[bits >> 25 & 0x1f];
-		out[3] = b32[bits >> 20 & 0x1f];
-		out[4] = b32[bits >> 15 & 0x1f];
-		out[5] = b32[bits >> 10 & 0x1f];
-		out[6] = b32[bits >> 5 & 0x1f];
-		out[7] = b32[bits & 0x1f];
-		*olen += 8;
-		out += 8;
-	}
-	if (ilen > 0) {
-		bits = 0;
-		switch (ilen) {
-		case 4:
-			bits |= (uint64_t)in[3] << 8;
-		case 3:
-			bits |= (uint64_t)in[2] << 16;
-		case 2:
-			bits |= (uint64_t)in[1] << 24;
-		case 1:
-			bits |= (uint64_t)in[0] << 32;
-		}
-		out[0] = b32[bits >> 35 & 0x1f];
-		out[1] = b32[bits >> 30 & 0x1f];
-		out[2] = ilen > 1 ? b32[bits >> 25 & 0x1f] : '=';
-		out[3] = ilen > 1 ? b32[bits >> 20 & 0x1f] : '=';
-		out[4] = ilen > 2 ? b32[bits >> 15 & 0x1f] : '=';
-		out[5] = ilen > 3 ? b32[bits >> 10 & 0x1f] : '=';
-		out[6] = ilen > 3 ? b32[bits >> 5 & 0x1f] : '=';
-		out[7] = '=';
-		*olen += 8;
-		out += 8;
-	}
-	out[0] = '\0';
-	++*olen;
-	return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Decode data in RFC 2548 base 32 representation, stopping at the
- * terminating NUL, the first invalid (non-base32, non-whitespace)
- * character or after len characters, whichever comes first.
- *
- * The olen argument is used by the caller to pass the size of the buffer
- * and by base32_dec() to return the amount of data successfully decoded.
- * If the buffer is too small, base32_dec() discards the excess data, but
- * returns the total amount.
- */
-int
-base32_dec(const char *in, size_t ilen, uint8_t *out, size_t *olen)
-{
-	size_t len;
-	uint64_t bits;
-	int shift;
-
-	for (len = 0, bits = 0, shift = 40; ilen && *in; --ilen, ++in) {
-		if (*in == ' ' || *in == '\t' || *in == '\r' || *in == '\n') {
-			continue;
-		} else if (*in >= 'A' && *in <= 'Z') {
-			shift -= 5;
-			bits |= (uint64_t)(*in - 'A') << shift;
-		} else if (*in >= 'a' && *in <= 'z') {
-			shift -= 5;
-			bits |= (uint64_t)(*in - 'a') << shift;
-		} else if (*in >= '2' && *in <= '7') {	
-			shift -= 5;
-			bits |= (uint64_t)(*in - '2' + 26) << shift;
-		} else if (*in == '=' &&
-		    (shift == 30 || shift == 20 || shift == 15 || shift == 5)) {
-			/* hack: assume the rest of the padding is ok */
-			shift = 0;
-		} else {
-			*olen = 0;
-			return (-1);
-		}
-		if (shift == 0) {
-			if ((len += 5) <= *olen) {
-				out[0] = (bits >> 32) & 0xff;
-				out[1] = (bits >> 24) & 0xff;
-				out[2] = (bits >> 16) & 0xff;
-				out[3] = (bits >> 8) & 0xff;
-				out[4] = bits & 0xff;
-				out += 5;
-			}
-			bits = 0;
-			shift = 40;
-		}
-		if (*in == '=')
-			break;
-	}
-	if (len > *olen) {
-		*olen = len;
-		return (-1);
-	}
-	*olen = len;
-	return (0);
-}

lib/liboath/oath_base64.c

@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
-/*-
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Universitetet i Oslo
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
- *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
- *    permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
- */
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
-# include "config.h"
-#endif
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-#include <security/oath.h>
-
-static const char b64[] =
-    "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
-    "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
-    "0123456789+/";
-
-/*
- * Encode data in RFC 3548 base 64 representation.  The target buffer must
- * have room for base64_enclen(len) characters and a terminating NUL.
- */
-int
-base64_enc(const uint8_t *in, size_t ilen, char *out, size_t *olen)
-{
-	uint32_t bits;
-
-	if (*olen <= base64_enclen(ilen))
-		return (-1);
-	*olen = 0;
-	while (ilen >= 3) {
-		bits = 0;
-		bits |= (uint32_t)in[0] << 16;
-		bits |= (uint32_t)in[1] << 8;
-		bits |= (uint32_t)in[2];
-		ilen -= 3;
-		in += 3;
-		out[0] = b64[bits >> 18 & 0x3f];
-		out[1] = b64[bits >> 12 & 0x3f];
-		out[2] = b64[bits >> 6 & 0x3f];
-		out[3] = b64[bits & 0x3f];
-		*olen += 4;
-		out += 4;
-	}
-	if (ilen > 0) {
-		bits = 0;
-		switch (ilen) {
-		case 2:
-			bits |= (uint32_t)in[1] << 8;
-		case 1:
-			bits |= (uint32_t)in[0] << 16;
-		}
-		out[0] = b64[bits >> 18 & 0x3f];
-		out[1] = b64[bits >> 12 & 0x3f];
-		out[2] = ilen > 1 ? b64[bits >> 6 & 0x3f] : '=';
-		out[3] = '=';
-		*olen += 4;
-		out += 4;
-	}
-	out[0] = '\0';
-	++*olen;
-	return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Decode data in RFC 2548 base 64 representation, stopping at the
- * terminating NUL, the first invalid (non-base64, non-whitespace)
- * character or after len characters, whichever comes first.
- *
- * The olen argument is used by the caller to pass the size of the buffer
- * and by base64_dec() to return the amount of data successfully decoded.
- * If the buffer is too small, base64_dec() discards the excess data, but
- * returns the total amount.
- */
-int
-base64_dec(const char *in, size_t ilen, uint8_t *out, size_t *olen)
-{
-	size_t len;
-	uint32_t bits;
-	int shift;
-
-	for (len = 0, bits = 0, shift = 24; ilen && *in; --ilen, ++in) {
-		if (*in == ' ' || *in == '\t' || *in == '\r' || *in == '\n') {
-			continue;
-		} else if (*in >= 'A' && *in <= 'Z') {
-			shift -= 6;
-			bits |= (uint32_t)(*in - 'A') << shift;
-		} else if (*in >= 'a' && *in <= 'z') {
-			shift -= 6;
-			bits |= (uint32_t)(*in - 'a' + 26) << shift;
-		} else if (*in >= '0' && *in <= '9') {
-			shift -= 6;
-			bits |= (uint32_t)(*in - '2' + 52) << shift;
-		} else if (*in == '+') {
-			shift -= 6;
-			bits |= (uint32_t)62 << shift;
-		} else if (*in == '/') {
-			shift -= 6;
-			bits |= (uint32_t)63 << shift;
-		} else if (*in == '=' && (shift == 12 || shift == 6)) {
-			/* hack: assume the rest of the padding is ok */
-			shift = 0;
-		} else {
-			*olen = 0;
-			return (-1);
-		}
-		if (shift == 0) {
-			if ((len += 3) <= *olen) {
-				out[1] = (bits >> 16) & 0xff;
-				out[1] = (bits >> 8) & 0xff;
-				out[2] = bits & 0xff;
-				out += 3;
-			}
-			bits = 0;
-			shift = 24;
-		}
-		if (*in == '=')
-			break;
-	}
-	if (len > *olen) {
-		*olen = len;
-		return (-1);
-	}
-	*olen = len;
-	return (0);
-}

lib/liboath/oath_hotp.c

@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
-/*-
- * Copyright (c) 2012-2013 Universitetet i Oslo
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
- *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
- *    permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
- */
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
-# include "config.h"
-#endif
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <security/oath.h>
-
-#define StToNum(St) (St)
-
-static uint32_t
-DT(const uint8_t *String)
-{
-	uint8_t OffsetBits;
-	int Offset;
-	uint32_t P;
-
-	OffsetBits = String[19] & 0x0f;
-	Offset = StToNum(OffsetBits);
-	P = (uint32_t)String[Offset + 0] << 24 |
-	    (uint32_t)String[Offset + 1] << 16 |
-	    (uint32_t)String[Offset + 2] << 8 |
-	    (uint32_t)String[Offset + 3];
-	return (P & 0x7fffffffUL);
-}
-
-unsigned int
-oath_hotp(const uint8_t *K, size_t Klen, uint64_t seq, unsigned int Digit)
-{
-	HMAC_CTX ctx;
-	uint8_t C[8];
-	uint8_t HS[20];
-	unsigned int HSlen;
-	uint32_t Sbits, Snum;
-	unsigned int mod, D;
-
-	for (int i = 7; i >= 0; --i) {
-		C[i] = seq & 0xff;
-		seq >>= 8;
-	}
-
-	/* HS = HMAC-SHA-1(K,C) */
-	HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, K, Klen, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
-	HMAC_Update(&ctx, (const uint8_t *)&C, sizeof C);
-	HMAC_Final(&ctx, HS, &HSlen);
-	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-	Sbits = DT(HS);
-	Snum = StToNum(Sbits);
-	for (mod = 1; Digit > 0; --Digit)
-		mod *= 10;
-	D = Snum % mod;
-	return (D);
-}
-
-/*
- * Computes the current code for the given key and advances the counter.
- */
-unsigned int
-oath_hotp_current(struct oath_key *k)
-{
-	unsigned int code;
-
-	if (k == NULL)
-		return (-1);
-	if (k->mode != om_hotp)
-		return (-1);
-	if (k->counter == UINT64_MAX)
-		return (-1);
-	code = oath_hotp(k->key, k->keylen, k->counter, k->digits);
-	k->counter += 1;
-	return (code);
-}
-
-/*
- * Compares the code provided by the user with expected values within a
- * given window.  Returns 1 if there was a match, 0 if not, and -1 if an
- * error occurred.  Also advances the counter if there was a match.
- */
-int
-oath_hotp_match(struct oath_key *k, unsigned int response, int window)
-{
-	unsigned int code;
-	int dummy;
-
-	if (k == NULL)
-		return (-1);
-	if (window < 1)
-		return (-1);
-	if (k->mode != om_hotp)
-		return (-1);
-	if (k->counter >= UINT64_MAX - window)
-		return (-1);
-	dummy = (strcmp(k->label, OATH_DUMMY_LABEL) == 0);
-	for (int i = 0; i < window; ++i) {
-		code = oath_hotp(k->key, k->keylen, k->counter + i, k->digits);
-		if (code == response && !dummy) {
-			k->counter = k->counter + i;
-			return (1);
-		}
-	}
-	return (0);
-}

lib/liboath/oath_key.c

@@ -1,268 +0,0 @@
-/*-
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Universitetet i Oslo
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
- *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
- *    permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
- */
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
-# include "config.h"
-#endif
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <inttypes.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <security/pam_appl.h>
-#include <security/openpam.h>
-
-#include "openpam_asprintf.h"
-#include "openpam_strlcmp.h"
-
-#include <security/oath.h>
-
-/*
- * Allocate a struct oath_key and populate it from a Google Authenticator
- * otpauth URI
- */
-struct oath_key *
-oath_key_from_uri(const char *uri)
-{
-	struct oath_key *key;
-	const char *p, *q, *r;
-	uintmax_t n;
-	char *e;
-
-	if ((key = oath_key_alloc()) == NULL)
-		return (NULL);
-
-	/* check method */
-	p = uri;
-	if (strlcmp("otpauth://", p, 10) != 0)
-		goto invalid;
-	p += 10;
-
-	/* check mode (hotp = event, totp = time-sync) */
-	if ((q = strchr(p, '/')) == NULL)
-		goto invalid;
-	if (strlcmp("hotp", p, q - p) == 0) {
-		key->mode = om_hotp;
-	} else if (strlcmp("totp", p, q - p) == 0) {
-		key->mode = om_totp;
-	} else {
-		goto invalid;
-	}
-	p = q + 1;
-
-	/* extract label */
-	if ((q = strchr(p, '?')) == NULL)
-		goto invalid;
-	if ((key->labellen = q - p + 1) > sizeof key->label)
-		goto invalid;
-	memcpy(key->label, p, q - p);
-	key->label[q - p] = '\0';
-	p = q + 1;
-
-	/* extract parameters */
-	key->counter = UINT64_MAX;
-	while (*p != '\0') {
-		if ((q = strchr(p, '=')) == NULL)
-			goto invalid;
-		q = q + 1;
-		if ((r = strchr(p, '&')) == NULL)
-			r = strchr(p, '\0');
-		if (r < q)
-			/* & before = */
-			goto invalid;
-		/* p points to key, q points to value, r points to & or NUL */
-		if (strlcmp("secret=", p, q - p) == 0) {
-			if (key->keylen != 0)
-				/* dupe */
-				goto invalid;
-			key->keylen = sizeof key->key;
-			if (base32_dec(q, r - q, key->key, &key->keylen) != 0)
-				goto invalid;
-			if (base32_enclen(key->keylen) != (size_t)(r - q))
-				goto invalid;
-		} else if (strlcmp("algorithm=", p, q - p) == 0) {
-			if (key->hash != oh_undef)
-				/* dupe */
-				goto invalid;
-			if (strlcmp("SHA1", q, r - q) == 0)
-				key->hash = oh_sha1;
-			else if (strlcmp("SHA256", q, r - q) == 0)
-				key->hash = oh_sha256;
-			else if (strlcmp("SHA512", q, r - q) == 0)
-				key->hash = oh_sha512;
-			else if (strlcmp("MD5", q, r - q) == 0)
-				key->hash = oh_md5;
-			else
-				goto invalid;
-		} else if (strlcmp("digits=", p, q - p) == 0) {
-			if (key->digits != 0)
-				/* dupe */
-				goto invalid;
-			/* only 6 or 8 */
-			if (r - q != 1 || (*q != '6' && *q != '8'))
-				goto invalid;
-			key->digits = *q - '0';
-		} else if (strlcmp("counter=", p, q - p) == 0) {
-			if (key->counter != UINT64_MAX)
-				/* dupe */
-				goto invalid;
-			n = strtoumax(q, &e, 10);
-			if (e != r || n >= UINT64_MAX)
-				goto invalid;
-			key->counter = (uint64_t)n;
-		} else if (strlcmp("period=", p, q - p) == 0) {
-			if (key->timestep != 0)
-				/* dupe */
-				goto invalid;
-			n = strtoumax(q, &e, 10);
-			if (e != r || n > OATH_MAX_TIMESTEP)
-				goto invalid;
-			key->timestep = n;
-		} else {
-			goto invalid;
-		}
-		/* final parameter? */
-		if (*r == '\0')
-			break;
-		/* skip & and continue */
-		p = r + 1;
-	}
-
-	/* sanity checks and default values */
-	if (key->mode == om_hotp) {
-		if (key->timestep != 0)
-			goto invalid;
-		if (key->counter == UINTMAX_MAX)
-			key->counter = 0;
-	} else if (key->mode == om_totp) {
-		if (key->counter != UINTMAX_MAX)
-			goto invalid;
-		if (key->timestep == 0)
-			key->timestep = OATH_DEF_TIMESTEP;
-	} else {
-		/* unreachable */
-		oath_key_free(key);
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-	if (key->hash == oh_undef)
-		key->hash = oh_sha1;
-	if (key->digits == 0)
-		key->digits = 6;
-	if (key->keylen == 0)
-		goto invalid;
-	return (key);
-
-invalid:
-	openpam_log(PAM_LOG_NOTICE, "invalid OATH URI: %s", uri);
-	oath_key_free(key);
-	return (NULL);
-}
-
-struct oath_key *
-oath_key_from_file(const char *filename)
-{
-	struct oath_key *key;
-	FILE *f;
-	char *line;
-	size_t len;
-
-	if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
-		return (NULL);
-	/* get first non-empty non-comment line */
-	line = openpam_readline(f, NULL, &len);
-	if (strlcmp("otpauth://", line, len) == 0) {
-		key = oath_key_from_uri(line);
-	} else {
-		openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR,
-		    "unrecognized key file format: %s", filename);
-		key = NULL;
-	}
-	fclose(f);
-	return (key);
-}
-
-char *
-oath_key_to_uri(const struct oath_key *key)
-{
-	const char *hash;
-	char *tmp, *uri;
-	size_t kslen, urilen;
-
-	switch (key->hash) {
-	case oh_sha1:
-		hash = "SHA1";
-		break;
-	case oh_sha256:
-		hash = "SHA256";
-		break;
-	case oh_sha512:
-		hash = "SHA512";
-		break;
-	case oh_md5:
-		hash = "MD5";
-		break;
-	default:
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-
-	if (key->mode == om_hotp) {
-		urilen = asprintf(&uri, "otpauth://"
-		    "%s/%s?algorithm=%s&digits=%d&counter=%ju&secret=",
-		    "hotp", key->label, hash, key->digits,
-		    (uintmax_t)key->counter);
-	} else if (key->mode == om_totp) {
-		urilen = asprintf(&uri, "otpauth://"
-		    "%s/%s?algorithm=%s&digits=%d&period=%u&secret=",
-		    "totp", key->label, hash, key->digits, key->timestep);
-	} else {
-		/* unreachable */
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-
-	/* compute length of base32-encoded key and append it */
-	kslen = base32_enclen(key->keylen) + 1;
-	if ((tmp = realloc(uri, urilen + kslen)) == NULL) {
-		free(uri);
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-	uri = tmp;
-	if (base32_enc(key->key, key->keylen, uri + urilen, &kslen) != 0) {
-		free(uri);
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-
-	return (uri);
-}

lib/liboath/oath_key_alloc.c

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-/*-
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Universitetet i Oslo
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
- *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
- *    permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
- */
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
-# include "config.h"
-#endif
-
-#include <sys/mman.h>
-
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <security/pam_appl.h>
-#include <security/openpam.h>
-#include <security/oath.h>
-
-/*
- * OATH
- *
- * Allocates an OATH key structure
- */
-
-struct oath_key *
-oath_key_alloc(void)
-{
-	struct oath_key *key;
-	int prot, flags;
-
-	prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
-	flags = MAP_ANON;
-#ifdef MAP_NOCORE
-	flags |= MAP_NOCORE;
-#endif
-	if ((key = mmap(NULL, sizeof *key, prot, flags, -1, 0)) != NULL) {
-		memset(key, 0, sizeof *key);
-		key->mapped = 1;
-		if (mlock(key, sizeof *key) == 0)
-			key->locked = 1;
-	} else {
-		openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "mmap(): %m");
-		if ((key = calloc(sizeof *key, 1)) == NULL)
-			openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "malloc(): %m");
-	}
-	return (key);
-}
-
-/**
- * The =oath_key_alloc function allocates and initializes an OATH key
- * structure.
- *
- * Keys allocated with =oath_key_alloc must be freed using =oath_key_free.
- *
- * >oath_key_free
- *
- * AUTHOR UIO
- */

lib/liboath/oath_key_dummy.c

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-/*-
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Universitetet i Oslo
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
- *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
- *    permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
- */
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
-# include "config.h"
-#endif
-
-#include <inttypes.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <security/oath.h>
-
-/*
- * OATH
- *
- * Creates a dummy OATH key structure
- */
-
-struct oath_key *
-oath_key_dummy(enum oath_mode mode, enum oath_hash hash, unsigned int digits)
-{
-	struct oath_key *key;
-
-	if ((key = oath_key_alloc()) == NULL)
-		return (NULL);
-	key->mode = mode;
-	key->digits = digits;
-	key->counter = 0;
-	key->timestep = 30;
-	key->hash = hash;
-	strcpy(key->label, "oath-dummy-key");
-	key->labellen = strlen(key->label);
-	key->keylen = sizeof key->key;
-	return (key);
-}
-
-/**
- * The =oath_key_dummy function allocates and initializes a dummy OATH key
- * structure.
- * Authentication attempts using a dummy key will always fail.
- *
- * Keys allocated with =oath_key_dummy must be freed using =oath_key_free.
- *
- * >oath_key_alloc
- * >oath_key_free
- *
- * AUTHOR UIO
- */

lib/liboath/oath_totp.c

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-/*-
- * Copyright (c) 2012-2013 Universitetet i Oslo
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
- *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
- *    permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
- */
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
-# include "config.h"
-#endif
-
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-
-#include <security/oath.h>
-
-#define TOTP_TIME_STEP 30
-
-unsigned int
-oath_totp(const uint8_t *K, size_t Klen, unsigned int Digit)
-{
-	time_t now;
-
-	time(&now);
-	return (oath_hotp(K, Klen, now / TOTP_TIME_STEP, Digit));
-}
-
-unsigned int
-oath_totp_current(const struct oath_key *k)
-{
-	unsigned int code;
-	uint64_t seq;
-
-	if (k == NULL)
-		return (-1);
-	if (k->mode != om_totp)
-		return (-1);
-	if (k->timestep == 0)
-		return (-1);
-	seq = time(NULL) / k->timestep;
-	code = oath_hotp(k->key, k->keylen, seq, k->digits);
-	return (code);
-}
-
-/*
- * Compares the code provided by the user with expected values within a
- * given window.  Returns 1 if there was a match, 0 if not, and -1 if an
- * error occurred.
- */
-int
-oath_totp_match(struct oath_key *k, unsigned int response, int window)
-{
-	unsigned int code;
-	uint64_t seq;
-	int dummy;
-
-	if (k == NULL)
-		return (-1);
-	if (window < 1)
-		return (-1);
-	if (k->mode != om_totp)
-		return (-1);
-	if (k->timestep == 0)
-		return (-1);
-	seq = time(NULL) / k->timestep;
-	dummy = (strcmp(k->label, OATH_DUMMY_LABEL) == 0);
-	for (int i = -window; i <= window; ++i) {
-#if OATH_TOTP_PREVENT_REUSE
-		/* XXX disabled for now, should be a key parameter? */
-		if (seq + i <= k->lastuse)
-			continue;
-#endif
-		code = oath_hotp(k->key, k->keylen, seq + i, k->digits);
-		if (code == response && !dummy) {
-			k->lastuse = seq;
-			return (1);
-		}
-	}
-	return (0);
-}

lib/libpam/Makefile.am

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-# $Id$
-
 NULL =
 
 AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include
@@ -18,6 +16,7 @@ noinst_HEADERS = \
 	openpam_strlcat.h \
 	openpam_strlcmp.h \
 	openpam_strlcpy.h \
+	openpam_strlset.h \
 	openpam_vasprintf.h
 
 libpam_la_SOURCES = \
@@ -44,9 +43,10 @@ libpam_la_SOURCES = \
 	openpam_set_option.c \
 	openpam_set_feature.c \
 	openpam_static.c \
+	openpam_straddch.c \
 	openpam_strlcat.c \
 	openpam_strlcpy.c \
-	openpam_straddch.c \
+	openpam_strlset.c \
 	openpam_subst.c \
 	openpam_vasprintf.c \
 	openpam_ttyconv.c \
@@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ libpam_la_SOURCES = \
 	pam_vprompt.c \
 	$(NULL)
 
-libpam_la_LDFLAGS = -no-undefined -version-info @LIB_MAJ@
-libpam_la_LIBADD = @DL_LIBS@
+libpam_la_LDFLAGS = -no-undefined -version-info $(LIB_MAJ)
+libpam_la_LIBADD = $(DL_LIBS)
 
 EXTRA_DIST = \
 	pam_authenticate_secondary.c \

lib/libpam/openpam_asprintf.c

@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

lib/libpam/openpam_asprintf.h

@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef OPENPAM_ASPRINTF_H_INCLUDED

lib/libpam/openpam_borrow_cred.c

@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

lib/libpam/openpam_check_owner_perms.c

@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

lib/libpam/openpam_configure.c

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*-
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2012 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2015 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
@@ -193,6 +191,7 @@ openpam_parse_chain(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 			openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR,
 			    "%s(%d): missing or invalid facility",
 			    filename, lineno);
+			errno = EINVAL;
 			goto fail;
 		}
 		if (facility != fclt && facility != PAM_FACILITY_ANY) {
@@ -208,18 +207,28 @@ openpam_parse_chain(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 				openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR,
 				    "%s(%d): missing or invalid service name",
 				    filename, lineno);
+				errno = EINVAL;
 				goto fail;
 			}
 			if (wordv[i] != NULL) {
 				openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR,
 				    "%s(%d): garbage at end of line",
 				    filename, lineno);
+				errno = EINVAL;
 				goto fail;
 			}
 			ret = openpam_load_chain(pamh, servicename, fclt);
 			FREEV(wordc, wordv);
-			if (ret < 0)
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				/*
+				 * Bogus errno, but this ensures that the
+				 * outer loop does not just ignore the
+				 * error and keep searching.
+				 */
+				if (errno == ENOENT)
+					errno = EINVAL;
 				goto fail;
+			}
 			continue;
 		}
 
@@ -229,6 +238,7 @@ openpam_parse_chain(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 			openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR,
 			    "%s(%d): missing or invalid control flag",
 			    filename, lineno);
+			errno = EINVAL;
 			goto fail;
 		}
 
@@ -238,6 +248,7 @@ openpam_parse_chain(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 			openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR,
 			    "%s(%d): missing or invalid module name",
 			    filename, lineno);
+			errno = EINVAL;
 			goto fail;
 		}
 
@@ -247,8 +258,11 @@ openpam_parse_chain(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 		this->flag = ctlf;
 
 		/* load module */
-		if ((this->module = openpam_load_module(modulename)) == NULL)
+		if ((this->module = openpam_load_module(modulename)) == NULL) {
+			if (errno == ENOENT)
+				errno = ENOEXEC;
 			goto fail;
+		}
 
 		/*
 		 * The remaining items in wordv are the module's
@@ -281,7 +295,11 @@ openpam_parse_chain(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 	 * The loop ended because openpam_readword() returned NULL, which
 	 * can happen for four different reasons: an I/O error (ferror(f)
 	 * is true), a memory allocation failure (ferror(f) is false,
-	 * errno is non-zero)
+	 * feof(f) is false, errno is non-zero), the file ended with an
+	 * unterminated quote or backslash escape (ferror(f) is false,
+	 * feof(f) is true, errno is non-zero), or the end of the file was
+	 * reached without error (ferror(f) is false, feof(f) is true,
+	 * errno is zero).
 	 */
 	if (ferror(f) || errno != 0)
 		goto syserr;
@@ -390,6 +408,10 @@ openpam_load_chain(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 	for (path = openpam_policy_path; *path != NULL; ++path) {
 		/* construct filename */
 		len = strlcpy(filename, *path, sizeof filename);
+		if (len >= sizeof filename) {
+			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+			RETURNN(-1);
+		}
 		if (filename[len - 1] == '/') {
 			len = strlcat(filename, service, sizeof filename);
 			if (len >= sizeof filename) {
@@ -402,6 +424,9 @@ openpam_load_chain(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 		}
 		ret = openpam_load_file(pamh, service, facility,
 		    filename, style);
+		/* success */
+		if (ret > 0)
+			RETURNN(ret);
 		/* the file exists, but an error occurred */
 		if (ret == -1 && errno != ENOENT)
 			RETURNN(ret);
@@ -411,7 +436,8 @@ openpam_load_chain(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 	}
 
 	/* no hit */
-	RETURNN(0);
+	errno = ENOENT;
+	RETURNN(-1);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -432,13 +458,17 @@ openpam_configure(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 		openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "invalid service name");
 		RETURNC(PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
 	}
-	if (openpam_load_chain(pamh, service, PAM_FACILITY_ANY) < 0)
-		goto load_err;
+	if (openpam_load_chain(pamh, service, PAM_FACILITY_ANY) < 0) {
+		if (errno != ENOENT)
+			goto load_err;
+	}
 	for (fclt = 0; fclt < PAM_NUM_FACILITIES; ++fclt) {
 		if (pamh->chains[fclt] != NULL)
 			continue;
-		if (openpam_load_chain(pamh, PAM_OTHER, fclt) < 0)
-			goto load_err;
+		if (OPENPAM_FEATURE(FALLBACK_TO_OTHER)) {
+			if (openpam_load_chain(pamh, PAM_OTHER, fclt) < 0)
+				goto load_err;
+		}
 	}
 	RETURNC(PAM_SUCCESS);
 load_err:

lib/libpam/openpam_constants.c

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*-
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2017 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
@@ -44,86 +42,126 @@
 #include "openpam_impl.h"
 
 const char *pam_err_name[PAM_NUM_ERRORS] = {
-	"PAM_SUCCESS",
-	"PAM_OPEN_ERR",
-	"PAM_SYMBOL_ERR",
-	"PAM_SERVICE_ERR",
-	"PAM_SYSTEM_ERR",
-	"PAM_BUF_ERR",
-	"PAM_CONV_ERR",
-	"PAM_PERM_DENIED",
-	"PAM_MAXTRIES",
-	"PAM_AUTH_ERR",
-	"PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD",
-	"PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT",
-	"PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL",
-	"PAM_USER_UNKNOWN",
-	"PAM_CRED_UNAVAIL",
-	"PAM_CRED_EXPIRED",
-	"PAM_CRED_ERR",
-	"PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED",
-	"PAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED",
-	"PAM_SESSION_ERR",
-	"PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR",
-	"PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVERY_ERR",
-	"PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY",
-	"PAM_AUTHTOK_DISABLE_AGING",
-	"PAM_NO_MODULE_DATA",
-	"PAM_IGNORE",
-	"PAM_ABORT",
-	"PAM_TRY_AGAIN",
-	"PAM_MODULE_UNKNOWN",
-	"PAM_DOMAIN_UNKNOWN"
+	[PAM_SUCCESS]			 = "PAM_SUCCESS",
+	[PAM_OPEN_ERR]			 = "PAM_OPEN_ERR",
+	[PAM_SYMBOL_ERR]		 = "PAM_SYMBOL_ERR",
+	[PAM_SERVICE_ERR]		 = "PAM_SERVICE_ERR",
+	[PAM_SYSTEM_ERR]		 = "PAM_SYSTEM_ERR",
+	[PAM_BUF_ERR]			 = "PAM_BUF_ERR",
+	[PAM_CONV_ERR]			 = "PAM_CONV_ERR",
+	[PAM_PERM_DENIED]		 = "PAM_PERM_DENIED",
+	[PAM_MAXTRIES]			 = "PAM_MAXTRIES",
+	[PAM_AUTH_ERR]			 = "PAM_AUTH_ERR",
+	[PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD]		 = "PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD",
+	[PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT]		 = "PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT",
+	[PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL]		 = "PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL",
+	[PAM_USER_UNKNOWN]		 = "PAM_USER_UNKNOWN",
+	[PAM_CRED_UNAVAIL]		 = "PAM_CRED_UNAVAIL",
+	[PAM_CRED_EXPIRED]		 = "PAM_CRED_EXPIRED",
+	[PAM_CRED_ERR]			 = "PAM_CRED_ERR",
+	[PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED]		 = "PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED",
+	[PAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED]		 = "PAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED",
+	[PAM_SESSION_ERR]		 = "PAM_SESSION_ERR",
+	[PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR]		 = "PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR",
+	[PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVERY_ERR]	 = "PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVERY_ERR",
+	[PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY]		 = "PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY",
+	[PAM_AUTHTOK_DISABLE_AGING]	 = "PAM_AUTHTOK_DISABLE_AGING",
+	[PAM_NO_MODULE_DATA]		 = "PAM_NO_MODULE_DATA",
+	[PAM_IGNORE]			 = "PAM_IGNORE",
+	[PAM_ABORT]			 = "PAM_ABORT",
+	[PAM_TRY_AGAIN]			 = "PAM_TRY_AGAIN",
+	[PAM_MODULE_UNKNOWN]		 = "PAM_MODULE_UNKNOWN",
+	[PAM_DOMAIN_UNKNOWN]		 = "PAM_DOMAIN_UNKNOWN",
+	[PAM_BAD_HANDLE]		 = "PAM_BAD_HANDLE",
+	[PAM_BAD_ITEM]			 = "PAM_BAD_ITEM",
+	[PAM_BAD_FEATURE]		 = "PAM_BAD_FEATURE",
+	[PAM_BAD_CONSTANT]		 = "PAM_BAD_CONSTANT",
+};
+
+const char *pam_err_text[PAM_NUM_ERRORS] = {
+	[PAM_SUCCESS]			 = "Success",
+	[PAM_OPEN_ERR]			 = "Failed to load module",
+	[PAM_SYMBOL_ERR]		 = "Invalid symbol",
+	[PAM_SERVICE_ERR]		 = "Error in service module",
+	[PAM_SYSTEM_ERR]		 = "System error",
+	[PAM_BUF_ERR]			 = "Memory buffer error",
+	[PAM_CONV_ERR]			 = "Conversation failure",
+	[PAM_PERM_DENIED]		 = "Permission denied",
+	[PAM_MAXTRIES]			 = "Maximum number of tries exceeded",
+	[PAM_AUTH_ERR]			 = "Authentication error",
+	[PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD]		 = "New authentication token required",
+	[PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT]		 = "Insufficient credentials",
+	[PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL]		 = "Authentication information is unavailable",
+	[PAM_USER_UNKNOWN]		 = "Unknown user",
+	[PAM_CRED_UNAVAIL]		 = "Failed to retrieve user credentials",
+	[PAM_CRED_EXPIRED]		 = "User credentials have expired",
+	[PAM_CRED_ERR]			 = "Failed to set user credentials",
+	[PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED]		 = "User account has expired",
+	[PAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED]		 = "Password has expired",
+	[PAM_SESSION_ERR]		 = "Session failure",
+	[PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR]		 = "Authentication token failure",
+	[PAM_AUTHTOK_RECOVERY_ERR]	 = "Failed to recover old authentication token",
+	[PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY]		 = "Authentication token lock busy",
+	[PAM_AUTHTOK_DISABLE_AGING]	 = "Authentication token aging disabled",
+	[PAM_NO_MODULE_DATA]		 = "Module data not found",
+	[PAM_IGNORE]			 = "Ignore this module",
+	[PAM_ABORT]			 = "General failure",
+	[PAM_TRY_AGAIN]			 = "Try again",
+	[PAM_MODULE_UNKNOWN]		 = "Unknown module type",
+	[PAM_DOMAIN_UNKNOWN]		 = "Unknown authentication domain",
+	[PAM_BAD_HANDLE]		 = "Invalid PAM handle",
+	[PAM_BAD_ITEM]			 = "Unrecognized or restricted item",
+	[PAM_BAD_FEATURE]		 = "Unrecognized or restricted feature",
+	[PAM_BAD_CONSTANT]		 = "Invalid constant",
 };
 
 const char *pam_item_name[PAM_NUM_ITEMS] = {
-	"(NO ITEM)",
-	"PAM_SERVICE",
-	"PAM_USER",
-	"PAM_TTY",
-	"PAM_RHOST",
-	"PAM_CONV",
-	"PAM_AUTHTOK",
-	"PAM_OLDAUTHTOK",
-	"PAM_RUSER",
-	"PAM_USER_PROMPT",
-	"PAM_REPOSITORY",
-	"PAM_AUTHTOK_PROMPT",
-	"PAM_OLDAUTHTOK_PROMPT",
-	"PAM_HOST",
+	[PAM_SERVICE]		 = "PAM_SERVICE",
+	[PAM_USER]		 = "PAM_USER",
+	[PAM_TTY]		 = "PAM_TTY",
+	[PAM_RHOST]		 = "PAM_RHOST",
+	[PAM_CONV]		 = "PAM_CONV",
+	[PAM_AUTHTOK]		 = "PAM_AUTHTOK",
+	[PAM_OLDAUTHTOK]	 = "PAM_OLDAUTHTOK",
+	[PAM_RUSER]		 = "PAM_RUSER",
+	[PAM_USER_PROMPT]	 = "PAM_USER_PROMPT",
+	[PAM_REPOSITORY]	 = "PAM_REPOSITORY",
+	[PAM_AUTHTOK_PROMPT]	 = "PAM_AUTHTOK_PROMPT",
+	[PAM_OLDAUTHTOK_PROMPT]	 = "PAM_OLDAUTHTOK_PROMPT",
+	[PAM_HOST]		 = "PAM_HOST",
 };
 
 const char *pam_facility_name[PAM_NUM_FACILITIES] = {
-	[PAM_ACCOUNT]		= "account",
-	[PAM_AUTH]		= "auth",
-	[PAM_PASSWORD]		= "password",
-	[PAM_SESSION]		= "session",
+	[PAM_ACCOUNT]		 = "account",
+	[PAM_AUTH]		 = "auth",
+	[PAM_PASSWORD]		 = "password",
+	[PAM_SESSION]		 = "session",
 };
 
 const char *pam_control_flag_name[PAM_NUM_CONTROL_FLAGS] = {
-	[PAM_BINDING]		= "binding",
-	[PAM_OPTIONAL]		= "optional",
-	[PAM_REQUIRED]		= "required",
-	[PAM_REQUISITE]		= "requisite",
-	[PAM_SUFFICIENT]	= "sufficient",
+	[PAM_BINDING]		 = "binding",
+	[PAM_OPTIONAL]		 = "optional",
+	[PAM_REQUIRED]		 = "required",
+	[PAM_REQUISITE]		 = "requisite",
+	[PAM_SUFFICIENT]	 = "sufficient",
 };
 
 const char *pam_func_name[PAM_NUM_PRIMITIVES] = {
-	"pam_authenticate",
-	"pam_setcred",
-	"pam_acct_mgmt",
-	"pam_open_session",
-	"pam_close_session",
-	"pam_chauthtok"
+	[PAM_SM_AUTHENTICATE]	 = "pam_authenticate",
+	[PAM_SM_SETCRED]	 = "pam_setcred",
+	[PAM_SM_ACCT_MGMT]	 = "pam_acct_mgmt",
+	[PAM_SM_OPEN_SESSION]	 = "pam_open_session",
+	[PAM_SM_CLOSE_SESSION]	 = "pam_close_session",
+	[PAM_SM_CHAUTHTOK]	 = "pam_chauthtok"
 };
 
 const char *pam_sm_func_name[PAM_NUM_PRIMITIVES] = {
-	"pam_sm_authenticate",
-	"pam_sm_setcred",
-	"pam_sm_acct_mgmt",
-	"pam_sm_open_session",
-	"pam_sm_close_session",
-	"pam_sm_chauthtok"
+	[PAM_SM_AUTHENTICATE]	 = "pam_sm_authenticate",
+	[PAM_SM_SETCRED]	 = "pam_sm_setcred",
+	[PAM_SM_ACCT_MGMT]	 = "pam_sm_acct_mgmt",
+	[PAM_SM_OPEN_SESSION]	 = "pam_sm_open_session",
+	[PAM_SM_CLOSE_SESSION]	 = "pam_sm_close_session",
+	[PAM_SM_CHAUTHTOK]	 = "pam_sm_chauthtok"
 };
 
 const char *openpam_policy_path[] = {

lib/libpam/openpam_constants.h

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*-
- * Copyright (c) 2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2011-2017 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -25,14 +25,13 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef OPENPAM_CONSTANTS_H_INCLUDED
 #define OPENPAM_CONSTANTS_H_INCLUDED
 
 extern const char *pam_err_name[PAM_NUM_ERRORS];
+extern const char *pam_err_text[PAM_NUM_ERRORS];
 extern const char *pam_item_name[PAM_NUM_ITEMS];
 extern const char *pam_facility_name[PAM_NUM_FACILITIES];
 extern const char *pam_control_flag_name[PAM_NUM_CONTROL_FLAGS];

lib/libpam/openpam_cred.h

@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef OPENPAM_CRED_H_INCLUDED

lib/libpam/openpam_ctype.h

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*-
- * Copyright (c) 2012 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2012-2014 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef OPENPAM_CTYPE_H_INCLUDED
@@ -38,11 +36,19 @@
 #define is_digit(ch)				\
 	(ch >= '0' && ch <= '9')
 
+/*
+ * Evaluates to non-zero if the argument is a hex digit.
+ */
+#define is_xdigit(ch)				\
+	((ch >= '0' && ch <= '9') ||		\
+	 (ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'f') ||		\
+	 (ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'F'))
+
 /*
  * Evaluates to non-zero if the argument is an uppercase letter.
  */
 #define is_upper(ch)				\
-	(ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'A')
+	(ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z')
 
 /*
  * Evaluates to non-zero if the argument is a lowercase letter.

lib/libpam/openpam_debug.h

@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef OPENPAM_DEBUG_H_INCLUDED

lib/libpam/openpam_dispatch.c

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*-
  * Copyright (c) 2002-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2017 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
@@ -41,6 +39,8 @@
 
 #include <sys/param.h>
 
+#include <stdint.h>
+
 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
 
 #include "openpam_impl.h"
@@ -63,12 +63,10 @@ openpam_dispatch(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 	int flags)
 {
 	pam_chain_t *chain;
-	int err, fail, r;
+	int err, fail, nsuccess, r;
 	int debug;
 
 	ENTER();
-	if (pamh == NULL)
-		RETURNC(PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
 
 	/* prevent recursion */
 	if (pamh->current != NULL) {
@@ -101,11 +99,13 @@ openpam_dispatch(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 	}
 
 	/* execute */
-	for (err = fail = 0; chain != NULL; chain = chain->next) {
+	err = PAM_SUCCESS;
+	fail = nsuccess = 0;
+	for (; chain != NULL; chain = chain->next) {
 		if (chain->module->func[primitive] == NULL) {
 			openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: no %s()",
 			    chain->module->path, pam_sm_func_name[primitive]);
-			r = PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
+			r = PAM_SYMBOL_ERR;
 		} else {
 			pamh->primitive = primitive;
 			pamh->current = chain;
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ openpam_dispatch(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 			openpam_log(PAM_LOG_LIBDEBUG, "calling %s() in %s",
 			    pam_sm_func_name[primitive], chain->module->path);
 			r = (chain->module->func[primitive])(pamh, flags,
-			    chain->optc, (const char **)chain->optv);
+			    chain->optc, (const char **)(intptr_t)chain->optv);
 			pamh->current = NULL;
 			openpam_log(PAM_LOG_LIBDEBUG, "%s: %s(): %s",
 			    chain->module->path, pam_sm_func_name[primitive],
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ openpam_dispatch(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 		if (r == PAM_IGNORE)
 			continue;
 		if (r == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			++nsuccess;
 			/*
 			 * For pam_setcred() and pam_chauthtok() with the
 			 * PAM_PRELIM_CHECK flag, treat "sufficient" as
@@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ openpam_dispatch(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 		 * fail.  If a required module fails, record the
 		 * return code from the first required module to fail.
 		 */
-		if (err == 0)
+		if (err == PAM_SUCCESS)
 			err = r;
 		if ((chain->flag == PAM_REQUIRED ||
 		    chain->flag == PAM_BINDING) && !fail) {
@@ -170,6 +171,18 @@ openpam_dispatch(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 
 	if (!fail && err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
 		err = PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+	/*
+	 * Require the chain to be non-empty, and at least one module
+	 * in the chain to be successful, so that we don't fail open.
+	 */
+	if (err == PAM_SUCCESS && nsuccess < 1) {
+		openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR,
+		    "all modules were unsuccessful for %s()",
+		    pam_sm_func_name[primitive]);
+		err = PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
+	}
+
 	RETURNC(err);
 }
 

lib/libpam/openpam_dlfunc.h

@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
+ *    permission.
  *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
@@ -22,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef OPENPAM_DLFCN_H_INCLUDED

lib/libpam/openpam_dynamic.c

@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

lib/libpam/openpam_features.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*-
- * Copyright (c) 2012 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2012-2015 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
@@ -65,4 +63,9 @@ struct openpam_feature openpam_features[OPENPAM_NUM_FEATURES] = {
 	    "Verify ownership and permissions of module files",
 	    1
 	),
+	STRUCT_OPENPAM_FEATURE(
+	    FALLBACK_TO_OTHER,
+	    "Fall back to \"other\" policy for empty chains",
+	    1
+	),
 };

lib/libpam/openpam_features.h

@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef OPENPAM_FEATURES_H_INCLUDED

lib/libpam/openpam_findenv.c

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*-
  * Copyright (c) 2002-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2017 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
@@ -31,14 +31,13 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
 # include "config.h"
 #endif
 
+#include <errno.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
@@ -59,12 +58,11 @@ openpam_findenv(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 	int i;
 
 	ENTER();
-	if (pamh == NULL)
-		RETURNN(-1);
 	for (i = 0; i < pamh->env_count; ++i)
 		if (strncmp(pamh->env[i], name, len) == 0 &&
 		    pamh->env[i][len] == '=')
 			RETURNN(i);
+	errno = ENOENT;
 	RETURNN(-1);
 }
 

lib/libpam/openpam_free_data.c

@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

lib/libpam/openpam_free_envlist.c

@@ -23,8 +23,6 @@
  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

lib/libpam/openpam_get_feature.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*-
- * Copyright (c) 2012 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2012-2017 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
@@ -50,7 +48,7 @@ openpam_get_feature(int feature, int *onoff)
 
 	ENTERF(feature);
 	if (feature < 0 || feature >= OPENPAM_NUM_FEATURES)
-		RETURNC(PAM_SYMBOL_ERR);
+		RETURNC(PAM_BAD_FEATURE);
 	*onoff = openpam_features[feature].onoff;
 	RETURNC(PAM_SUCCESS);
 }
@@ -58,7 +56,7 @@ openpam_get_feature(int feature, int *onoff)
 /*
  * Error codes:
  *
- *	PAM_SYMBOL_ERR
+ *	PAM_BAD_FEATURE
  */
 
 /**

lib/libpam/openpam_get_option.c

@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

lib/libpam/openpam_impl.h

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*-
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2017 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef OPENPAM_IMPL_H_INCLUDED
@@ -130,19 +128,28 @@ struct pam_handle {
 /*
  * Internal functions
  */
-int		 openpam_configure(pam_handle_t *, const char *);
-int		 openpam_dispatch(pam_handle_t *, int, int);
-int		 openpam_findenv(pam_handle_t *, const char *, size_t);
-pam_module_t	*openpam_load_module(const char *);
-void		 openpam_clear_chains(pam_chain_t **);
+int		 openpam_configure(pam_handle_t *, const char *)
+	OPENPAM_NONNULL((1));
+int		 openpam_dispatch(pam_handle_t *, int, int)
+	OPENPAM_NONNULL((1));
+int		 openpam_findenv(pam_handle_t *, const char *, size_t)
+	OPENPAM_NONNULL((1,2));
+pam_module_t	*openpam_load_module(const char *)
+	OPENPAM_NONNULL((1));
+void		 openpam_clear_chains(pam_chain_t **)
+	OPENPAM_NONNULL((1));
 
-int		 openpam_check_desc_owner_perms(const char *, int);
-int		 openpam_check_path_owner_perms(const char *);
+int		 openpam_check_desc_owner_perms(const char *, int)
+	OPENPAM_NONNULL((1));
+int		 openpam_check_path_owner_perms(const char *)
+	OPENPAM_NONNULL((1));
 
 #ifdef OPENPAM_STATIC_MODULES
-pam_module_t	*openpam_static(const char *);
+pam_module_t	*openpam_static(const char *)
+	OPENPAM_NONNULL((1));
 #endif
-pam_module_t	*openpam_dynamic(const char *);
+pam_module_t	*openpam_dynamic(const char *)
+	OPENPAM_NONNULL((1));
 
 #define	FREE(p)					\
 	do {					\
@@ -152,11 +159,11 @@ pam_module_t	*openpam_dynamic(const char *);
 
 #define FREEV(c, v)				\
 	do {					\
-		while (c) {			\
-			--(c);			\
-			FREE((v)[(c)]);		\
+		if ((v) != NULL) {		\
+			while ((c)-- > 0)	\
+				FREE((v)[(c)]);	\
+			FREE(v);		\
 		}				\
-		FREE(v);			\
 	} while (0)
 
 #include "openpam_constants.h"

lib/libpam/openpam_load.c

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*-
  * Copyright (c) 2002-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2013 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
@@ -84,6 +82,7 @@ openpam_load_module(const char *modulename)
 static void
 openpam_release_module(pam_module_t *module)
 {
+
 	if (module == NULL)
 		return;
 	if (module->dlh == NULL)
@@ -104,6 +103,7 @@ openpam_release_module(pam_module_t *module)
 static void
 openpam_destroy_chain(pam_chain_t *chain)
 {
+
 	if (chain == NULL)
 		return;
 	openpam_destroy_chain(chain->next);

lib/libpam/openpam_log.c

@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

lib/libpam/openpam_nullconv.c

@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

lib/libpam/openpam_readline.c

@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

lib/libpam/openpam_readlinev.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*-
- * Copyright (c) 2012 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2012-2016 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
@@ -59,7 +57,6 @@ openpam_readlinev(FILE *f, int *lineno, int *lenp)
 	wordvsize = MIN_WORDV_SIZE;
 	wordvlen = 0;
 	if ((wordv = malloc(wordvsize * sizeof *wordv)) == NULL) {
-		openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "malloc(): %m");
 		errno = ENOMEM;
 		return (NULL);
 	}
@@ -70,7 +67,6 @@ openpam_readlinev(FILE *f, int *lineno, int *lenp)
 			wordvsize *= 2;
 			tmp = realloc(wordv, wordvsize * sizeof *wordv);
 			if (tmp == NULL) {
-				openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "malloc(): %m");
 				errno = ENOMEM;
 				break;
 			}
@@ -79,6 +75,7 @@ openpam_readlinev(FILE *f, int *lineno, int *lenp)
 		/* insert our word */
 		wordv[wordvlen++] = word;
 		wordv[wordvlen] = NULL;
+		word = NULL;
 	}
 	if (errno != 0) {
 		/* I/O error or out of memory */
@@ -86,6 +83,7 @@ openpam_readlinev(FILE *f, int *lineno, int *lenp)
 		while (wordvlen--)
 			free(wordv[wordvlen]);
 		free(wordv);
+		free(word);
 		errno = serrno;
 		return (NULL);
 	}

lib/libpam/openpam_readword.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*-
- * Copyright (c) 2012 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2012-2017 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
@@ -55,18 +53,35 @@ openpam_readword(FILE *f, int *lineno, size_t *lenp)
 {
 	char *word;
 	size_t size, len;
-	int ch, comment, escape, quote;
+	int ch, escape, quote;
 	int serrno;
 
 	errno = 0;
 
 	/* skip initial whitespace */
-	comment = 0;
-	while ((ch = getc(f)) != EOF && ch != '\n') {
-		if (ch == '#')
-			comment = 1;
-		if (!is_lws(ch) && !comment)
+	escape = quote = 0;
+	while ((ch = getc(f)) != EOF) {
+		if (ch == '\n') {
+			/* either EOL or line continuation */
+			if (!escape)
+				break;
+			if (lineno != NULL)
+				++*lineno;
+			escape = 0;
+		} else if (escape) {
+			/* escaped something else */
 			break;
+		} else if (ch == '#') {
+			/* comment: until EOL, no continuation */
+			while ((ch = getc(f)) != EOF)
+				if (ch == '\n')
+					break;
+			break;
+		} else if (ch == '\\') {
+			escape = 1;
+		} else if (!is_ws(ch)) {
+			break;
+		}
 	}
 	if (ch == EOF)
 		return (NULL);
@@ -76,7 +91,6 @@ openpam_readword(FILE *f, int *lineno, size_t *lenp)
 
 	word = NULL;
 	size = len = 0;
-	escape = quote = 0;
 	while ((ch = fgetc(f)) != EOF && (!is_ws(ch) || quote || escape)) {
 		if (ch == '\\' && !escape && quote != '\'') {
 			/* escape next character */
@@ -90,7 +104,7 @@ openpam_readword(FILE *f, int *lineno, size_t *lenp)
 		} else if (ch == quote && !escape) {
 			/* end quote */
 			quote = 0;
-		} else if (ch == '\n' && escape && quote != '\'') {
+		} else if (ch == '\n' && escape) {
 			/* line continuation */
 			escape = 0;
 		} else {
@@ -118,7 +132,6 @@ openpam_readword(FILE *f, int *lineno, size_t *lenp)
 	}
 	if (ch == EOF && (escape || quote)) {
 		/* Missing escaped character or closing quote. */
-		openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "unexpected end of file");
 		free(word);
 		errno = EINVAL;
 		return (NULL);

lib/libpam/openpam_restore_cred.c

@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

lib/libpam/openpam_set_feature.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*-
- * Copyright (c) 2012 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2012-2017 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
@@ -50,7 +48,7 @@ openpam_set_feature(int feature, int onoff)
 
 	ENTERF(feature);
 	if (feature < 0 || feature >= OPENPAM_NUM_FEATURES)
-		RETURNC(PAM_SYMBOL_ERR);
+		RETURNC(PAM_BAD_FEATURE);
 	openpam_features[feature].onoff = onoff;
 	RETURNC(PAM_SUCCESS);
 }
@@ -58,7 +56,7 @@ openpam_set_feature(int feature, int onoff)
 /*
  * Error codes:
  *
- *	PAM_SYMBOL_ERR
+ *	PAM_BAD_FEATURE
  */
 
 /**

lib/libpam/openpam_set_option.c

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*-
  * Copyright (c) 2002-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2023 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
@@ -85,6 +83,7 @@ openpam_set_option(pam_handle_t *pamh,
 		for (free(cur->optv[i]); i < cur->optc; ++i)
 			cur->optv[i] = cur->optv[i + 1];
 		cur->optv[i] = NULL;
+		--cur->optc;
 		RETURNC(PAM_SUCCESS);
 	}
 	if (asprintf(&opt, "%.*s=%s", (int)len, option, value) < 0)

lib/libpam/openpam_static.c

@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

lib/libpam/openpam_straddch.c

@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
@@ -58,7 +56,6 @@ openpam_straddch(char **str, size_t *size, size_t *len, int ch)
 		/* initial allocation */
 		tmpsize = MIN_STR_SIZE;
 		if ((tmpstr = malloc(tmpsize)) == NULL) {
-			openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "malloc(): %m");
 			errno = ENOMEM;
 			return (-1);
 		}
@@ -69,7 +66,6 @@ openpam_straddch(char **str, size_t *size, size_t *len, int ch)
 		/* additional space required */
 		tmpsize = *size * 2;
 		if ((tmpstr = realloc(*str, tmpsize)) == NULL) {
-			openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "realloc(): %m");
 			errno = ENOMEM;
 			return (-1);
 		}

lib/libpam/openpam_strlcat.c

@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

lib/libpam/openpam_strlcat.h

@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef OPENPAM_STRLCAT_H_INCLUDED

lib/libpam/openpam_strlcmp.h

@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef OPENPAM_STRLCMP_H_INCLUDED

lib/libpam/openpam_strlcpy.c

@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H

lib/libpam/openpam_strlcpy.h

@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
 #ifndef OPENPAM_STRLCPY_H_INCLUDED

lib/libpam/openpam_strlset.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*-
- * Copyright (c) 2012-2013 Universitetet i Oslo
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -25,38 +25,32 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
-#ifndef OATH_TYPES_H_INCLUDED
-#define OATH_TYPES_H_INCLUDED
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+# include "config.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLSET
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include "openpam_strlset.h"
 
 /*
- * OATH key and associated parameters
+ * like memset(3), but stops at the first NUL byte and NUL-terminates the
+ * result.  Returns the number of bytes that were written, not including
+ * the terminating NUL.
  */
-struct oath_key {
-	/* mode and parameters */
-	enum oath_mode	 mode;
-	unsigned int	 digits;
-	uint64_t	 counter;
-	unsigned int	 timestep; /* in seconds */
-	uint64_t	 lastuse;
+size_t
+openpam_strlset(char *str, int ch, size_t size)
+{
+	size_t len;
 
-	/* housekeeping */
-	unsigned int	 mapped:1;
-	unsigned int	 locked:1;
-
-	/* hash algorithm */
-	enum oath_hash	 hash;
-
-	/* label */
-	size_t		 labellen; /* bytes incl. NUL */
-	char		 label[OATH_MAX_LABELLEN];
-
-	/* key */
-	size_t		 keylen; /* bytes */
-	uint8_t		 key[OATH_MAX_KEYLEN];
-};
+	for (len = 0; *str && size > 1; ++len, --size)
+		*str++ = ch;
+	*str = '\0';
+	return (++len);
+}
 
 #endif

lib/libpam/openpam_strlset.h

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*-
- * Copyright (c) 2012-2013 Universitetet i Oslo
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -25,18 +25,15 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * $Id$
  */
 
-#ifndef OATH_IMPL_H_INCLUDED
-#define OATH_IMPL_H_INCLUDED
+#ifndef OPENPAM_STRLSET_H_INCLUDED
+#define OPENPAM_STRLSET_H_INCLUDED
 
-/*
- * Dummy key parameters
- */
-#define OATH_DUMMY_LABEL	("oath-dummy-key")
-#define OATH_DUMMY_LABELLEN	(sizeof DUMMY_LABEL)
-#define OATH_DUMMY_KEYLEN	80
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLSET
+size_t openpam_strlset(char *, int, size_t);
+#undef strlset
+#define strlset(arg, ...) openpam_strlset(arg, __VA_ARGS__)
+#endif
 
 #endif